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ABSTRACT0FTHESIS 
In 1961, Egypt's major industries were taken into public ownership. 
This was accompanied by the enactment of a series of Laws which provided 
workers with guaranteed wages, protection against dismissal, and a 
package of other benefits. Bureaucratization took over and public 
enterprise was brought under the operational sphere of the Civil 
Service. 
The present study considers the impact of Arab socialism on the 
effectiveness of rewards and sanctions as a'means of control of workers 
in a state textile enterprise in Egypt. This involved an interview 
survey of a sample of workers and management to investigate the 
workers' orientation to work and the company's human resources development 
policies. The study was particularly concerned with the payment system, 
promotion, performance appraisal and discipline. 
The findings reveal that the workers are instrumentally oriented, and 
that years of employment experience is the most important variable in 
wages d9termination. Prospect of promotion has little effect on workers 
because the chances of promotion in the company are limited and also 
there are wide overlaps in the wages and salary structure. Workers, 
and management' responses indicate that performance appraisal neither 
reflects workers' performance nor their behaviour. Disciplinary 
sanctions are not effective because of the protection provided to the 
workers by socialist laws, and also because the company suffers from 
shortages of labour. The workers respond to labour control mechanisms 
in the company in different ways. Four 'typical' responses were 
revealed in the study: stayers with no second job, stayers with a 
iii. 
second job, workers planning to'quit and victims of the system. 
A final part seeks to link control of workers in public enterprise 
with the situation in the society at large, comparing the Egyptian 
case with some other developing countries. Finally, two proposals 
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PARTI 
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
2 
Part I is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 deals with the evolution 
of the public sector in Egypt, with particular reference to the 
bureaucratic mode used to control public'enterprise. Chapters 2 and 3 
develop the theoretical orientation of the study. In Chapter 2 we 
consider the means of Labour control at work in order to plan our model. 
The model is taken up to establishýthe hypotheses of the study in chapter 
3. Chapter 4 sets out the general background for the study'setting, 
It demonstrates the relative importance of the textile industry in 
Egypt, and the company which is the subject of the present study. 
3 
CHAPTER0NE 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLBLIC SECTOR IN EGYPT AND THE PROBLEM OF THE STUDY 
The year 1961 could be considered a major turning point in Egypt. It 
witnessed the largest nationalisation movement ever experienced in the 
country. According to O'Brien 865 companies were under state control 
(1) 
in 1963 . The nationalised companies were grouped into 38 sectors 
according to the type of activity, and 38 Public Organisations were 
established to undertake the function of supervision. 
The National Charter issued in 1962 stated that: 
"the socialist solution to the problems of economic and 
social underdevelopment in Egypt .... was never a question 
of free choice" (2) 
The Charter pointed out that Egyptian capitalists were 'incapable of 
shouldering the responsibility of nationalist aspirations' 
(3) 
, and 
because of that the only way was the 'creation of a capable public sector 
that would lead progress in all domains and bear the main responsibility 
(4) 
of the development plan' 
However, Aziz Sidqi, the minister of industry at the time of nationalisation 
decisions in 1961, said that the reasons for these decisions are unclear. 
And he added that: 
"Before the decreest his Ministry issued an inventory of all 
Egyptian industries called the Dalil as-Sinalat. In I-lay 
1961 Nasser had a luncheon at Malmura in Alexandria, and he 
kept Sidqi after the others had gone. They went to his 
office where Sidqi saw on his desktop a copy of the Dalil. 
4 
Nasser then asked how could the state plan anything if 
the industrial sector was under the control-oflindividualsl* 
Sidqi saw that Nasser had marked various companies with a 
lead pencil and that was that. " (5) 
Cooper suggests that the reason behind the wholesale nationalisation 
and adoption of 'Arab Socialism' was to use the state as a means of 
getting political support. He states that: 
"The military coup d'6tat which toppled the monarchy in 
September 1952 was staged by a small group of junior 
officers who ..... lacked a political programme and a 
political organisation ..... Unable to create a political 
Organisation of its own, the regime used the state to clair. 1 
an extremely broad constituency" (6) 
Waterbury also argues that the, nationalisation policy was not 'primarily 
motivated, by economic factors', but-was rather to eliminate the economic 
base of the groups who-could, have:, possibly challenged the regime 
(7) 
0 
Vatikiotis agrees with both Cooper and Waterbury since, he states that: 
"The 'socialist solution' ... was more of a necessity 
Of Power for the regime than a genuine idelogical 
commitment to socialism" (8). 
Dekmejian proposes that leaders who depend on charismatic-, authority 
are, likely-to institutionalise that authority. This usually occurs 
as they consecrate institutions and the process of social existence. 
(9) 
Thus authority is routinised and bureaucratisation takes over 
The emerging public sector as the main economic power in the country was 
(10) 
one of these institutions -. 
Workers and employees of nationalised 
5 
enterprises became dependent on the state. -At the same time, O'Brien 
points out that nationalisatio'n"created a new class of burieucrats who 
replaced capitalists with regard to the privileges they had before 
0. 
Cooper suggests that, since this class of burfýcrats were gaining benefits 
from the state control of the economy, 
(12) 
the regime 
they also became committed to 
As a part of transformation, - Law No 114 for 1961: entitled workers and 
employees to send one representative each to the boards of directors of 
all public enterprises. Laws 111 and 112 of 1961 entitled workers and employees 
to a quarter of the profits available for distribution to shareholders. 
In 1964, the regime provided an extensive and generous system of social 
security for all workers. Social insurance Law No 63 ofI1964 stated that 
the state will guarantee fair treatment to all workers bY means. of_ limiting 
working hours, guaranteed wages, social insurance, health insurance, and 
the right to rest and vacations. Mabro and Radwan pointed out that the 
wages of' workers in industry rose by 32 per cent between the years 1962 
and 1964, 'a larger increase in twenty-four months than in the previous 
ten years' 
WithýArab socialism., market mechanisms were'replaced by central planning. 
Profits are neither used to reward managers nor'to keep enterprise in 
business. Public enterprise managers receive'fixed salaries irrespective 
of the performance of their enterprises. Also, managements have to 
prepare various reports to different controlling bodies, such as the 
Central Agency-'for Audit. 'Managements have to abide by public sector 
Labour Law. For example, they-cannot get rid of redundant labour, 
and workers are granted guaranteed wages unrelated to performance. 
(14) 
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1vioreover, prices of inputs and outputs are controlled, but enterprises 
receive subsidies for controlled prices which are 
below production costs. For example, the subsidy for $popular cloth' 
was EE46 million in 1979 and EE55.1 million in 1980 
(15) 
& 
The problems of public enterprise in Egypt bI ecame clear in the'late 
sixties and talks about the need for reform began at that time 
(16) 
0 
However, no real decision was taken to rid Public enterprise of its problems. 
According to Dekmejian the reason was that Nasser felt that the reform; 
"would have required a new round of tax and price increases, 
further exacerbating domestic discontent" (17) 
0. 
At the same time, experience revealed that the bureycratisation of 
public enterprise is a major reason for its problems. There has been 
a tendency to emphasise centralised decision making, management by 
(18) 
extensive procedures, and undue red tape Crozier defines a 
bureaucratic organisation as: 
"an organisation that cannot correct its behaviour by 
learning from its errors". (19) 
This usually occurs in centralised structures where one way communication, 
top-down, is found, rather'than a two-way communication system. In such 
structures even the information which is sometimes provided by Lower 
to higher levels may not be accurate. Farber, for example, says that: 
"under the conditions of complete political monopoly by the 
one-party state, authentic feedback, truthful information, 
and independent initiatives from below, are rare, if not 
altogether eliminated. In this situation, there usually 
develops an institutionalised tendency for subordinates 
7 
to tell their superiors what they want to hearg rather 
than the often unpleasant truth" (20). 
v 
After the'death of President Nasser, the new leadership made it clear 
(21) 
that reorientation of the economy was required They decided to 
open tH-6 door for foreign investment, and Law 43 was passed in 1974 
concerning the investment of Arab and foreign funds and free zones. This 
signaled Egyptian Leaders' desire to follow an approach which relies more 
on market mechanisms. Bruton states that one of the major reasons for 
deciding to abandon the physical planning approach is that 'the talent 
required to make such an approach effectIve simply could not be found' 
(22). 
In 1975, it was decidedýto reorganise the public sector by Law 111 for 
1975. Higher Sectoral Councils headed by the appropriate minister 
replaced Public Organisations, All the chairmen of the companies within 
the sector, three members with technical, administrative and legal expertise, 
and a representative of the Ministries, of Finance', Planning, and Economy 
are members. The Law-defines'the responsibilities of these Higher 
Sectoral Councils as, follows: (1) setting the overall objectives of 
the sector, (2) coordinating the plans and general policies of the member 
companies in the sector, (3) coordinating the investment project in 
accordance with the national plan,, and (4)'following up on the achievement 
of the sector objectives. Despite this change, one recent analysis 
(23) 
concluded that the problems of public enterprise are still unresolve 
In 1982 the UNDP/ILO Mission reported that: 
8 
"From the point of 'view of productive efficiency, the public 
enterprise have, given the constraints under which they 
operate, performed quite well during the past decade and there 
is nothing to indicate that public ownership per se should 
be an obstacle to efficiency. The public enterprise need badly, 
however, to be freed from bureaucratic strait-jackets and 
given full flexibility to perform their main objective, namely 
producing goods and services under decent conditions of work 
for their employees" (24). 
Withregard to pI ublic enterprise labour law, ' nothing much has changed. 
Under ýaw No 48 for 1978 management have only freedom of hiring, but 
wages are still constrained by government intervention and workers 
continue'to guarantee their jobs and other benefits. Perhaps it'is 
risky to handle this matter - ie 'workers gains by socialist Laws, - 
for it may affect political stability. Another'reason for the difficulty 
of change is that, as noted before, a cadre of bureaucrats has been 
formed, especially since a large number of enterprises were brought 
under government control in 1961. And, because those bureaucrats have 
(25) interests in the continuation of the present structure , it is 
difficult to challenge it. Crozier, talking about the issue of 
resistence to change in a bureaucratic system when it is confronted 
with difficulties states that; 
"The resulting difficulties instead of imposing 
readjustment of the model, -are utilised by individuals 
and groups for improving their position ih the power 
struggle within the organisation, Thus a new pressure 
is granted for impersonality ancl centralisation, the 
only solution to the problem of personal privileges" (26). 
The bureaucratic structure in Egypt has become not only too strong to 
be challenged, but also in a position to help private and foreign 
investors. Waterbury, for example, points out that: 
9 
"By the middle 1970s the managerial bourgeoisie, with its 
administrative core, private sector allies, and foreign 
benefactors, had consolidated itself and, because of its 
partial control over the state, conferred legitimacy upon 
,, 
itself. It was out in the open, courzed by foreign business- 
men, praised for its perseverance under Nasserist socialism, 
and promised avanguard role in the development of Egypt's 
mixed economy" (27). 
After Sadat's assassination, Mubarak was elected as President of Egypt. 
The new leadership is faced with a great challenge. That is, to 
correct past mistakes and achieve development. Public sector-enterprise 
management is one of, or a reason fory Egypt's economic problems. In 
the present study we examine the impact of 'bureaucratic strait-jackets' 
on labour control at work. Mintzberg points out that a bureaucratic- 
0, (28) type organisation, "is a structure with-an, obsession, namely control" 
At the same time, Croziejr states that: 
"people have power over other people insofar as the 
Latter's behaviour is narrowly limited by rules whereas 
their own behaviour is not" (29). 
With regard to public enterprise in Egypt, the 'gains' granted to 
workers by socialist Laws and the process of bureaucratisation are 
expected to negatively affect public enterprise management power over 
workers. And this is what we consider in this study. In other words, 
the study furnishes an informative background for the assessment of the 
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CHAPTERTW0 
MEANS OF LABOUR CONTROL AT WORK: THE MODEL OF THE STUDY 
Undoubtedly, management have to use some mechanisms of control in order to 
transfermlabour power to labour. The importance of labour control stems from 
the fact that workers' interests are different from management interests 
Labour control is inevitable in capitalism in order that capitalists can 
achieve profits and ensure the process of accumulation of wealth. In 
socialist societies, on the other hand, labour control at work is also needed 
(2) because these societies use the mode of production of capitalism . In the 
two systems, capitalism and socialism, the equipment and the systrm of 
management are similar. For example, Lenin: 
"was clear that discipline, hierarchy and control were necessary 
in a socialist society" (3). 
Lenin, also, introduced Taylorism into Russian industry, because of its 
achievements in the United States at that time 
(4) 
. Furthermore, Hill points 
out that in both capitalism and socialism, the workers do not own the means 
of production and they do not know how the profits of their production are 
(5) 
distributed 
Two of the key workers in the field of control have offered two definitions 
which clarify the purpose of control. Tannenbaum defines control as: 
"any process in which a person or group of persons or 
organisation of persons determines, that is, intentionally 
affects, the behavior of another person, group, or organisation" 
Edwards defines control as: 
"the ability of capitalists and/or managers to obtain desired 
work behavior from workers. Such ability exists in greater 
or lesser degrees, depending upon the relative strength of 
workers and their bosses" (7). 
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The two definitions indicate three points. First, the purpose of control 
is to influence the behaviour of organisation members on the job. Second, 
control is an interpersonal process, for managers exercise control over 
workers who can respond in different ways as discussed below. Third, in both 
capitalism and socialism enterprise management conduct the function of 
labour control. But the significant difference between the two systems is 
that, in capitalism management conduct this function to meet'the interests 
of ownership in profits and accumulation, with minimal intervention from 
goverment. But in socialism, where political administration controls the 
economy, the relation between workers and management is controlled by rules 
underpinned by law. The rules may cover all aspects of this relation, 
including working hours, wages, insurance, pensions and all other benefits. 
This affects labour control in socialist societies in two ways: 
(1) enterprise management have less power over workers compared to enterprise 
management in capitalist societies, and (2) as a concomitant of (1) there is 
only limited scope for workers to satisfy their economic needs through an 
#effort bargain' 
(8) 
with management. Therefore, they may try to find 
additional means to satisfy their economic needs outside public enterprise. 
Different research workers have discussed different control devices. 
For example, Braverman talked about TaylOrian control, Edwards distinguished 
b etwýen technical control and bureaucratic control, and Friedman identified 
direct control and responsible autonomy. Our main concern here is not to 
(9) 
discuss these techniques for they are demonstrated-in detail in other places 
Rather, the means of control which could be used in a bureaucratic structure 
are the focus of attention. 
To start with, technical control is defined as a strategy which: 
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"involves designing machinery and planning the flow of 
work to minimise the problem of transforming labor 
power into labor as well as to minimise the purely 
physically based possibilities for achieving efficiencies"(10). 
but, as demonstrated in chapter 4, the textile industry is a man-machine 
system and not a continuous process, as are assembly lines. Hence, 
technical control is used as a partial means in addition to other means of 
control in the textile industry. Also, Thompson raised the point that, 
even in industries where technical control is supposed to be effective, 
such as car industry, other devices, such as payment systems, are used as 
an additional means of control 
(11) 
. 
With regard to payment systems as a means of labour control, Taylorism 
provided the first example. The solution offered by Taylorism is based on 
dividing the roles between workers and management. Management is responsible 
for prescribing what workers do, how to do it, and the needed time. 
Management has to use scientific methods, time and motion study, instead 
of guess-work, to set work standards and piece-rates so that workers can 
be rewarded for their productivity. This is what Braverman calls the 
'separation of conception from execution' 
(12) 
. 
Breverman argues that, when management acquire the knowledge about 
work processes which means 'the absence of such knowledge among workers' 
(13) 
this knowledge can be used to control workers. This analysis is criticised 
because it assumes that workers are passive, while they are an 'active and 
(14) 
problematic presence' . This analysis is also criticised because it 
does not recognise that there is no monopoly over knowledge. Even after 
is 
IIf-- 
management acquire the knowledge of production, skilled workers continue 
to have their knowledge. What they lose is 'the advantage of management 
ignorance'(15). Therefore, Taylorian type of- control alone does not solve 
the problem of labour control, for it does not counter workers' resistence. 
As demonstrated in chapter 3, workers can regulate their output even with 
the use of all the means provided by Taylor and his followers. 
According to Edwards, bureaucratic control developed because of the limits 
of Taylorian control, and the conflicts between workers and management 
(16) 
caused by the assembly lines Bureaucratic control occurs through: 
"the social and organisational structure of the firm and 
is built into job categories, work rules, promotion 
procedures, discipline, wage scales, definition of 
responsibilities and the like" (17). 
Storey, also pointed out that managers in 'bureaucratic modes (have) a 
range of control devices', which includes incentive systems, promotion, 
performance appraisal, and training 
(18) 
. Littler and Salaman stated 
that 
bureaucratic controls try to drive performance through a structure of 
(19) 
rewards and sanctions made clear in rules and regulations 
On the other hand, Friedman's 'responsible autonomy' strategy is based on: 
"allowing individual workers or groups of workers a wide 
measure of discretion over the direction of their work 
tasks and the maintenance of managerial authority by 
getting workers to identify with the competitive aims of 
the enterprise so that they will act 'responsibly' with 
a minimum of supervision" (20). 
This strategy is suitable for skilled workers 'who already have elements 
(21) 
of job control and discretion' . Thompson also stated that: 
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"what Friedman calls responsible autonomy was more often 
accommodation in different ways to shopfloor job controls" (22). 
Socialisation is another device which could be used to control workers, but 
(23) 
not at the point of production It is defined as: 
"the process by which a new member learns the value'system, the 
norms, and the required behaviour patterns of the society, 
organisation or group which he is entering" (24). 
The socialisation process can be carried out inside or outside the 
organisation. Salaman says that it is more the responsibility of each 
organisation to socialise its members, because this process is related to 
(25) 
the particular culture of the organisation . However, we should 
differentiate here between capitalist and socialist societies. Salaman's 
point of view is related to capitalist rather than socialist socieites. 
For in the latter the process of socialisation or indoctrination is 
usually conducted on a national basis by central organisations under the 
control of the party. In Egypt, for example j in the early sixties after 
the massive nationalisation decisions, this process was carried out by 
Youth Organisation and the Institute for Workers Indoctrination which 
was supervised by the General Labour Union. Workers were taught things 
such as the purpose of the public sector in Egypt, and workers' rights 
and responsibilities in Arab socialism. However, by the 1980s this process of 
ideological indoctrination has ceased. Egyptian workers today are not 
subjected to any form of political education. 
Regarding control devices available to public enterprise management in 
Egypt, there are some important points to be mentioned. First, the 
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effectiveness of technical control depends on the type of technology used in 
the enterprise. Therefore, in order to increase the effectiveness of this 
device management needs to be able to choose and/or develop the technology 
used in its enterprise. But in Egypt public enterprise management have 
limited authority in this regard. For, as noted in Chapter 1, investment 
decisions are controlled by central authorities. Moreover, these decisions 
depend on the availability of foreign exchange which is controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance. As there is no significant machine building sector in 
Egypt, the means of production are mostly imported. Therefore, at best, 
enterprise management's influence on choice of technology is indirect. 
Second, with respect to the use of participation in management as a 
means to enhance workers' effort, recent studies indicate that neither 
workers' participation in management nor profit sharing has been successful 
(26) in Egypt as presently constituted by law . Third, the socialisation 
process for Egyptian workers is supposed to be carried out both by 
central organisations, as noted before, and by each enterprise through its 
own training activities. However, a recent study conducted on the 
public manufacturing industry in Egypt revealed that training was not 
used effectively at enterprise level, and what limited training workers 
received was strictly technical in nature 
(27) 
. 
The concept of Isocio-technicall system, introduced by Trist, was used by 
Rice to improve workers' performance at the Ahmedabad Calico Mills in 
India in the fifties. This notion is based on reorganisation of work to 
satisfy both task and social needs 
(28) 
. Given limitations of time and 
resources it was considered to be more profitable to focus in the present 
study on the structure of rewards and sanctions, rather than the concept 
of 'socio-technical' system. This is for two reasons. First, reorganisation 
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of work only, without an effective system of incentives, is not expected 
to achieve substantial improvement in workers' performance. Second, 
it seemed probable that rewards and sanctions could be important means 





Since the structure of rewards and sanctions is established by public 
sector labour law, there is little room for management discretion. While 
public enterprise management have to meet production targets*determined 
by higher authorities, thqy have only a limited set of control devices 
available to them. This set is supposed to suit all enterprises irrespective 
of differences in activities and the nature of work. 
Neither workers nor management have much scope for 'effort barg ing' 
to increase the efficiency of the enterprise and satisfy workers needs. 
This study was conceived as an attempt to assess the way the production 
management of one very large public sector enterprise set about controlling 
the labour process usin4 predetermined labour policies, techniques and sanctions 
Specifically, we are concerned with exploring the effectiveness of the 
statutorily defined rewards and_sanctions system available to managers as 
motivation and control devices in the public sector textile industry in 
Egypt. In particular we examine the payment system, promotion, performance 
appraisal and discipline. 
In order to examine the effectiveness of these policies as means of labour 
motivation and control, we should also investigate workers' orientation to 
work and their perceptions of the policies. This is important because a 
control device is only effective in so far as it is subjectively perceived 
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as significant in its consequences to those over whom control is exercised. 
Fox, for example, points out that: 
"It thus seems reasonable to think in terms of high priority 
and low priority aspirations. The former are those which are 
actively, entertained and pursued. They are experienced as 
pressing and they appear realistic and within hope of realisation. 
They may well be the aspirations which attract a man to a 
Particular job, which cause*him to stay in it, and which 
constitute the predominant criteria by which he evaluates it. 
Low aspirations are less strongly held or seen unrealistic, 
or both" (30). 
Therefore, the study includes subjective and objective aspects. The 
subjective aspects include workers' orientation to work as perceived by 
workers and management, and workers and management perceptions of the policies 
covered in the study. The objective aspects include wages and salary 
structure and turnover rates. 
Figure 2/1 shows the schematic model underpinning the study. Our model 
includes three groups of variables: (1) independent variables, A and B, 
(2) intervening variables, C, D and E and (3) dependent variables, F, G 
and H. 
The independent variables include: 
Personal variables (A), which include: hometown, marital status, family 
responsibilities, education and length of service. These variables were 
selected because they are expected to affect workers orientation to work 
and their perceptions of management policies. Although some of these 
variabled may correlate, like age and marital status, we prefered to 
include them all in order to give more depth to the analysis. 
Societal variables (B), this group refers to the changes which occuiltd in 
the society at large but affect management policies on the one hand, and 
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workers orientation to work and their reactions to management policies on 
the other hand. Examples of these variables are: socialist laws, changes 
in the costs of living and changes in work opportunities. 
Workers' orientation to work (C), this variable refers to the priority of 
the needs which Egyptian workers try to satisfy when they engage in work 
activities. 
Management policies (D), this group includes human resources development 
policies which could be used as means of labour control at work. The policies 
covered in the present study are: payment system, promotion, performance 
appraisal and discipline. 
Workers' perceptions of management policies (E), this is a subjective 
variable which is affected by workers orientation to work and affects their 
reactions to management policies. 
The dependent variables include: 
Workers' behaviour at the workplace (F), 
Workers' propensity to have a second job (G), 
Workers' intent to leave and turnover (H). 
These variables determine the effectiveness of management policies as 
control devices. For workers subjectively assess the benefits they obtain 
from public enterprise, their needs, and alternative sources to satisfy 
their needs. And on the basis of this assessment they manage their 
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Therefore, the purpose of the study is as follows: 
First: To investigate workers' needs priority and present level of 
satisfaction, as perceived by workers and management. 
Second: (1) To investigate workers' perceptions of management policies. 
The policies covered in the study are: the payment system, 
promotion, performance appraisal, and discipline. 
(2) To investigate workers' intent to leave, and their propensity 
to have a second job. 
(3) To investigate management perceptions of the policies 
mentioned above. 
Third: To analyse the differences between workers and management perceptions 
of: 
(1) Workers' needs priority and present level of satisfaction. 
(2) The human resources development policies mentioned above. 
Fourth: To assess the effectiveness of existing human resources development 
policies as means of labour control in public enterprise. An 
agenda for reform? 
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CHAPT E"R THREE 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT POLICIES: THE HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY 
In this chapter we present a review of the literature on workers' 
orientation to work, and human resources development policies included 
in our model. The purpose of this review is, to develop the hypotheses 
which will be examined in the present study. Therefore, the discussion 
in this chapter is divided into the following sections: 
- Workers' orientation to work. 
- Payment systems. 
- Promotion. 
- Performance appraisal. 
- Discipline. 
Each section will end up with'some hypotheses. These hypotheses are 
examined in part II of the study. 
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kORKERS' ORIENTATION TO ! ýORK; 
Certainly people engage in work activities in order to attain specific 
rewards. Taylor considered money the only reward which workers seek in 
their jobs. He saw a direct relationship between the amount of money 
a worker can get, and the amount of effort he is willing to exert. 
(1) 
Argyle, approaching the subject from a different standpoint, argues that 
money is of greater or less importance to people in different occupations. 
But it acquires special meaning whenever people get little else out of 
(2) 
their jobs . This notion was supported further by McClelland who 
stated that: 
"People with relatively'low achievement motivation, on 
the other hand, will work haraer for increased financial 
rewards. It is not the task itself that interests them ..... 11(3)9 
The results of some studies revealed that pay was more important to 
w- orkers than other rewards'. Goldthorpe and his associates found that 
car workers were almost exclusively concerned with the amount of pay 
their-w - ork brought in 
(4) 
. A-stuay of process workers in automatea 
chemical plants in four different locations in Great Britain indicated 
(5) 
that worker's gave priority to high pay . Simonds and Orife found, 
on the basis of analysing workers' actual behaviour in real situations, 
that differences in pay were more important to workers than differences 
in job enrichment 
(6) 
. 
Mayo, on the other hand, raised the point that workers strive for 
more than money. His famous experiments that were the basis for the 
human relations school, led him to beiieve that self-esteem, recognition, 
and participation in management are just as important as financial 
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(7) 
rewards . Mayols'findings Were supported by a number of scholars. 
McGregor, for example, said that"management should deal with workers 
from theory Y's point of view in oraer to integrate the individual and 
W\ 
the organisation It is>ýhis sense that Brown stated that: 
"it must be rec I ognis I ed that men'work both in order to live and 
in order to feel useful, wanted, and to attain a social 
status" (9). 




There have also been some debates about the importance of'extrinsic and intrinsic 
rewards to workers. In a study conducted by Centers and Bugental, it 
was concluded that the value of content and context factors was a 
function of occupational level, that is, content factors were most valued 
at higher levels and context factors at lower levels 
(11). 
Locke and 
Whiting, with a nationwide sample in the'United States, provided support 
(12) 
for Centers and Bugental's results . On the other hand, in an analysis 
of some data from productivity bargaining, Daniel pointed out that 
the priority of rewards to workers depends on the context. He has shown 
how improving the pay packet is-demanded-In a bargaining 6ituation, 
while intrinsic satisfaction is stressed in the context of working under 
(13) 
the new agreement . Watson, also, stated that: 
"What is becoming clear is that to understand work 
behaviour we must recognise the importance of dynamic 
orientations and that, instead of relating work 
attitudes and behaviour in a direct way to either fixed 
psychological needs or technological constraints, we must 
recognise that individuals see things differently and act 
accordingly in different situations and at different times" (14). 
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There have been a number, of surveys conducted to determine the importance 
of job-related factors to workers. An early survey carried out by the 
Labor- Relations Institute of New York revealed that supervisors had 
(15) 
little idea about their employees' needs in jobs Another study 
indicated that there was a gap between workers' self-ranking of fourteen 
job related factors and management and union Leaders' perceptions of 
(16) 
the importance of the samefactors to workers In a more recent 
study, it was concluded that supervisors, assumed that workers place 
greater importance on pay and security than on personal growth and 
achievement 
To assess.. the, impact, of culture on need importance and need satisfaction, 
a study was conducted in, the, United States, and Mexico. The study 
revealed-that. -American workersl ranking of 
five neects was different 
from Mexican workers, and that: 
"The average Mexican worker goes to work primarily to 
provide his family with material needs" (18). 
Another study, conducted in India indicated that pay was considered 
(19) the most important factor to workers in their jobs 
The findings reported above suggest the following conclusions. Workers 
engage in work activities not only to obtain material rewards, but 
also to satisfy a set of other needs. In other words, money is not 
the only outcome for workers in theirJobsq nor is it necessarily the 
most significant. The importance a worker places on each job-related 
characteristic appears to be a function of other factors, such as 
occupation and level of satisfaction of other needs. Previous research 
also indicates that there is a gap between workers' and management perceptions 
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of the priority of the needs which workers-try to satisfy in their work 
organisation, 
On the basis of the previous results, the present study will ex , amine the 
following hypotheses: 
First: The importance which workers accord to pay is higher than the 
importance they place on other job-rejated characteristics'. 
'' 
Second: There are significant differences between workers' perceptions 
and management perceptions of the importance of six characteristics 
related to workers' jobs. 
Third: There are significant differences between workers' perceptions 
and management perceptions of the level of six characteristics 
present in workers' jobs. 
These hypotheses are examined in Chapter 5. 
PAYMENT SYSTEMS: 
Early in this century, Taylor provided the first citation of using payment 
systeýs as a managerial tool to transform labour power to labour 
(20) 
0 
Previous studies indicate that the effectiveness of monetary incentives 
depends upon the degree to which workers value money, and the degree to 
which they believe that more effort and better performance will lead to 
(21) 
higher earnings . This notion was first introduced by Georgopoulos 
and his associates who found in a research study that workers who 
perceived higher personal productivity as a means to increased earnings 
performed better'than workers who did not perceive this relationship. 
(22) 
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Cherrington, Reitz and Scott concluded on the basis of an experimental 
study, thati people were satisfied when they were appropriately rewarded, 
(23). 
i. e. when the rewards were contingent upon performance 
Adams, on the other hand, developed a reward theory which incorporates 
the social aspects of pay into a. theoretical frame-work known as equity. 
This theory postulates that a worker evaluates his job inputs and 
outcomes compared to the inputs and outcomes of co-workers or a reference 
group. If a worker perceives-a case of inequity, he will seek to reduce 
(24)' 
it by one or more of several methods, such as absenteeism. Carrell 
obtained results from a longitudinal research wh#h confirmed the existence 
(25)ý 
of-an equity norm among groups of workers in organisations 
In order to tie pay to performance, various pay incentive schemes have 
been used. These schemes could be classified into three categories: 
(26) 
individualf group and plant-wide schemes Each scheme has its 
advantages and disadvahtages, and is suitable for certain circumstances. 
Group incentives, for example, are particularly suitable when it is 
difficult, to distinguish one individual's contribution-from another's 
or when co-operation among workers is important. There is also evidence 
that, individual incentive'schemes are better than group schemes in 
(27), 
tying pay to performance Behrend stresses the notion that each 
firm has to develop a scheme which conforms to its specific circumstances. 
She points out that it is difficult to find one or other type of scheme 
which. suits all fi=s 
(28) 
-z 
One of the essential elements of pay incentive schemes is 
the determination of standards of output. There are different methods 
for setting standards, such as time study, past performance and 
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(29) 
negotiations between management and workers However, as indicated 
in the literature, this element has-been a, source of problems to 
management. Uliyte, for example, pointed out that establishing standards 
is a human relations'problem which may remain unresolved even with the 
(30) 
use of all the techniques of work measurement It is in this sense 
that Behrend stated that: 
"It is clear that questions of the 'rightness' of rates or 
standards are not questions of fact but of subjective 
judgement. Even if standards of effort were measurable 
(which they are not) there could never be any scientific 
criterion for judging the rightness of a particular 
standard of effort" (31). 
At the same time, Donald Roy provided a detailed description of workers' 




Understanding the pay incentive scheme is another essential element. 
On the basis of evidence presented in four studies, Marriott concluded 
that employees and workers understanding of the schemes was not good 
(33) 
which reduced the effectiveness of those schemes In a study 
conducted to test the characteristics of an effective incentive scheme, 
Cammann and Lawler confirmed the importance of understanding the scheme(34) 0 
McClelland raises another point regarding the incentive scheme, that is, 
the importance of the size of the reward which is a relative matter 




On the other hand, thepractice of tying pay to performance in - 
organisations seems to be different from the theory. ý A survey conducted 
on the largest 500 firms in the United States revealed tnat pay was 
not tied effectively to performance at the non-supervisory level. This 
survey indicated that the percentage of the firms which used-job 
performance to award wage increment to blue-collar worxers-, was less than 
(36) 
6 per cent . Kearney pointed out that in most organisations the 
relationship between pay and performance is weak. He gave four reasons 
for the difficulty of typing pay to performance. These reasons are: 
(1) peformance measurement problem, (2) the ability of the organisation 
to pay for performance, (3) the influence of labour unions and 
(37) 
(4) inflation and increases in costs of living . After reviewing 
some studies on pay and performance, Lawler concluded that: 
"Overall, therefore, the studies suggest that business 
organisations do not do a very good job of tying pay 
to performance" (38). 
Edwards, also, said that the Polaroid Corporation have 'a sophisticated 
bureaucratic control' in which pay is tied to performance. However, 
he observed that: 
"The formal system of evaluation does not perfectly 
mirror the actual system, of course, and personality 
clashes, favouritism and jealousies remain" (39). 
The conclusions which emerge from the previous discussion are the 
following. Tying pay to performance is one of the factors which affect 
workers' effort in their jobs. Other factors include the importance 
of money to workers, and the constraints imposed upon them which may 
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affect their response such as group pressure. Organisations have to 
recognise the difficulties associated with pay incentive schemes, and 
try to develop suitable schemes in the light of particularities. 
As a result of the previous discussion, ana on the basis of our 
discussion in the first chapter regarding the socialist Laws in Egypt, 
the hypothesis which will be examined in the present study is: 
The relationship between pay and performance is weak, which 
reduces the effectiveness of the payment system as a means 
of labour control in the company (4U). 
This hypothesis is examined in chapters 6 and 7. 
PROMOTION: 
Promotion is another reward which could be used as a managerial tool 
for motivating performance. Pigors and 14yers define promotion as: 
"the advancement of an employee to better job - better in 
terms of greater responsibilities, more prestige or 
'status', greater skill, and especially, increased rate 
of pay or salary" (41). 
The difference between pay and promotion, as rewards, is that promotion 
opportunities are limited, which means that promoting a worker-is 
(42) 
usually *at the expense of another' 
Many writers have pointed out that it is important for each organisation 
to have a promotion policy which specifies the procedures and the bases 
of considering candidates for promotion. As noted before, in a 
bureaucratic mode rewards and sanctions are manifested in rules and 
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procedures. Mansfield said that in these systems, the formal or 
(43) 
'informal' rules governing promotion may become widely known to workers 
Wallrapp,, talking about promotion from within the organisation, gives 
an example of a job posting system which is based on informing workers 
of: 
- 
(1) job vacancies, (2) the requirements of the vacant jobs, 
(3) the procedures of application and selection and (4) communicating 
the reasons of non-selection to workers. He also remarks that job 
(44) 
posting could be an effective approach if it is well developed 
Another important aspect in promotion policy is the basis of selecting 
candidates for promotion. The argument is always about using: 
(1) seniority, or (2) ability or (3) a combination of the two factors. 
Unions usually prefer the first factor, for it is objective which 
conquers the problem of the fairness of supervisors' judgement of 
workers' ability. The other point of view is that using ability is 
(45) 
desirable because it motivates performance The latter opinion 
is also criticised, because a worker's good performance on his present 
i, ýII- (46) 
job does not necessarily mean that he will do well on the higher jo 
Mansfield points out that in an ideal bureaucratic system promotion 
could'be based on ability to ensure uniformity'in abilities, or on the 
bases of ability and seniority to ensure uniformity in abilities and 
(47) 
also to keep age in grade structure 'relatively constant 
An investigation conducted by the Acton Society Trust in five plants 
indicated that 50 per. cent of skilled workers and 41 per cent of semi- 
skilled and unskilled workers-were very interested in being promoted. 
However, only 20 per cent of the former group and 9 per cent of the latter 
(48) 
had applied for promotion At the same time, 'Goldthorpe and his 
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associates found that their workers were not concerned about promotion. 
Only 8 percent liked the idea of being promoted, but had done nothing 
(49) 
to increase their chanceu of promotion . After reviewing some 
studies on job career, Lawler concluded that 'managers-are more upwardly 
(50) 
career oriented than workers. ' 
To sum up, some workers may be interested in promotion, for it may lead 
to some monetary and non-monetary rewaras. Others may not be interested 
in being promoted because they find it difficult to attain or for other 
reasons. Promotion opportunities are limited, ana selecting a worker 
to be promoted may have an impact on other workers. Because of that, 
organisations need to have a promotion policy, communicate it to 
workers, inform them of vacancies and give/ them a chance to apply if 
they are interested. This may yield positive perceptions of promotion 
decisions in organisations. 
As a result of the previous discussion, the following hypotheses will 
be examined in the present study: 
First: Promotion has an incentive effect on workers. 
Second: There are significant differences between workers' and manage- 
ment perceptions of the most important factor in identifying 
workers for promotion. 
Third: There are no significant differences among workers with regard 
to their interest in being promoted. 
Fourth: There are no significant differences among workers with regard 
to their perceptions of their chances of being promoted. 
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These-hypotheses are'examined, in chapter 8,, ý -_ 
PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL: 
The appraisal process, as the literature attests, can fulfil several 
functions. First, it is central to wage and salary, I promotion, and 
dismissal decisions. In these cases, the purpose of performance apprai, sal 
(51) 
is 'judgemental' & Employees' and workers' coaching programmes also 
depend on performance appraisal, and appraisal for this purpose is called 
(52) 
'developmental' A growing body of the literature on performance 
appraisal indicates that organisations need different appraisal systems, 
(53) because one system cannot fulfil all purposes . Cummings and Schwab, 
for example propose*an approach based on three programmes for different 
pruposes; 'developmental action program, maintenance action program and 
(54) 
remedial action program' 
Prior to the implementation of an appraisal programme, management need 
to determine what to be appraised. The argument is usually about using 
(55) 
person-oriented traits, behaviour, or results The common difficulty 
of person-oriented traits is that they are unclear and subjective, which 
results in some errors such as leniency error, halo effect and centrCil 
(56) 
tendency A longitudinal stuay conducted in an international 
petroleum1company indicated that employees perceived the results orientea 
(57) 
appraisal more positively than the person-traits approach 
Regarding who should perform the appraisal, it is supervisors' responsibility 
because they know their subordinates' strengths and weaknesses more than 
(58) higher levels of management . On the other hand, there are opinions, 
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some of. which refer to empirical data, which suggest that it is better 
to involve subordinates in the appraisal process. McGregor put forward 
an approach for performance appraisal which places the major responsibility 
on subordnates to set their own objectives 
(59) 
. Meyer, Kay and French, 
on the basis of a study conducted in General Motors, pointed out that 
discussions between supervisors and subordinates to establish goals which 
were objectively defined improved performance and changed subordinates' 
(60) 
attitudes in a favourable direction . Cummings found, on the basis 
of an experimental study, that workers' reactions to an appraisal system 
which involved them in the process were more positive than their reactions 
(61) 
to another system in which appraisal was performed by supervisors only 
Regarding the practice of appraisal, the results of a study carried out 
by Marriott on three British factories indicated that, rewards were 
dependent not only on the quantity of work, but also on subjective 
factors 
(62) 
.A survey carried out in 216 organisations in the United 
States revealed that 23 percent of the included organisations did not 
(63) 
have a formal appraisal programme . Yager said that he rarely found 
managers satisfied with the results of performance appraisal systems 
(64) 
in their organisations . Oberg argues that one of the reasons for 
obtaining unsatisfactory results of appraisal is that companies do not 
pay much attention to selecting the suitable techniques for particular 
(65) 
objective . Drucker also suggests that unless performance appraisal 
depends on objective factors, the whole process would be abused 
(66). 
Finally, Levinson points out that it is important to give feedback 
to workers about the results of their appraisal, and that delay in 
(67) 
feedback may reduce the effectiveness of the process In a study 
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conducted on 25 organisations in the United Kingdom, 'the'research group 
concluded that: 
"the impression obtained is that open appraisal may lead 
to a lowering of standards of assessment, but does not 
always do so" (68). 
In summary, in order for the appraisal system to be effective, management 
have to develop the programme which suits their purposes. Using 
objective factors is better than subjective vague traits. Involving 
workers in the apprai. sal process is another. aspect which may improve 
the effectiveness of the programme. 
Therefore, to study the effectiveness of performance appraisal as'a 
control devicep the following hypotheses are examined in the present 
study: 
First: Workers understand how the appraisal system works in thecompany. 
Second: Workers consider the appraisal system in the company to be fair. 
Third: Management consider the appraisal'system in the company an 
effective control device. 
These hypotheses are'examined in chapter 9. ( 
DISCIPLINE: 
Discipline is another control device used by management to derive 
performance. The importance of discipline has been stated by many 
authors. Bramblett pointed out that: 
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"Discipline in the broad sense means orderliness - the 
opposite of confusion. It is a fundamental requirement 
for the people working in a plant just as it is for other 
segments of society" (69). 
Williams stated that: 
"In its broadest sence discipline in organisations may be 
defined as a state of orderliness or control in terms of 
the standards by which acceptable behaviour and performance 
are measured" (70). 
Booker said that: 
"Disciplinary actions are the. steps taken by management in 
an effect to modify the behaviour of employees who have 
behaved in a manner contrary to company policies or rules"(71). 
The previous statements indicate that discipline is based on thp 
recognition of a need for control in organisations. Discipline could 
(72) be used in a negative or in a positive way . In a negative case, 
discipline is used in a punitive rather than corrective manner. Its 
purpose is to enforce the rules set up by management. But in the 
positive case, the purpose of disciplinary actions is behaviour change, 
it looks at misconduct in terms of the future to prevent recurrence 
by the offender or by others. Williams pointed out. that, in order for 
disciplinary actions to be effective, management should concentrate on 
(73) 
solving the causes of the problems-rather than the symptoms 
Boncarosky also stated that a worker's poor performance or bad behaviour 
(74) 
could be due to the worker or to his supervisor or to the organisation 
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On the basis of two experimental studies, Maier concluded that one of 
the problems of discipline is that supervisors do not like to be 
(75) involved in disciplinary actions Oberle suggested that the reason 
could be that supervisors do not like to lose friendship with workers, 
(76) 
or with supervisors who do not use discipline effectively . At the 
.. same 
time, Rosen and Jerdee suggested, that disciplinary judgements are, 
-, 
affected by supervisors' attitudes and feelings, and the value of the 
offender to the organisation in terms of his ability, past performance 
(77) 
and status . To face that problem, McGregor has formulated an approach 
to discipline which can help to lessen resentment towards supervisors. 
The approach is called "the red-hot-stove rule". This approach suggests 
four elements for disciplinary action: (1) the consequence should be 
immediatep (2) the individual shouid be warned, (3) consistency in the 
penalties, and (4) the penalties should be given in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Applying these elements is expected to increase workers' 
acceptance of accountability for the consequences of offences 
(78) 
0 
Huberman, also, has developed a progressive approach for discipline 
which involves increasingly severe penalties each time a worker commits 
an offence. This approach consists of five steps: (1) when misconduct 
occurs a casual reminder is given to the worker on the job, (2) if 
misconduct reoccursq step one is repeated, (3) in the third step the shift 
foreman is involved, more effort is made, to determine the reasons for the 
incident, and a letter is sent to the worker's home, (4) if another 
incident occurs, a final discussion is made, the worker is asked to take 
the rest of the shift off with pay, and warned that another incident will 
(79) 
result in termination, and (5) discharge 
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Steinmetz suggests another penalty as substitute for discharge, He uses 
the term Idehiring' to mean encouraging the worker to resign. He 
argues that dehiring is less damaging to the offender's career, and 
(80) 
causes less problems to the organisation 
Finally, there should be formal regulations for disputes over disciplinary 
actions, These regulations should be known to workers, and any changes 
sh ould be communicated to them 
(81) 
To sum up, there should be an organisational policy for discipline. 
This policy should be communicated to workers, and should be consistently 
enforced, so that workers do not feel that incidents are sometimes 
tolerated. Supervisors should be trained in how to conduct disciplinary 
actions. This is important because these actions affect both workers 
and organisations in case of conflict. 
On the basis of the previous discussion, the following hypotheses will 
be examined in the present study: 
First: Discipline is used in the company in a punitive rather than 
corrective manner. 
Second: Workers believe that sanctions are significant. 
Third: Management view discipline as an effective means of control 
over workers. 
These hypotheses are examined in chapter 10. 
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CHAPTERF0UR 
STUDY SETTING: THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN EGYPT AND THE CASE STUDY 
The real start of the textile industry in Egypt has been reported severally 
as being in 1927. In that year Tall at Harb started setting up the Misr 
Spinning and Weaving Company in Mehalla. El-Kobra. The Second World War 
gave an impetus to the textile industry in Egypt. Older-established 
mills were expanded and a number of new ones were built. In 1961, all 
large private textile factories were nationalised, and 28 public textile 
(1) 
companies were established 
In 1979, public enterprise accounted for just over 35 percent of GDP 
(2) 
and 60 percent of total employment in Egyptian manufacturing industry 
In 1979 the public textile industry employed 50 percent and accounted for 
38 percent of gross value added in public manufacturing industry 
(3) 
0 
Textile companies employed 300,000 people in 1979,45 percent of this 
number were employed by 6 companies. The wage bill in those 6 companies 
(4) 
represented 47 percent of total wages in the public textile industry 
Wage costs represented 30 percent of total costs of production in the 
textile industry in 1978. During the period 1972-1978 employment increased 
15 percent and output increased 20 to 21 percent*- During the same period 
(5) 
labour productivity increased about 1 percent annually However, 
labour productivity in the textile industry in Egypt represents 25 
percent of-Labour productivity in the UK and-: 14 percent of labour 
productivity in the US. Hourly earnings of workers in the textile industry 
in Egypt is 6.2 percent of hourly earnings of workers in the textile 
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industry in the US, slightly higher than Pakistan which is the lowest; 
5.7 percent compared to the US. At-the same time, labour cost per unit of 
production is the lowest in Egypt compared to Europe, the US, Japan and 
(6) 
Pakistan Hansen and Radwan point out that in the textile industry 
in Egypt: 
"machine productivity is much closer to European standards 
than labour productivity. This indicates that the 
problem is less on the technical management side than on 
the personnel side" (7). 
Setting output targets for public textile companies ususally starts in 
each company. Every company prepares its plans in the light of the 
expected capacity and the policy of the government regarding foreign 
currency, prices of inputs and outputs, and priorities of different 
types of products. The plans of all textile companies are discussed 
by the Higher Sectoral Council chaired by the minister of industry* 
At the end of each financial year, every company prepares a report 
, 
the year. This report is about the results of its activities during 
discussed by the general assembly of the companyq chaired by the 
(8) 
minister of industry or his deputy 
The company that forms the basis of this study was founded in November 
1940. In 1945 it took the name 'Industrial Establishment for Rayon 
and Cotton (ESCO)I. The purpose of ESCO was decided to be spinning, 
weaving, and dyeing and finishing cotton, and spinning rayon. Wool 
spinning, weaving, and finishing were added later to the activities 
of the company. The company started with four factories. After ESCO 
was nationalised in 1961, other companies were merged with it. At the 
present time, the company operates 10 factories. Only one factory 
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is located at Kalyub, about 20 kilometres north of Cairo, and the other 
factories are located in Bal&iem and Shubra El-Kheima in the 
governorate of Kalyubia, but they are considered parts of greater Cairo. 
This company has been selected for our survey for three reasons. Firstly, 
it is the second largest textile company in Egypt, employing over twenty 
thousand people. Secondly, it is the only textile company in Egypt 
which has factories for cotton and wool spinning, weaving and dyeing 
and finishing, and rayon spinning as well. Hence, we had the opportunity 
to represent workers from different activities in the textile industry. 
Finally, the company was started in 1940 which made it possible to 
represent workers of different ages and different years of service with 
the company. 
The products of the company include finished cotton and wool clothp 
and rayon yarn. Most of the production is sold in the local market. 
The company exports, mostly in the form of cotton yarn and cloth, 
accounted for 15.5 per cent of the total sales in 1981-82. 
(9) 
All 
the production of the company, except finished wool cloth, is sold 
at controlled prices which is less than the costs of production. But, 
wool sales represents a low percentage of total sales; in 1981-82 
they accounted for 7.5 per cent of total sales. The results of 
production activities were losses in the last three years, reaching 
%E8.2 millions in 1981-82. The company also received EE12.9 millions 
(10) 
as subsidy in the financial year 1981-82 The company's problems 
are similar to those from which most textile companies in Egypt suffer. 
Among these problems is the shortage of shop-floor workers 
so 
The main types 6f jobs in production area in ESCO: 
Here a brief discussion of the main types of jobs is in order, Both 
cotton and wool spinning and weaving are similar with regard to the 
stages of production. t1ibile a process of dyeing and finishing is 
needed for cotton cloth production, in wool cloth production there is 
only a process of finishing. On the other hand, the stages of rayon 
spinning are different from cotton and wool spinning. Table 411 
summarises, for example, the stages of cotton and rayon spinning, 
TABLE 411 
Production Stages in Cotton and Rayon Spinning Factories 
Cotton spinning Rayon spinning 
Blending a. Preparation: This 
Opening and cleaning includes the processes 
Carding of, preparing'the 
Combing materials neecea for 
-Drawing spinning. 
Roving These materials are: 
Spinning CS2 ana Viscose. 
Iýincing 
Doubling b. Spinning. 
Twisting 
Singeing c. Acid bath station. 
a. Winding. 
0 
Three main tasks are required in each stage in all processes of production 
in the company. These tasks are: delivery of materials, operating 
machines, and maintenance. Tasks of delivery of an intermediate 
material from one stage to another are necessary because production 
in the textile industry is not a continuous process. The tasks relatea 
to operating machines are separatea into different jobs. In cotton 
51 
and wool spinning, for example, a machine operator is responsible for 
feeding and operating machines. Tasks related to removal of output 
are conducted by a helper. In cotton and wool weaving, on the other 
hand, a machine operator with a helper are responsible for feeding 
machines with shuttle' cones ana operating. Feeding machines with 
drawn cones and removal of output are separated from other operative 
tasv. s and constitute a different operative job. With regard to main- 
tenance workers, they are diviaea into two groups. The first is on 
day shift and they are responsible for major repairs* The second 
group, includes maintenance workers assigned to each of three shifts. 
They are responsible for oilir4gi-ana minor repairs. But, because 
of the shortage of labour in the company, the latter group work 12 
hours per aay, in-some sections, as they are aiviaed into, two shifts 
only. I. 
The supervisory staff in the production area is dividea into two 
groups. The first group supervises maintenance workers, and the second 
group supervises operatives, helpers ana delivery workers. Each group 
includes: foremen, supervisors, section'managers, sections managerso 
ana department managers. At the top of the hierarchy of each plant 
there is a plant manager. * 
All'types of workers' jobs and all levels of management were represented 
in the sample of the study. We use the term machine operators to refer 
to workers who are responsible for machines and who'are paid on the 
basis of a piece-rate system. The term auxiliary workers refers to 
machine operators' helpets ana workers who are responsible for delivery 
of materials. 'We consider these two types one group because they are 
C--, ý 
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not responsible for machines and their wages are not affected by the 
amount of production. The third group is maintenance workers, which 
includes workers on day shift and on normal shift. 
We considered them one group because the nature of their work is 
similar to some extent, and they tend to have skills'different from 
the skills of-the previous'groups. 
Management. ' on'the'other hand, 'is divided, in the analysis of our data, 
into two groups. The first group includes foremen and supervisors, 
and the second includes higher levels of management. We preferred 
to use this grouping, because foremen and supervisors are closer to 
workers and production. 'Hence, they are expected to have different 
opinions'about workers and production problems. At the same time, 
this enables us to compare their answers with-the answers-of higher 
levels who are not in direct contact with workers. 
Finally, -during the interview survey we noticed three points which need 
to be mentioned here. First, -the tools used for delivering materials 
from one stage-to the next were poor, if any.,,, -Second,,, the, floor in 
most plants was uneven for the pavement was cracked which is dangerous, 
especially because we noticed that workers usually carried materials 
on their 
S 
houlders. Third, in the rayon plant and in the colour 
kitchen, -in the cotton dyeing and finishing plant, where workers 
use chemical materials all the time, they were not provided with any 
sort of safety clothing in spite of the presence of toxic chemicals. 
Henceforth our case study will be referred to as ESCO or the company. 
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Data Collection: 
The data was obtained through an interview survey carriea out in the 
company which is the basis of the present stuay. The survey involvea 
a sample of 351 male personnel employed in the production area. All 
(12) 
processes of production in the company were represented in the sample 
The survey piloting was planned to include consiaeration of optimum 
and feasible stratification factors for selecting, two samples of 
workers and management. A likely plan was that a sample would be 
selected stratified according to occupation ana length of service. As 
a matter of fact, no data was available in the records of the company 
about the breakaown of workers and management in each plant, by the two 
factors mentioned above or by any other factor. As a result, the only 
alternative was to depend on the help of sections managers, section 
managers and supervisors to select a representative,, sample. -,,,, 
Two questionnaires were used; one for workers and the second for 
(13) 
management . During the pilot study we found that there was no 
organised training activity in the company. Training was very limited and 
was done haphazardly without any planning. Therefore, it was deciaed 
to exclude the questions on training from our survey. 
The survey wasconducted in 1983. Permission was sought from the 
Central Agency for Public Mobilisation andIStatistics to carry out the 
survey 
Characteristics of theRespondents: 
Beynon and Blackburn saia that 'perhaps the most generally relevant 
social characteristic is age, since it is related to so many aspects 
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1(15) of a person's experience Table 4/2 shows the age aistribution of 
our sample: 
TABLE 4/2 
The Age Distribution of the Responaents 
Age -30 31-40 41-50 51+ Total 
Mean 
Occupation N N N N N Age 
Auxiliary workers 9 26.5 10 29.3 11 32.4 
ý4 _11.8 t34 
100 38 
Machine operators 25 21.4 51 43.6 26 22.2 15 12.8 117 100 37.9 
Maintenance workers 19 38.0 15 30.8 13 26.0 3 6.0 5-0 100 35.9 
Foremen and supervisors 2 2.4 18 20.9 45 52.3 21 24.4 86 100 45.4 
Higher levels 0 0 17 26.6 24 37.5 
1 
23 35.9 64 100 46.9 
Total 55 15.7 111 31.6 119 33.9 
Ib& 
18.8 351 41OU 41.1 
As can be seen from the table, 44 percent of auxiliary workers in our 
sample are aged over 40. This is because machine operators who become 
disabled as a result of ageing are usually transferred to auxiliary work 
which needs less effort. This is also reflected. in the percentage of 
machine operators in each, age group. For example, 44 percent. of machine 
operators are aged between 31 and 40, but 22_percent are aged between 
41 and 50. This-could be also because some older machine operators were 
promoted to maintenance work or to foremen. 
The table also shows that higher percentages of foremen and supervisors, 
and-the higher levels of management are at an advanced age. This is 
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because, 48 percent of foremen and supervisors had 1 to 2 jobs before, and 
45 percent had 3 to 4 jobs before being promoted to their present jobs. 
Also, 59 percent of the higher levels of management had between 1 and 3 
jobs, and 40 percent had between 4 and 6 jobs in the company. In our 
sample of management, 10 percent-started in managerial jobs, 14 percent 
started in technical jobs, and 76 percent started in production jobs, 
ie, auxiliary workers, machine operators and maintenance workers. 
Maintenance workers are more educated than both machine operators and 
auxiliary workers. In our sample, 56 percent of maintenance workers 
have a leaving certificate. But 32 percent of auxiliary workers, and 
29 percent of machine operators are educated. With respect to the 
supervisory staff, 44 percent of the foremen and supervisors, ana 73 
percent of the higher levels of management are educatea 
(16) 
0 
The following table shows our respondents' years of employment experience 
in the company: 
TABLE 4/3 
Respondents' Years of Employment Experience 
in the Company 
Years -10 11-20 21-30 31+ Total 
, an P te 
Occupation N C/O N . 01 . 10 N 
N renure 
Auxiliary workers 10 29.4 8 23.5 15 44.2 1 2.9 34 100 17.2 
Machine operators 32 27.4 32 27.4 44 37.6 9 7.6 117 100 17.4 
Maintenance workers 21 42.0 '9 18.0 18 36.0 2 4.0 50 100 15.8 
Foremen and supervisors 4 4.7 12 14.0 48 55.7 22 25.6 86 100 25.4 
Higher levels of 





64 100 22.6 
Total 75 21.4 76 21.7 152 43.3 
[48 ý13.7 
351 100 20.1 
56 
As can be seen from the table, 42 per cent of maintenance workers 
in our sample have 10 or less years of service-with the company. The- 
company suffers from shortage of labour, especially among technicians. 
Because of that, ESCO depends on secondary technical graduates who 
have completed their formal education recently to fill the vacancies 
in maintenance jobs. In our sample, 44 per cent of maintenance workers 
are secondary technical graduates. Regarding previous experience, 
23 per cent of auxiliary workers, 32 per cent of machine operators, 
and 28 per cent of maintenance workers worked for other organizations. 
Also, 37 per cent of foremen and supervisors and 58 per cent of the 
higher levels of management worked for other organisations. - Among 
our respondents, 21 per cent of, all our workers and 35 per cent of 
management worked for other textile companies. 
With respect to marital status, 87 per cent of the workers and 99 
per cent of management are married. The majority of married people 
have children, '93 per cent of workers and 99 per cent of management. 
The mean number of children is 4-f=. auxiltary workers, 3.8 for machine 
operators, 3.5 for maintenance workers, about 5 for foremen and 
supervisors, and 3.5 for the higher levels of management 
our informants. come either from Cairo or from outside Cairo. The 
percentages of those who come from outside Cairo are : 41 per cent 
of the workers, 48 per cent of foremen and supervisors, and 56 per cent 
of the higher levels of management. The following table shows the 
distance between work and hometown for non-Cairo respondents: 
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TABLE 4/4 
The Distance netween Work ana hometown for Non-Cairo born Respondents 
Distance (miles) -50 51-100 101-2UO 201+ Total 
Occupation N N N N % N TO 
Auxiliary workers 5 35.7 7 50.0 2 14.3 0 0 14 100 
Nachine operators 17 37.8 17 37.8 8 17.7 3 6.7 45 100 
Viaintenance workers 11 55.0 4 20.0 3 15.0 2 10.0 20 100 
Foremen and supervisors 17 34.7 23 46.9 6 12.2 3 6.2 49 100 
Higher levels of 
management 14 41.2 11 32.4 5 14.7 4 11.8 34 100 
Total ý64 39.5 62 38.3 124 
14.8 12 7.4 
, 
1b2 100 
As can be seen from the table most workers and management who come from 
outside Cairo do not work very far from their hometown as the Oistance 
for most of them is not more than one hundrea miles. 
Over three quarters of both workers and management who come from outside 
Cairo visit their hometown at least once per year. But if we take into 
consideration that there are two feasts per year for iý, usjims, at which 
most people visit their hometown 
(18) 
, we would find it better to 
look 
at the percentages who visit their hometown three times or mo(e-per 
year. About 43 percent of non-Cairo born auxiliary workers, 7U percent 
of non-Cairo born machine operators, and 6U percent of non-Cairo born 
maintenance workers visit their hometo, *n three times or more per yeare 
Also, 53 percent of foremen ana supervisors, ana 59 percent of the 
higher levels of management who were brought up outsice Cairo visit 
their hometown three times or more per year. This suggests that 
workers, foremen, supervisors and managers who migratea to Cairo have 
not been completely urbanised. They still go back to their hometown 
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to visit parents, 68 percent of the workers and 77 percent of management, 
or to visit relatives such as brothers and sisters, 32 percent of 
workers and 23 percent of management. 
With regara to place of residence, 28 percent of the workers ana 37 
percent of management have their own houses. At the same time, 19 
percent of the workers ana 6 out of 150 supervisory staff live with 
their parents. Those who rent their, accommodation from a private owner 
(19) 
represent 43 percent of tr., -- wo. Lkers ana 50 percent of management 
As rent represents a part of financial responsibilities, people who 
live in their own houses or with parents might be expectea to have 
lower financial responsibilities. This has its effect on workers' 
behaviour, as will be discussed in chapters 11 and 12. 
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PARTII 
HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AS MEANS 
OF LABOUR CONTROL AT WORK: THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC 
ENTERPRISE CASE 
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In this part we present our'empirical data. It includes eight chapters, 
from 5 to 12., Chapter 5 is devoted to examining our workers' orientation 
to work. In chapters 6 to lU we examine the effectiveness of management 
policies, included in the model of the study, as means of labour control 
at work. Chapter 11 considers the impact of management'policies on 
workers' intent to leave, turnover, ana having a second joo in the 
private sector. In chapter 12 an attempt is made to sketch out the 
workers' 'typical' response to labour control mechanisms in the company. 
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CHAPTERFIVE 
WORKERS' ORIENTATION TO WORK 
In this chapter an attempt will be made to demonstrate the relative 
importance of six characteristics in workers' jobs, and workers' and 
management perceptions of the present level of these characteristics 
in workers' jobs. The six characteristics are: (1) earnings from the 
job, (2) respect and fair treatment, (3) friendly and helpful fellow 
workers, (4) secure future, (5) fringe benefits and (6) chances of 
promotion. We selected these characteristics for two reasons: 
(1) as per capita income in Egypt is low, as noted in chapter 2, it 
seemed probable that Egyptian workers would be more concerned about 
physiological and social needs, and (2) most workers in the textile 
industry, as noted in chapter 4, are either*semi-skilled or unskilled. 
Therefore, it seemed unlikely that their jobs would include elements 
related to higher level needs, such as self actualisation. In order 
to explore our workers' orientation to work, we shall also examine 
their perceptions of the job itself. At the same time, workers' 
perceptions will be compared with management perceptions of the 
importance of the six characteristics, and the present level in 
workers' jobs. The purpose is to examine to what extent the two groups 
agree with one another. 
Three hypotheses are examined in this chapter. These hypotheses are: 
First: The importance which the workers accord to pay is higher than the 
importance they place on other job-related characteristics. 
Second: There are significant differences between workers' perceptions 
and management perceptions of the importance of six characteristics 
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related to workers' jobs. 
Third: There are significant differences between workers' perceptions 
and manegement perceptions of the present level of six 
characteristics in workers' jobs. 
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The Importance of Six Characteristics in Workers' Jobs 
To explain the factors-which chiefly determine the company choice ana 
attachment, workers were first askea why they selected ESCO to work for. 
Overall, 78 percent of the workers selected the company either because 
frienas or relatives work for it, or for its location. The first reason 
accounts for 54 percent (Table 5/1). 
Table 5/1 also shows that 15 percent of our workers were sent to the 
company by employment offices. However, it should be noted that employ- 
ment offices usually distribute workers according to their hometown. In 
other words, these offices send people to the nearest enterprise to 
their place of residence. Therefore, those workers work for ESCO also 
because it' is'near their hometown, ie, 'because of its locatiori. 
It is interesting to note that 4 out of 28 (14 percent) workers with 
primary education, ana 2 out of 23 (9 percent) worxers with preparatory 
education work for the company because it employs workers before obligatory 
(1) 
military service Those workers may not return to ESCO after their 
military service, if they find better jobs. However, the company follows 
this policy, ie, employment of workers before obligatory military service, 
because it suffers from a shortage of labour. 
As the location of the company comes as the secona reason for selecting 




U-hy Workers decided to Work for the Company by Hometown 
Hometown Village Town Cairo Total 
Reasons N To N 0/ N 
Friends or relatives work 
for the company 58 77.3 5 62.5 45 38.5 108 54 
Location 4 5.4 - - 44 37. b 48 24 
Employs workers before 
obligatory military 1 1.3 - - 7 b. 0 8 4 
service 
Employment offices 12 16 3 37.5 15 12.8 30 15 
The company provide 
transportation means - 6 5.1 6 3 
Total 75 luo 8 100 117 WO 200 10c) 
a, Note x= 44.91 P l-. Ol 
The table shows that over three quarters of workers who come from villages 
work for ESCO because friends or relatives work for it. Regarding workers 
who were brought up in Cairo, the location of the company, ana friends 
or relatives work for it are of nearly the same importance. 
The second question asked to both workers and management was to rank the 
three most important characteristics to workers ofthe six mentionea 
(2) 
previously The rank oraer of the frequency with which the six 
characteristics were selected is presented in the following table: 
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TABLE 5/2 
Rank Order of the Importance of Six Characteristics Related to Workers' Jobs 
Importance As perceived As perceived 
by workers by management 
Characteristics Rank Cases Rank Cases 
Earnings from the job 1 190 94.5 1 149 99.3 
Respect and fair treatment 2 136 67.7 2 81 54.0 
Friendly and helpful 
fellow workers 3 91 45.3 6 47 31.3 
Secure future 4 70 34.8 5 51 34.0 
Fringe benefits 5 65 32.3 4 56 37.3 
Chances of promotion 6 51 25.4 3 66 44. U, 
N 201 150 
Note. This table was produced by SPSS FLULT RE! )PONSE option which does not 
provide a significance index. 
As can be seen from table 5/2, 'earnings from the job' is selected as the 
most important characteristic by the majority of workers ana management. 
At the same time, the two groups place 'respect and fair treatment' second. 
The responses demonstrate quite clearly that workers accord the greatest 
importance to pay, since the difference between the frequency of pay and 
the frequency of the second characteristic is wide. The table also 
indicates that management clearly recognises the importance of pay to 
workers. 
Regarding the thira characteristic, the aisparity between workers and 
management is wide. While wokkers rank 'friendly and helpful fellow 
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workersl. third, management rank it sixth. Insteaa, management assume, 
that 'chances of promotion' is the third important characteristic to 
workers. First, workers ranking 'chances of promotion' sixth could be 
because chances of promotion in the company are poor, or because 
promotion does not affect workers' earnings 
(3) 
. which is the most 
important characteristic to them. Second, management rating 'helpful 
fellow wokers' sixth may mean that they do not have complete understanding 
of their workers' needs., It may also mean that management do not see that 
co-operation among workers is important. however, it is difficult1to 
argue against the importarceof co-operation among workers in the textile 
industry. For instance, operative tasks in spinning need a number of 
supporting tasks, such as machine cleaning, oiling and repairing. Therefore 
co-operation among different groups is important. 
At the same time, 'secure future' is ranke. d fourth by workers, as more 
important than fringe benefits and chances of promotion. By Law, even the 
chairman of the company cannot dismiss a worker, for dismissals among 
(4) 
workers go through long procedures . Therefore, the importance given 
to security could be because it has-a material meaning to workers rather than 
a guaranteed job. In other words, -security means to workers guaranteeing 
enough money for themselves and their families. 
Workers' perceptions of the most important job-related characteristics 
could be affected by level of education, for this variable may affect 
workers' aspirations. Workers' age may also affect their priority of 
needs, for people may emphasise the importance of different needs at 
different ages. Workers' perceptions of the importance of their neeas may 
(5) 
also be affected by marital status, as it affects family responsibilitLes 
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People who come from villages may also have a different priority 
of needs from those who were brought up in towns or in Cairo. 
in order to test for the effects of these variables on workers' 
perceptions of the most important job-related characteristics, we 
used the analysis of variance. The independent variables entered in 
the equation are: education, mari . tal status, home town, I and age 
as covariate. The ANOVA reveals that the equation is significant 
at the 1 per cent level, and it explains 14.2 per cent of the total 
variance., Education is the only variable which has a significant 
effect on workers' perceptions of the most important job-related 
(6) 
characteristic 
In order to explore the effect-of education, we cross-tabulated the 
six job-related characteristics by, education. As can be, seen 
from table 5/3, the percentage of workers who selected 'earnings' 
as the most important characteristic has an inverse relationship 
with level of education. The table also shows that the percentage 
of workers who selected 'fair treatment' as the most important 
characteristic increases with level of education, though the numbers 
are smaller. This could be because as noted before, more educated 
workers have different aspirations, and think in a different way 
from less educated workers. I 
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TABLE 5/3 
Pdrcentages who Selectea each Job-Related characteristic as most important 
by Workers' Education 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory 
. 
Secondary Total 
Characteristics N 5.1 N N N N % 
Earnings 100 78.1 14 50.0 11 47.8 8 36.4 133 , -66.1 
Friendly and helpful 
fellow workers 7 5.5 2 7.1 3 13.1 3 13,6 15 7,5 
Chances of promotion 3 2.3 1 3.6 1 4.3 2 9.1 7 3.5 
Secure future 3 2.3 5 17.9 1 4.3 2 9.1 11 5.5 
Fring benefits 2 1.6 0 0 1 4.3 0 0 1ý5 
Respect and fair 
treatment 13 10.2 6 21.4 6 26.2 7 31.8 32 15.9 
Total 128 100 28 100 23 100 22 100 201 1OU 
N6te x2= 34.192 P4.01 
The importance of earnings to workers is supported further by our 
informants' responses to another question. Workers and management were 
asked whether they agree or disagree that workers work only for money. The 
responses indicate that most workers and management agreed, 95 percent 
of workers, 91 percent of foremen and supervisors, and 89 percent of the 
higher levels. We used the analysis of variance to examine the effects 
of some variables on workers' responses. The independent variables are; 
education, hometown, marital status and age as covariate. The equation 
is significant at the 10 percent level, and it explains 6.8 percent of 
the total variance. Hometown is the only variable which has a significant 
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(7) 
effect The responses reveal that all workers who were brought up 
outside Cairo agree that they work only for money, while 91 percent of 
(8) 
workers who were brought up in Cairo agree As can be seen, the 
difference between the two percentages'is not wide. However, it -could 
be because a higher percentage of workers who were brought up'in Cairo 
either own houses or live with their parents, as demonstrated in Chapter 
11, Therefore, they do not pay rent which represents a part of family 
(9) 
responsibilities. This in turn may affect workers' priority of needs 
The results obtained so far indicate that earnings from the job is by far 
the most important characteristics to our workers. This is not meant 
to imply that Egyptian workers do not pay attention to other characteristics. 
As noted previously, 'respect and fair treatment' and 'friendly and 
helpful fellow workers' were placed second and third in importance. 
It could also be argued that, depending on the individual, money might 
satisfy the needs of esteem and autonomy 
(10). At the same'time, the 
importance of 'earnings' to our workers is similar to the results 
(11) (12) 
obtained by Goldthorpe and his associates , and by Vamplew with 
regard tb, British workers. The study of Mexican workers also revealed 
similar results regarding the importance of 'earnings' to workers 
(13) 
. 
Level of the Characteristics Present in Workers' Jobs 
Workers and management were asked about the level of the previous six 
characteristics present in workers' jobs. The following table shows 
workers' perceptions of the present level: 
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TABLE 5/4 
Workers' Perceptions of the Level of Six Characteristics Present in their Jobs 
Level High Moderate LOW Total 
Characteristics N 0 N Ný N 1,16 
Earnings 6 3.0 28 13.9 167 83.1 201 100 
Friendly and helpful 
fellow workers 125 62.2 72 35.8 4 2.0 201 100 
Chances of promotion 1 0.5 15 7.5 185 92.0 201 100 
Secure future 27 13.4 149 74.2 25 12.4 201 100 
Fringe benefits 9 4.5 48 23.9 144 71.6 201 100 
Respect and fair 
treatment 33 16.4 132 65.7 36 17.9 201 100 
Although-'workers consider 'earnings' the most important characteristic/. 
as noted before, table 5/4 shows that most of them consider the present 
level of their earnings low. It can also be noted-that, despite the fact 
that by law workers are guaranteed their jobs to a great extent, nearly 
three quarters said that the present level of 'security' is moderate. 
This could be because, as noted before, workers are concerned about their 
earnings rather than just a guaranteed job. We can also see from the table 
that the majority of the workers said that 'chances of promotion' in 
the company are low. 
As night be expected, workers' perceptions of the present level of their 
earnings is found to be related to their earnings. The percentage of 
workers who consider the level of their earnings low decreases as earnings 
(14) 
increase however, it is interesting to note that 6 workers get more 
than EE 120 per month but 3 of them still consider the level of their 
earnings low. 
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Regarding security in the job, we suggested'previouslyýthat job security 
has a material meaning to our workers. This was supported by the responses 
obtained when we asked them whether they consider the present level of 
security in their jobs'high, moderate or low. We used the analysis of 
variance to examine the effects of some variables on workers' perceptions 
of job security. The independent variables are: Occupation, education, 
hometown, marital status, and earnings as covariate. The results of 
ANOVA reveal that the equation is significant at the 5 percent level, 
and it explains 8e9 percent of the total variance. Earnings has a 
significant effect at the 1 percent level, and marital status has a 
significant effect at the 5 percent level 
(15) 
0 
Cross-tabulating workers' perceptions of the level of job security 
by earnings indicates that as workers' earnings increase, lower percentages 
consider the level of security low. For example, while 16 percent of 
the workers who get EE60 or less per month said that the level of job 
security'is low, 3 out of 42 (7 percent) workers who get EE81 to 100 
(16) 
per month gave'the same answer 
With respect to marital status, while 1 out of 27 single workers 
considered the'level of job security low, 14 percent of married workers 
(24 out of 174) gave the same answer. This could be because married 
workers have more financial responsibilities. And, as noted above, 
job security has material meaning to workers. 
Most managers, supervisors and foremen agreed with workers that the 
present level of workers' earnings is low, as 86 percent (N=129) of 
management said that the level is low, and 14 percent (N= 21) said that 
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the level is moderate. On the other hand, the responses indicate that a 
higher percentage of the supervisory staff said that the level of security 
is high, than the percentage of workers. For, while 13 percent of the 
workers said that job security is high, 17 percent of foremen and super- 
visors, and 34 percent of the higher levels of management said that the 
(17) 
present level of security in workers' jobs is high . This could be 
because management think of job security in a different way. l4anagement 
may think of workers' security in terms of guaranteeing the job rather 
than earnings from the job, and as noted before, management cannot aismiss 
workers. At the same time, there are some factors which reduce the 
effectiveness of the disciplinary system in the company Therefore, 
management may think that workers have too 'much security in their jobs. "' 
On the basis of the evidence presented in this section, it would appear 
that most workers and management agreed togetherthat the present level 
of workers' earnings is low. It is bLlso indicated that workers perceive 
job security in terms of their earnings, Le, the level of workers' 
earnings affects their perceptions of the level of security in their jobs. 
The Workers and their Jobs; 
In the previous sections workers were asked directly about their needs ana 
the level felt to be present in their jobs. In this section we shall approach 
the same issue but from a different standpoint. Workers were asked some 
questions about their jobs to help explore their orientation to work. 
First, workers were asked whether they think about their jobs after work. 
Overall, 78 percent of the workers, do not think about their jobs after work. 
Analysing the responses by occupation shows that maintenance workers who 
think about their jobs after work are more than those in the other two 
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groups of workers, as reported in the following table: 
TABLE 5/5 
Uhether Workers think auout their Jobs after Work by Occupatior 
Auxiliary biachine ýiaintenance Occupation Workers Operators Workers Total 
Think about the job N /0 N% N . 14) N% 
Yes 5 14.7 19 16.3 20 40 44 21.9 
No 29 85.3 98 83.7 3U 60 157 78.1 
Total No of I 34 100 117 luo 50 1UU 2U1 100 
respondents 
Note x2 = 15.747 P 1,01 
The following are typical of the replies given by worKers who saiO that 
they do not think about their jobs after work: 
"I forget everything related to work at the gate of the plant". 
"I go back home unable even to talk, I sleep directly 
after eating". 
'To you want me to kill myself, isn't eight hours enough? " 
"When I go back home, I find other kinas of proolems". 
Workers who said that they think about their jobs after work were asKed, 
which things they think about. We founa that auxiliary workers and 
machine operators think about the effort 1which they exert at work, 12 
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percent and 9 percent respectively. kaintenance workers, on the other 
hand, said that they think about a problem related to the work itself, 
22 percent, or the work done during the day, 14 percent 
(19) 
. As noted 
in chapter 4, maintenance workers' responsibilities are different'from 
the responsibilities of machine operators anddWxiliary workers. hencet 
maintenance workers may have more things in their jobs to think about. 
For instance, they may think about the machines they have repaired, ana 
they may also think of any problems facing them in other machines. What 
makes the task of maintenance workers more difficult is the lack of 
training in the company. Even for new machines, no planned training 
(20) 
programmes are carried out. 
Workers were further asked whether they would prefer to do another job 
in the company. The responses indicate that nearly one third of machine 
operators would like to be transferred to another job. At the same time, 
27 percent of auxiliary workers, and 10 percent of maintenance workers 
(21) 
said that they would like to do another job . When we asked workers 
which job they prefer, 15 percent of both auciliary workers and machine 
operators said that they prefer maintenance jobs. Also, 7 percent o. I' 
machine operators said'that they would prefer to do any other job on the 
shop-floor but not machine operator 
(22) 
. Workers were also asked why 
they prefer the other job which they mentioned. We founa that 'Less 
effort needed' come, as the first reason. Surprisingly, hi, -:, her percentage 
of younger workers mentioned this reason than olaer workers, 18 percent 
(23) 
and 10 percent resepctively This could be because workers' earnings 
are not related to their effort, as will be demonstratea in the next chapter. 
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Another reason could be that workers would like to save their effort 
(24) 
because they have a second job outside the company 
To summarise, most workers consider their jobs merely as a means to an 
end. Among the different aspects of the job money appears to be the one 
which causes the greatest concern among workers. At the same time, 
getting a job which needs less effort or gives more money predominated 
in the replies of the workers who said that they would prefer another, 
job in the company. 
This conclusion is one that is supporteci further by^the responses- 
obtained when workers were asked, if they could change one thingýin 
their jobs what would it be. The following table shows workers' 
responses: 
TABLE 5/6 
What Workers would like to change in their Jobs by Education 
Education Illiterate 
Primary Secondary Total 
Preparatory 
Things to be changed N 
V/ 
,0 
01 N ,Q N % 14 5. 
To get more money 98 77.8 35 68.7 12 54.6 145 73 
Fairer treatment from 
management 6 4.8 7 13.7 5 22.6 18 9. U 
Better chances for 
promotion 11 8.7 5 9.8 1 4.6 17 6.5 
Better health service 11 8.7 4 7.6 1 4.6 id b. C; 
To be equipped with 
tools 0 0 00 3 13.6 3 1.5 




Note x2 = 34.959 P tul 
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As can be seen from the table, overall, 73 percent of the workers said 
that they would like more money. It is also noted that there is an inverse 
relationship between the level of education and asking for 'more money' 
and a proportional relationship between the level of education and- asking 
for 'fairer treatment'. This cannot be interpreted to mean that higher 
educated workers ask for 'fairer treatment' more than money. Higher 
educated workers expect to get higher wages, find good opportunities for 
promotion, and find the tools which they need in their jobs. Howevert 
as will be demonstrated. in the next chapter, length of service affects 
(25) 
workers' earnings more than education . Because of that higher ecucated 
workers ask for 'fairer treatment'. It was demonstrated quite clearly 
during the interview survey that educated workers meant by 'fairer 
treatment' to be paia according to their effort and the nature of their 
jobs. As one of the secondary level workers put it: 
"I do the same job as that man. I spent 12 years in 
schools and he cannot even write his name. Why does he 
get over a hundred pounds and I get only 55 pounds? 
Don't say that he has experience. When we repair a 
machine, he doesn't understand what he is doing, he 
just does it as he saw others coing it. We were 
taught in schools what ýý 
'j_do 
and why, but our wages Ec 
are lower, why? we doýsame jobs and worX the same hours! " 
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CONCLUSION 
The first result which emerges from our survey is that, the workers cited 
in the study are instrumentally oriented. They emphasise the importance 
of pay whenever they talk about their jobs. This confirms our first 
hypothesis. The second hypothesis is also supported, since management 
placed four characteristics differently. These characteristics are; 
friendly and helpful fellow workers, secure future, fringe benefits, and 
chances of promotion. Our third hypothesis is also confirmed by the 
results of the survey. For it was found that the percentage of supervisors 
and managers who considered the present level of security in workers' 
jobs high is more than the percentage of the workers who gave the same 
answer. 
A not altogether surprising conclusion is that materid incentives still 
serve as the key motivator of our workers. Therefore, to control those 
workers, management need to dependupon means relatea to material 
incentives. As noted before, in a bureaucratic mode these means are 
based on a structure of rewards and sanctions. On the basis of our 
results there is little evidence that job redesign or participation 
in management have importance for motivation of those workers, for they 




(1) Appendix (1), table (10). 
(2) The'-six characteristics were-written on a card which was handed to 
educated respondents to select the most important three. Regarding 
illiterate workers, the characteristics were first read to them twice 
and after that one by one to select the most important three. 
(3) This will be discussed in detail in chapter 8. 
(4) According to Law 48,1978, to dismiss a worker, a committee should first 
consider his'case. This committee must be composed of: (1) the head 
of employment office of the governorate where the company is located, 
(2) a representative of workers' union,,. and (3) a representative of the 
company management. The committee examines a worker's case and write 
" recommendation to the chairman of the company, wýo cannot dismiss 
" worker unless it is recommended by that committee (Law 48,1978, clause 
85). 
We use marital status as a proxy for family responsibilities because of 
two reasons: (1) using the number of children only is not enough for 
childrens' ages affect fathers' financial responsibilities, for 
example, a worker may have 5 children but 4 of them have grown up, 
while another worker may have 3 children who are still young, and 
(2) only 6 percent of married workers in our sample have 1 child, and 
87 percent have 2 children or more. 
Appendix (1), table (11). 
The same equation was used to analyse management responses but the 
result was not significant. 
(7) Appendix (1), table (12). 
The same equation was used to test management responses on the s 
question, but the result was not significant. 
(8) Appendix (1), table (13). 
(9) This point will be discussed in detail in chapter 
(10) McClelland, D C, op. cit., p 527. 
(11) Goldthorpe, et. al., op. cit, p 37. 
(12) Vamplew, C, op-cit. 
(13) Slocum J W, et. al., op-cit. 
(14) Appendix (1) , table (14). 
(15) Appendix (1), table (16). 
(16)'Appendix (1), table (17). 
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(17) Appendix (1),, table (18). 
(18) This will be discussed in detail in chapter 10. 
(19) Appendix (1), table (20). 
(20) Lack of training in the company will be discussed in chapter 12. 
(21) Appendix (1) , table (2 1) . 
(22) Appendix (1), table (22). 
(23) Appendix (1), table (23). 
(24) Evidence on this point is presented in chapter 11. 
(25) Promotion opportunities will be discussed in chapter 8. 
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hAPTERSIX 
ThE COi',, FANY UiAGES AND 6ALARY bIRUCTURE 
lhe results reportea in the previous chapter revealea that earnin&s 
was consicerea the ri, ost important job-relatea characteristic to our 
workers. 
'Therefore, 
the payment system coula ue an importaut managerial 
tool for motivation ana control over tnose workers. 
Cur hypothesis is: - 
The relationship between PaY ana performance is weax, which re6uces the 
effectiveness of tne payment system as a means of labour control in the 
company. 
In order to examine this hypothesis, we are concernea in this chapter 
with earnings function analysis to ey4ilore -. pay aifferentials in the 
company. In the next chapter we consiaer the incentives introaucea 0ý 
the company management as a means of motivation anu control over %orxers 
in the proauction area. 
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blanagement use different means of motivation and control in orcer to 
enhance workers' performance, as notea before. According to the human 
capital theory, individuals' performance depends on the knowledge ana 
skills people invest in themselves through eaucation ana training, ana 
this is what Schultz calls 'human capital formation ' human capital 
theorists assert that indivicuals' investment in eaucation and training 
depenus on the return of this process. Becker, for example, says that: 
"The most important single ueterminant of the amount 
investea in numan capital may well I)e its profitability 
or rate of return" (2) 
Returns to investment in eaucation are two types: private ana social. 
(3) In this stucy we are concemea with private rates of return 
The human capital theory has ueen criticisea by Bowles ana Gintis. Their 
main criticism is that the theory consiaeres labour as a commoaity which 
can be exchanged, and coes not pay attention to class conflict or social 
ana political factors. For example, they say that in the Unitea States: 
"Black ana female, t%ho are by ana large excluaea from 
exercising authority over any but workers of their own 
sex ana race, are liKely for this reason to earn lower 
returns to schoolinký". k4) 
But we believe that these are aistortions, aria ao not prove that rlie 
human capital theory is incorrect, as will be aiscussea later in this 
chapter. 
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In order to encourage people to improve their skills', a rational wa, ý, es 
ana salary structure rewaras eaucation ana on-the-job training ie, 
experience, as they increase indiviauals' proauctive capacity. The 
Earnings curve coittinues to rise %itn experience up to a certain point, 
then it flattens ana may start to turn downwarcs. Ihis is because after 
a certain pbirit inaiviauals' proauctive capacity might start 
to aecrease because of, for example, aepreciation of' eclucation ana loss 
of mental or physical vigour. 
Performance'is also affectea by, indiviauals' behaviour at the uorkpla: ce, 
as they may-acquire the needea xnowleage aria skills but turn tip late or 
absent themselves from work. Therefore, a rational wages aria salary 
structure neeas also to rewara resporisiole oehaviour wnich fits in with 
management objectives. Annual increments aria promotion coula be usea 
for this . urpose. In oraer to enhance worKers' effort, givin, 6--, or 
withholaing these rewaras neea to Ue seen to De baseu on performance. 
Performance appraisal could Le used to establish an inbtrumental 
relationship between performance and these re-waras. Discipline allo - 
affects pay, but on the negative siue, and coula be usea as another 
device of control over our workers who are instrumentally orientea. 
In this chapter an attempt will De made to explore the effects of 
education ana experience on our respanuents' earnin6s. The other 




Nincer cieveloped the following function for the analysis of logaritnmic 
earnings profiles: 
(b) 
In E=E0+r5+ rp f,, j= 1n Ys * rpi, 
E gross earnings in period j 
E= initial earning capacity 
0 
rss= return for schooling 
rPki= return for post-school investment 
Ys= initial earnir,, i; s after completion of s years of schooling 
This function seems appropriate, and we consider it the basis of earnings 
function analysis for our respondents. 
Earnings Function Analysis: 
In Egypt the wages and salary btructure of the puulic sector is governed 
by Law. The structure proviaed by Law No 48 of 1978 was intendea to be 
guidance for public enterprise management. Each'enterprise was expected 
to establish its own structure in tile light of the structure grantea by 
k7) 
the Law, and on the basis of a joO evaluation programme . liowever, 
with few exceptions, public enterprises usea the structure proviaeu Oy 
(8) 
the Law without any chanege Law no 46 of 1976 compressea job 6raueb 
(9) 
into 9 instead of 12 previously . Another structure was introducea 
by Law No 114 of 19bl, which provices a minimum ana a maximum for each 
grade with overlaps with several higher graces. For example, the maximurn 
of the fifth grade for manual workers - LE664 - overlaps with the secona 
(lu) 
grade - EE720 to 1848 - for middle management . At the same time, Law 
114,1981 increasea the wage of the lowest grade 56 percent, but the increase 
was 18.2 percent for top grade. Also, Law 31, l! jb3 increased the wage of 
(11) 
the lowest grade by 20 percent, but only 2.4 percent for top grade 
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Therefore, it is not surprising that a stucy conaucted on seven African 
countries concluaed that: 
1ý 
"'Whether one takes nominal salary cifferentials or 
total post-tax differentials (incluaing fringe benefits 
and seconcary incomes), it is probaoly still the case- 
that there is a spectrum with low and rapidly narrowini.,, 
differential Tanzania and Egypt at one ena arid ienya at the 
other" (12). 
In order to explore pay differentials for our, respondents, both workers 
and management will be incluclect in the analysis of earnings profiles. 
This is to avoiC the effects of truncation of the sample. For example, 
as years of eaucation is higher for managers than for workers 
k13) 
1 
analysin, ý, workers' earnings separately will not show the accurate effect 
of eaucation on earnings. Therefore, to test for the effects of eaucation 
ana experience an earnings, tne followin, ý, specifications were made for the 
sample of 351 regular male employees: - 
f (s) (1) 
f (S, E) 
f (S, E, E (3) 
f (S, E, 
z2 
S E-, E). E) (4) 
w f (Sit E, L-2) (5) 
W f (S, E , E 
) (b) 
c p 
W f (S, E, ý! , EZ ,E 
(7) 
'6vhere: 
Log total earnings in i: E incluaing basic pay, nature of worK paýment, 
(14) 
inflation payment, incentives ana fixea overtime 
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S= years of schooling 
(15) 
education cummy variables with 
S= no education (base dummy) 0 
1= primary education 
(6 years) 
S2= preparatory eaucation (9 years) 
S3 secondary general (12 years) 
S4 seconuary technical (12 years) 
S5 university (17 years) 
E= years of wage employment 
E years of wage employment with current employer 
c 
Ep= years of wage employment with previous employers 
The unadjusted age-earnings profiles by years of education are presentea 
(16) 
in Graph 6/1 The profiles tena to be straight lines rather than curves. 
Also, there is no peak in the profiles cefore retirment a6e. This is 
different from the results abtainea in other stuuies in which a peaK was 
(17) 
found at a certain age . The aifference between our result6 ana the 
results obtainea in other stuaies reflects the fact that in Eiypt workers' 
starting waý, e is aeterminea accoraing to tne grade sýsteui enforcea by ;, uDlic 
sector labour law. And every year workers are awarued an annual increment, 
determined also by the Law, and as will be cemonstiatea in chapter 
ý, the 
annual increment is awardea to almost all workers. 
Vioreover, the law states that if a worker is transferred to another job in the 
zc-m. e company or in another public sector company he must be paia ttle same 
(18) 
wagge or salary which he was getting, irrespective of the nature of the jols 
Fpr example, production worKers who become disaulea curing their employment 
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are usually transferred to the company store, or to be cleaners, or any 
other job which does not require much effort. however, theý continue 
to get the same wage ana they are also auardea the annual increment 
according to their joo 6rade. As'a result, tnere is no factor which 
decreases a worKer's earnings as his age increases. 14e also note from 
Graph 6/1 that at the beginning the differential between levels of 
education is not wide. But as age increases the Cifferential bet7ween 
university graduates on the one hand, and Other levels of education 
on the other hand increases continuously. With respect to secondary level 
after tne age of about 35 the differential between their earnings and 
university earnings starts to increase considerabl, ý. This could De 
because university gracuates are promoted -to higher positions in a 
shorter time than seconcary level graduates. For example, in ESCO 
university graduates at the age of 40 to 45 are either departmerit 
manaýýers or plant managers while secondary graQuates at the same aje are 
(1! 9) 
not more than section managers 
The results of applying regression analysis to test for the effects of 
education and experience on earnings profiles confirm the importance of 
(20) 
years of employment experience in the determination of earnings (Table 6/1) 
Education explains 0.01 percent of the variance in earriin&s (equation 1). 
The addition of years of employment experience in equation (2) increases 
the explanatory power of the earnin6s function by riot less -Lian 63 percent. 
As mi6ht be expected from the urapnical presentation, the coefficient on 
the square of years of experience is trivial aria not significant. This 
confirms that earnings profiles Lo riot turn cownwaras before retirement 
age. 
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We can also see from table 6/1 that, the squarecf years of education 
and, the interaction term of education and experience improve the 
explanatroy power of the function by about 4 percent. The ccefficient on 
the interation term (S. E) is not significant, but the coefficient 
on the square of years of education is significant. This suggests that 
there are differences in the rates of return for different levels of 
(21) 
education . To estimate these differences education was entered in 
a dummy form with years ofemployment experience, Equation (5) shows 
that the advantage for a university aegree is only 64 percent of the 
average earnings of a person with no education. Secondary technical 
graduates receive a greater premium than those with secondary general 
education. For while the first group receive about 31 percent over an 
illiterate person, the latter gain only aoout 19 percent. Ibis is a 
reflection of the shortage of maintenance workers. in the company. 

































Coefficients on Education ana Employment Total Exoerience 
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant term 4.417 3.599 3.543 3.653 3.612 
S 0.0041 0.029* 0.028* -0.0lb7* 
E 0.032* 0.039* O. U321--d* 0.0356* 
E3 -0.0001 -O. OU005 -0.0001 
0.0030* 
5. E U. 0003 
0.0517 
S2 O. Gull 
S U. 19U6* 
S U. 3143* 
U. 63cc* 
R 0.0011 0.640 0.641 u. 678 U. 704 
F 1.395 311 209 146, llýý 
90.48 
4.08 
E 22. u5 
N 351 
* significant at the 1 percent level. 
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In order to estimate the rates of return for previous ana current employment 
experience, we entered the two variables with education in other specifi- 
cations (Table 6/2) 
(23) 
'. As might'be expectedi previous and current 
employment experience affect earnings ctiffer ently. ýdhile the rate of 
return for previous experience is 2.5 percent per year, it is 3.3 percent 
per year for current experience (equation 6). In equation 7, when total 
experience and current experience are enterea together, we see that the rate of 
return to "job specific-skills" is nearly 1 percent per year, aaded to 
the return-for total experience. This result is consistent with the 
human capital theory. Blinder, for example, points out that: 
"there is every reason to believe that the two (experience 
relevant to the present job and previous experience) 
should affect wages differently" (24). 
This is certainlY rightg because previous experience increases indiviauals' 
general skills. On the other hand, job/specific skills tena to rise as 
years of experience on a specific job increase* hence, earnings aifferentials 




Coefficients on Employment Current Experience, Previous Experience and 
Education 
Equation (6) (7) 




E 0.033* 0.00959* 
c 
E 0.0229* 
Sz * 0.00292 
E G. UUUUU4 
R 0.645 0.663 
F 212 15 1 




E 22. U5 
N 351 
* significant at--the I percent level. '' " 
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In order to test for the effects of eQucation on the earnings of cohorts 
who joinea work at different timest we computed the return for eaucation 
with the sample stratified by total experience. The results are presented 
in table 6/3. The analysis reveals that the rate of return for education 
rises to a peak for individuals with between 16 to 20 years of em. ploymen-1. 
experience. According to the D'Uncerian concept of 'overtaking' or 'cross- 
over', this result suggests that observed earnings become equal to potential 
, perience 
(25). 
earnings durin,; this period, ie, between 16 and2Q years of work ex 
At -the peak, the rate of return for eaucation is about 4 percent per year 
of education. This rate is very low compared to the rate of return 
estimated for some developirw; countries. According to Psacharopoulos' 
estimation, the rate of return is around 14 percent for the averaZe 3(ear of 
education in developing coun-cries The overall rate of return is low 
because the rate of return for primary and preparatory is low and not 
si, -. nificant (Table 6/1). Even at university level the rate of return is 
(27) 
6.2 percent per annum 
TABLZ 6/3 
Coefficient on Education with the Sample Stratified Dy Total Experience 
Total experience 
in years -7 
6-15. 16-20 21-25 2t). 30 31+ 
Coefficient 0.023* 0.032-* 0.0.39* G. U23* U. U26* 0.006 
R 0.21 U. 414 0.561 U. 311 U. 173 -U. 004 
F 10.31 46.16 43.26 32.56. 13.36 U. u7o 
A 53 70 60 66 1CI3 121 
N 36 65 33 74 UG 76 
i., ean years of 8.28 7.46 6.95 4.47 2 65 1.10 education . 
*si&nificant at the I percent level. 
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To establish whether experience adds jjroportioriallý more to the earnin, 6s 
of higher levels of education, the sample was stratifiec, by level of 
education (Table 6/4). ke can see that tne sinj: ýle variable, years of %ork 
experience, explainea between 63 ana bl percent of variation in the 
earnings of different levels of eaucation. This confirms that uages 
and salary structure tenus to reward length of service rather than are 
other factor. The rate of return for a year of experience rangea from 
2.7 percent to about 3.7 percent, bur, followea no consikitent pattern. 
For example, the rate of return for a year of experience is nigher for 
preparatory than secoricary level, about 3.7 percent aria 3.2 percent 
respectively. i-ioreover, the rate its ýequal for uoth preparatory anu 
university levels, about 3.7 percent per year lor the two level. 6. This 
may mean that the effect of eaucation is ailutea by other factors such as 
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In summary, the previous results indicate that earnin6s are mostly 
determined by years of employment experience. Also, none of the a6e- 
earnings profiles appears to be turning downwards with advancing years. 
In the next section of this chapter we examine production workers' and 
management perceptions of wages and salary structure. 
Perceptions of the Structure of Wages and Salary: 
le first asked whether production workers' earnin6s depend on their 
effort. As might be expected, the majority of both workers ana man4., ement 
said 'no', 99 percent and 91 percent respectively. lhhen we asked them 
why, the important reason mentioned by the two groups was "because 
a worker's earnings depend upon his waý; e grade but effort depends upon 
his conscience" (75 percent of workerdresponses and 85 percent of manage- 
ment responsesl. 
Older workers argued that they have spent -their life in the companyp 
and that it is fair they should be paid more. lioreover, they said 
that younger workers can have a second job in the private sector, for 
(28) 
they are still fit and healthy . Younger workers, on the other hana, 
aid not agree. In their opinion, they co the same jobs ana they have 
family responsibilities like older workers. Therefore, it is unfair, 
as they said, to be paid less than older workers. T, ýie followin, ýý, are 
typical of the comments given by workers with -ýhorter ienýýth of service: 
"I do the same job as that ran, he gets a hLuiurea ana 
twenty pounas per month and I C-bet only seventy pounas. I buy meat once a month, last time Giy ýoungest caughter 
atemy piece of' meat. I was happy, but I have to wait till 
next month". 
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"As you see, I an. doing the same job as that old r,. an, 
so why do they pay him double my wage. he owns a 
house and I pay 15 pounas per month as a rent". 
"I have to feed my family. Isy wage here is not enough, 
I go to another job in the afternoon. I aon't worx 
hard here, but I give them effort equal to their money". 
As workers' wages are mostly related to their length of service rather 
than their performance, the question emerges about the usefulness of 
supervision in increasing production. t,, hen we asked production 
management about this point 87 percent of foremen and supervisors, 
ana 86 percent of the higher levels of management dia not agree that 
if worKers are closely supervised production will increase. They gave 
three reaons for that. First, they thinK that more money is the best 
way to push workers to work harcer (51 percent of the responses). 
Secona, some said that workers' desire to worK is more imiortant than 
supervision (38 percent of the respon6es). The third reason is that, 
trying to solve the problems which casue machine stoppage is more 
important than supervision (11 percent of the responses). The following 
are typical of management comments regarding this point: 
"A worker can produce in eiýLht hours the amount expected 
in only six hours, and as long as he is working I cannot 
say anything. he may work slowly, but he is workin,,,. 
A worker's desire is very important". 
"To get the best from workers, we have first to kive them 
enough money. '"-e know that most of them have other joDs, 
but what can they co? They have family respon. -iibilities". 
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"In the public sector there is no conscience, everybody 
says it is not mine, it is not yours, 'A festival without 
a director' (29)". 
The previous responses indicate that both workers and management agreea 
together that workers' performance Qepends on their conscience rather 
than pay. At the same time, management responses reveal that supervision 
alone is not enourý, h to motivate workers to exert more effort and improve 
their performance. This result is not aifferent from the results 
.. 
(30) 
obtainea in other stuaies 
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C014CLUSION 
Some of our findings are consistent witli the human capital theoryt and 
some are not. The analysis revealed that the rate of return for current 
experience is more than the rate of return for previous experience. 
This, as noted before, is consistent with the human capital theory 
assumptions. Since productive capacity in a particular job tends to 
increase with years of experience in that job, it needs to be rewarded 
more than previous experience. 
Our analysis also suggests that the rate of return for education 
increases with years of employment experience till it reaches a peak, 
then starts to decrease. This is also, as notea before, consistent with 
the assumptions of the human capital theory. 
On the other hand, the human capital theory sug, ýests that earninas 
profiles increase with rising experience (and with a6e as a proxy for 
experience) till they flatten, and may turn cownwaras after that. Our 
results do not conform this assumption. For it was found that earnings 
profiles tend to be straight lines which do not turn aownwarcs till 
retirement age. We believe that this is not because the assumiptions 
of the human capital theory are incorrect. For inuivicuals' proauctive 
capacity tends to increase with experience till it reaches a peak. Ana 
because of ageing it may not only flatten, but also start to ý, o down. 
This Cistortion in our results is because the wa,, es and salarý; structure 
of the company is governed by the public sector labour law. According 
to that law, as notea before, individuals are 8uaranteea their iýay 
40bS. irrespective of any chanýýes in their abilities or the nature of tAeir j 
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Also, as will be demonstrated in chapter 9p they are Zuaranteed their 
annual increments to a large extent. Added to that, all citizens who 
have jobs in the'public sector or the civil service are sometimes 
awarded exceptional raises by Presicential decrees on certain occasions, 
(31) 
such as the feast of Raraaan or workers' festival . As a result, 
individuals' earnings continue to increase with age irrespective of 
their productive capacity. 
By and large, the results reported in-this chapter support our hypothesis 
that, the relationship between pay and performance is weak, which 
reduces the effectiveness of the payment system as a means of control 
in the company. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
TEE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PAYMENT IN THE COMPANY 
As noted in the previous chapter, workers' earnings include four - 
components: basic pay, nature of work payment, inflation payment, and 
incentives. The first three components are set by, law. With respect 
to the fourth component, ie, incentives, enterprise management has more 
(1) 
freedom to establish its own scheme In this chapter we examine 
the effectiveness of the incentive scheme introduced by the company 
management as a means of motivation and control over production workers. 
In ESCO, machine operators get twotypes of incentive payment. These 
are: (1) a piece rate payment depending on the amount of production 
on an individual basis, and (2) an additional incentive paid in mid 
month. This additional incentive-is calculated on the"basis of the piece-rate 
payment to every machine operator in the previous month. 
With respect to other production workers and the supervisory staff they 
get an incentive depending on the average of the second type of incentive 
paid to machine operators. They also get it in mid month when machine 
operators get their second type of incentive payment. 
We shall first consider the piece-rate system, then the second type of 
incentive which covers all production workers and management. 
The Piece-Rate System: 
When a worker is transferred from one job to become a machine operator, 
20 pounds are deducted from his total earnings. This amount is refunded 
to the worker in the form of a piece-rate payment calculated on the basis 
of the rate established for particular machines. The rest of the workers' 
earnings, after deducting the 20 pounds, is considered a 'guaranteed wage' to 
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the worker. Regarding the effectiveness of the piece-rate system in 
the company, it was noted that machine operators do not know the amount 
of piece-rate payment in total earnings. Every worker gets with his monthly 
earnings a wage slip which shows only total earnings and the details of 
(2) 
deductions Therefore, piece-rate payment loses its effectiveness as 
an incentive. For, as noted in chapter 3, a piece-rate system could be 
effective when: (1) the amount of piece-rate payment is high enough to 
encourage more effort, and (2) workers know how much they get as piece-rate 
payment, so that they know the outcome of exerting more effort in their jobs 
(3) 
Because our workers did not know piece-rate payment, we did not have the 
opportunity to include it in the questionnaire as a separate item in 
(4) 
workers' earnings Instead, we obtained some data on piece-rate 
payment to a sample of workers from the records of the company. 
Table 7/1 shows that. the percentage of piece-rate payment to total 
earnings is higher for workers with shorter fength of service. For 
example, the percentage of piece-rate payment to worker number 1 in the 
table is 67 percent of his total earnings, but it represents about 29 per- 
cent of the total earnings for worker number 8 in the table. We can also 
see from the table that workers numbers 1,2 and 3 in the table get the 
same amount of piece-rate payment, 109.4 milliVq% per hour 
(5). 
However, 
the percentage of piece-rate payment to their total earnings is different. 
This is because the annual increments and any exceptional raises awarded 
to the workers 
(6) 
are added to the 'guaranteed wage', which is not 
affected at all by a workers' production. Hence, as a machine operator's 
length of service increases, the percentage of piece-rate payment to 
his total earnings goes down, as total earnings include the 'guaranteed 
wage' and piece-rate payment. 
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TABLE 













Millim, *: Millim % Millim % 
-2 1 164.2 54.8 33.4 109.4 66.6 
2 172.4 63 36.5 109.4 63.5 
3-7 3 232.6 123.2 53 109.4 47 
4 248.7 136.7 55 112.45 
5 243.1 133.7 55 109.4 45 
10-25 6 313.9 190.8 60.8 123.1 39.2 
7 387.9 273 70.4 114.9 29.6 
8 409.8 289.6 70.7 120.2 29.3 
9 415.7 299.3 72 116.4 28 
26+ 10 559.7 442 79.1 117.2 20.9 
11 465.2 362.8 78 102.4 22 
12 419.1 321.7 76.8 97.4 23.2 
13 558 446.7 80.1 111.3 19.9 
14 521.6 421.4 80.8 100.2 19.2 
15 487 404 83 83 17 
Source: ESCO, Wages records, 1983 
*Millim is one-thousandth part of Egyptian pound. 
It could be argued that workers with shorter length of service are motivated 
to work harder, since the percentage of piece-rate payment to their 
total earnings is higher. But the responses of both machine operators and their 
supervisors indicate that this does not sdem to be true. Machine 
operators and their supervisors were asked whether the present piece-rate 
is rather low, fairly good or excellent. The majority of machine operators 
said that the rate is low (93 percent), and about three quarters of 
(7) 
their supervisors agreed with that . The following are typical of 
workers' coimnents with respect to the present rates: 
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"The rate is calculated by millim, the rate for one kilogram 
As 3 millimp I produce 200 kilos per day which means 600 
millims, is the millim used now in the country? Do you see 
it at all? " 
"I operate 12 sheds, the average amount of my production 
is 5000 units per day,, and the rate is 11, piasters for-a 
thousand. My production gives me only 55 piasters a day, 
but my monthly earnings are eighty pounds". 
"The rate is 23 piasters for one thousand units. I produce 
on, average 4000 units per shift. If I work. hard, I may 
produce 200 units more which means less than 5 piasters. 
It is not enough to buy a kilo of tomatoesl" 
As thestandards affect the anticipated amount, of production, we also 
asked machine operators and their supervisors about the fairness of 
the present, standards in their sections. As would be expected a 
higher percentage of machine operators said that the standards are 
(8) 
.. unfair, than-their supervisors (63 percent and 36 percent respectively) 
At the same time, the majority of both machine operators and their 
supervisors agreed together thaiLthe standards have never been examined 
(97 percent and 95 percent, respectively). 
The previous result raises the question about the way of setting the 
standards in the company. When new machines are set up, the industrial 
engineering staff depend upon the catalogue of the machine to calculate 
the number of units which should be obtained if the machine works at 
the hundred percent efficiency level. As it is difficult to achieve 
the hundred per cent efficiency-level, the industrial engineering staff 
with the manager of the palnt determine the reasonable percentage of efficiency 
(9) 
which will be used for setting the standard . They depend on their judge- 
ment and their personal view to determine this percentage. The following 
formula is used for setting up the standard per shift in the company: 
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The standard amount for particular machine 
=x 60 xHxA 
where: 
number of units obtained at hundred percent efficiency level. 
60 = Minute. 
Working hours per shift. 
A= Anticipated level of efficiency. 
In summary, the piece-rate system in the company has two main short- 
comings. First, workers do not know the proportion of piece-rate payment 
in their total earnings. Second, workers consider the piece-rate low, 
which was supported by the responses of their supervisorystaff. 
The Incentive Scheme: 
In the previous section we, demonstrated the piece-rate system which 
covers only machine operators in the company. This section considers an 
additional incentive scheme which covers all shop-floor workers, 
including machine operators, and production management in our case study. 
Therefore, we use the term 'incentives' in this section to refer to this 
scheme which covers all workers and management in the production area. 
incentives are paid in mid month. Machine operators' incentives are 
calculated an the basis of their piece-rate payment in the previous 
month. For example, a worker in drawing, roving, combing, winding 
or doubling who gets EE 13.9 piece-rate payment in a certain month, 
gets 2 pounds as another-incentive in the middle of the following month. 
A worker in spinning or twisting who gets EE 13.9 as piece-rate payment, 
gets EE2.5 as another incentive in the middle of the-following month. 
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The amount of incentives, according to the company, incentive scheme, increases 
(10) 
with the amount of piece-rate payment, to workers . Therefore, both 
piece-rate payment and the additional 'incentives' to machine operators 
depend on their production. 
The average of machine operators' incentives is considered the basis 
for calculating the incentives of auxiliary and maintenace workers, and 
the supervisory staff in each section. The incentives of the supervisory 
staff, are calculated according to the following percentages: 
TABLE 7/2 






Foremen 5 150 
Shift supervisors 4 200 
Section managers 3 250 
Sections managers 2 300 
Department managers 1 400 
Source: ESCO, the incentive scheme, 1983. 
Maintenance workers get 70 percent of the incentives of the similar grade 
of the supervisory staff. For example, a maintenance worker on grade 5 
gets 70 percent of theJftcentives paid to a foreman on the same grade, i. e. 
wage grade S. Auxilliary workers are divided into two groups. The first 
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group are machine operators' helpers. This group gets 50 percent of 
the average of machine operators' incentives in each section. 'The 
second group includes other auxilliary workers such as porters, they 
get 35 percent of the average of machine Operators' incentive. 
The-literature indicates, -as noted in chapter-3, that understanding the 
reward system is a prerequisite for its, effectiveness. Therefore, the 
first question asked to our respondents was whether workers understand 
the incentive scheme. The responses reveal that a higher percentage 
of auxiliary workers said that they do not understand the-scheme than 
both machine operators and maintenance workers. -For, the percentage of the 
workers who said that they do, not understand the scheme are 32 percentr 
U 1) 13 percent, and 20 percent respectively It, can also be noted that 
a higher percentage of maintenance workers, do not understand the scheme 
than machine operators. . '. This could be because machine operators' 
incentives 
are tied to a clear factor, that is a worker's production. But with 
respect to the other two groups of workers, their incentives are calculated, 
as noted above, in an indirect way. 
The following are typical of the replies given by workers who said 
that they do not understand the incentive scheme: 
"When I go to get my incentive, I am like a person who goes 
fishing. He doesn't know what he will get". 
"I went to the wage department several times to find 
out how my incentive is calculated. Every time they 
say, don't ask, this is support from providence, 'God"'. 
"Last month I went to the cashier to get my incentives, 
but I didn't find anyl I don't know the reason, the 
wage department don't know. Who knows? " 
ill 
on the other hand, only 16 percent of foremen and supervisors, and, 8 percent 
of the higher levels of management said that workers do not understand 
the incentive scheme. 
Following that, we asked both workers and management about the factors 
used in calculating workers incentives, and whether they suggest anything 
to be taken into consideration. We found two interesting results. 
First, according to the incentive scheme, a worker who is absent more than 
5 days per month, including leave of absence, does not get any incentive 
ý (12) in that month . Workers suggested that a leave of absence, should 
not affect their incentives (61 percent of workers' responses). Management, 
on the other hand, said that one of the essential purposes of the incentive 
scheme is to reduce'absenteeism. Therefore, incentives are used as a 
means of controlling workers' absence. But is it effective in this 
regard? This question will be answered when we talk about the amount 
of incentives below. 
The second interesting result is that, workers-suggested that incentives 
should depend on effort rather than job grade (36 percent of workers' 
responses). As noted above, maintenance workers get a percentage of 
the incentives paid to the similar wage grade. Those workers argue that 
they put more effort and get less incentives than people sitting in 
offices; they meant section managers, sections managers and department 
managers. However, higher levels of management said that wage grade is used 
because it is difficult to measure maintenance workers' effort, and 
also because it does not leave any opportunity for personal relations 
to affect incentive payment. This means that higher levels of management 
use wage grade as a means of controlling incentive payment. 
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Furthermore, -we asked management-whether it is important for workers to 
understand the incentive scheme, About three quarters of, foremen and 
supervisors, and 83 percent. of the higherlevels of management said 
f. very important 
(13) 
. However, when we asked management 'what was 
done to explain the incentive scheme to workers 41 percent of foremen 
and supervisors, and 20 percent, of the higher levels of management 
said 'nothing was done'. Other 44 percent of each group, ie foremen 
and supervisors, and the higher levels, said that 'the scheme was only 
(14) 
announced to workers' They meant by this that workers were told that 
if they work harder they will get higher incentive. And in some sections, 
a copy showing the amount of incentives paid to machine operators on 
top of different amounts of piece-rate payment was posted at the door 
of the section manager's office. As most workers were illiterate, at 
best they had just an. '. idea about the incentive scheme, which is not 
enough. More than thirty years ago Lincoln stated that: 
"The primary problem in successfully installing incentive 
management is to get the desire for the plan in the minds 
of all in the organisation. This cannot be done by 
merely telling the organisation that management has 
decided to' install it and outlining the advantages that will 
result. It is not that easy" (15). 
The size of the Incentive and its Effect on Workers' Behaviour: 
The purpose of the incentive scheme in the company was to: (1) encourage 
workers to work harder during their shift, and (2). encourage workers 
to work overtime, for the company suffer from shortage of labour 
(16) 
. 
However, our survey indicates that the scheme has not achieved its second 
purpose. The reasons are in order. 
We first analysed machine operators' incentives by age. As can be 
seen from table 7/3, the percentage of incentives to total earnings has 
an inverse relationship with age. For example, the percentage of the 
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incentives of workers aged 24 years or less is nearly three times the 
percentage of the incentives of workers aged 53 years or. more. This 
is because workers' earnings go up as age increases (Graph 6/1). 
TABLE 7/3 
Machine Operators Mean Incentives and Mean Percentage of Incentives 




(EE per: -Taonth). 
Mean percentage of 
Incentive to earnings. 
N 
-24 7.33 0.17 6 
25-31 5.95 0.10 20 
32-38 6.72 0.09 25 
39-45 5.68 0.07 25 
46-52 7.13 0.08 8 
53+ 6.92 0.06 12 
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Although the percentage of incentives to total earnings is higher for 
younger machinists, they are not motivated to work overtime. For 
according to the incentive scheme of the company they can get up to 
(17) 
15 pounds as an incentive, on top of piece-rate payment, per month 
However, as table 7/3 shows, the mean incentive is not more than 7.3 
pounds per month for all machine operators. This suggests that the 
incentive schemeýdoes not motivate, either younger machinists or 
older machinists to work overtime in the company. 
Machinists do not prefer to work overtime in the company for two reasons. 
First, they said that a higher proportion of their extra effort goes to 
management incentives rather than their incentives. For as noted from 
I 
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table 7/2, the percentage of management incentives ranges between 150 
percent and 400 percent of the-average of-machine operators' incentives. 
This is confirmed by the results reported in table 7/4. This table 
shows that the amount of incentives paid to both foremen and supervisors, 
and the higher levels of management is more than the workers' incentives. 
The table also shows that the percentage of incentives to earnings is 
higher for the higher levels of management than for workers. This is 
because, as noted above, management incentives are up. to 400 percent of 
the average of machine operators' incentives. 
TABLE 7/4 
Mean Incentives and Mean Percentage of Incentives to Earnings by 
Occupation 
Occupation* Mean Range Std. Dev. 




Auxiliary workers 3.03 6 1.78 4.7 29 
Machine operators 6.39 21 5.11 8.5 96 
Maintenance workers 5.90 21 6.16 8.0 40 
Foremen and supervisors 7.92 29 6.52 7.7 74 
Higher levels of . --. . 
management 12.48 36 8.48 9.3 56 
295 
The second reason for which machine operators do not prefer to work 
overtime in the company is that because the amount of incentive is 
low, they find it more profitable to get any private work for three 
or four hours than to work an overtime shift in the company. They also 
said that after eight hours work in a weaving shed or in a spinning 
mill they become exhausted. Therefore, they find it difficult to 
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continue working for another eight hours, for they are not allowed to 
work for only a part of the overtime shift. We also have to take into 
consideration that, if a worker works 16 hours, ie two shifts, only 
eight hours will be left for him before his following shift. In the 
eight hours left, the worker needs to go back home, to rest, and come 
back to work which seems difficult. 
This indicates that workers try to manage their 'effort bargain' in a 
way which maximises their earnings. As one worker put it-. ý 
(18) "When I go back home I find mouths open .I work to 
feed them, not to increase the incentives for those 
1who live on our sweat' (19). If I heýp a builder for' 
five hours he gives me 5 pounds. But here, eight hours 
overtime in this noise for less than three pounds. I 
like my country, but I like my children more". 
Finally, workers and management were asked whether the amount of 
incentives paid to workers is sufficient. The majority said 'no'# 
98 percent of the workers, 97 percent of foremen and supervisors and 
86 percent of the higher levels of management. Those who said that 
the amount is not sufficient were asked about the sufficient amount 
to be paid to workers as incentives. The following table shows the 
proposed amount: 
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TABLE 7/5 - 
Mean-of Proposed Amounts for Workers Incentives (EE) 
Occupation Mean Std. Dev. N 
Auxiliary workers 13.8 7.9 33 
Machine operators 19.6 9.3 114 
Maintenance workers 21.1 10.8 49 
All Workers 19.0 9.7 196 
Foremen and supervisors 18.8 8.1 80 
Higher levels 17.6 6.9 54 
All management and 18.3 7.6 134 
supervisors I 
As can be see n from the table/ there is no wide discrepancy between 
workers' and managemdW suggestions. Comparing the proposed amounts 
with the amounts actually paid to workers indicates that the proposed 
amounts are more than three times the amounts actually paid (Tables 
7/4 and 7/5). At the same time, maintenance workers propose higher 
amounts than machine operators. This is due to their argument that 
they are higher in skill, and that effort is not only physical but 
also mental. For as they said, they think of how to get a machine to 
work, even after going back home sometimes. 
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With regard to the incentive scheme, the majority of both workers and 
management agreed together than the present amount of workers' incentives 
is low. The amount proposed by workers'and-management is about three 
times the present amount of workers' incentives. At the same time, 
machine operators, whose incentives are considered the basis for other 
workers' incentives, do not-prefer to work overtime so that they can get 
higher incentives. The main reason is that they find it more profitable 
to have a second job in the private sector. 
The results presented in this chapter and the previous chapter reveal 
that there is a need for revising the payment system. This is necessary 
if the company wants workers to give all their labour power instead of 
giving only part of it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The results, reported in this chapter suggest, that neither the piece-rate 
system nor the incentive scheme is effective as a means of motivation 
and control over our workers. The piece-rate system is not based 
on work study, but rather on guess-work. At the 
is considered low by most machine operators which 
them to exert more effort. Also, about three qua: 
of machine operators said that the rates are low. 
operators do not know how much piece-rate payment 
earnings. Hence, it loses its incentive effect. 
same timej the rate 
does not encourage 
rters of the supervisors 
Moreover, machine 
is in their monthly 
With, regard to the incentive scheme, the majority of both workers and 
management agreed together that the present amount of workers' incentives 
is low.. The amount proposed by workers and management is about three 
times the present amount of workers' incentives. At the same times 
machine operators, whose incentives are considered the basis for other 
workers'-incentives, do not prefer to work overtime so that they can 
get higher incentives. The main reason is that they find it more 
profitableýto have a second job in the private sector. 
The results presented-in this chapter and the previous chapter reveal 
that there is a need for revising the payment system. This is 
necessary if the company wants workers to give all their labour 
power instead of giving only part of it. 
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ChAPTEREIG ft T 
THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF PROWTION 114 THE COMPANY 
Promotion is a reward offerea to workers by their work organisations. 
our purpose in this chapter is to examine the effectiveness of promotion 
as a means of driving, performance at the workplace in our case study. 
We approach this point from two angles. First, we consider the oajective 
aspects of promotion in the company. Second, we examine workers' ana 
management perceptions of promotion in the company. 
Four hypotheses will be examinea in the present cnapter. These hýpotheses 
are: 
First: Promotion has an incentive effect on workers. 
Second: There are significant aifferences between workers' and management 
I 
perceptions of the mo6t important factor in iaentifying workers 
for promotion. 
Thira: There are no significant cifferences among workers with regara to 
tneir interest in being promotea. 
Fourth: There are no significant uifferences among worxers with regarcl 
to tneir perceptions of their chances of promotion. 
Wage Grade changes ana Promotion to higher Joos 
The important point to start with is tnat, in practice, increases in 
workers' wages, ancl changes in their responsiuilities co not necessarily 
occur together. For a worker's wage is relatea to his wage grace, wnich 
coula be changea without changing his responsibilities. Uri the other 
hana, a worker's job may be changea without getting increase in his pay, 
122 
because hisýcurrent wage graae has not ceen changea. For instance, a 
group of machine operators may be movea from the sixth to the fil'th wage 
grade, out stay in the same job. Later, when a higher jou becomes vacant, 
one of them could be promotea to that jori without changing his wage 
grade, which means getting the same wage. As a result, in our discussion 
we shall use two terms: (1) 'wake graae change$ to mean that a worker's 
wage grade only was changed but his responsibilities were not cnangea, and 
(2) 'promotion to a higher job' to mean that a worker's responsibilities 
were changed without changing his wage grade. 
Not-surprisingly, both workers and management pay more attention to 
moving workers to higher Wage graces than changes in responsibilities. 
For the former affects workers' earnings, while the latter may have no 
effect on workers' earnings. Because of that, several persons are 
involved in making the decisions re&arding uage grace chanLes, as noted 
-below. On the other hand, selecting workers for promotion to higner jous, 
according to vacancies, is usually performeu U. ý the department manager 
with advice from the sections manager. Tney then send a formal letter to 
the personnel department to inform them of the change 
Ike depend on the data obtainea from the records of the company to examine 
wage grace changes. But because no systematic uata existea in the 
records of, the comfony, with regara to promotion to higher jorj6, we 
depend on our survey to explore this aspect. 
Ikage grade changes: 
Decisions to move workers to higher wage graces were mace tnree times 
curing the last seven years. 7hebe cecisions were mace in the years 1977, 
1979 and 1981. The tenuency in the comapný is to make such aeci6ions 
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every two years, so that the available vacancies as a result of retire- 
ment or any other reason are sufficient to the neeaea effort. The process 
starts by identifying the workers who are eligible for the existing 
vacancies. This is usually performed by the plant manager with the 
department manager. They prepare a list including all workers who have 
the right to be moved to a higher wage grade according to the requirements 
of the public sector labour law. These requirements are length of service, 
and a worker's rating in performance appraisal shoula be 'excellent' 
(2) 
in two consecutive years . On the same list, the plant manager 
recommends the w. orker(s) whom ne thinks are the best to be movea to the 
higher wage grades. 
All the lists are submitted to a 'Promotion committee', who make the 
final decisions on the workers who will be movea to the higher wage 
grades. This committee is usually composed of: (1) the heaa of the 
company administration, (2) the manager of the subgroup of-factories 
where particular vacancies are being considered 
(3) 
, tile manager of the 
legal department, '(4) a member of the boarct of directors, (5) the leader 
of the union or a representative, anu (b) the manager of the factory 
(4) 
where particular vacancies are Deing consiaerea 
After 'promotion committee' aecisions are announcea, workers have the 
right to complain within fifteen aays. A 'promotion complaints committee' 
is set up to examine workers' complaints. The members of this committee 
(5) 
are usually the, members of the first committee . 'Ahile the first 
comm ittee completes its task within two months, the secona committee 
takes more than a year. For example, workers' complaints about the 
committee decisions in Decen, ber 1981, were Oeing examinea till June 
(6) 
1983 The reason could be that, the workers who con-plain may have 
the right to be movea to higher wage graaes. Therefore, the secolla 
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committee do not fina their task easy, especially if there are no vacant 
wage graces* 
To explore the chances available for proauction worxers to be movea to 
a higher wage graae, we take for example wage graae four, iE 396-1212 
(7) 
according to Law 31,1983 
The company recoras showed that 204 out of 1U, 675 people, about 2 percent, 
(8) 
in wage grade five, were moved to wage grace four in 1981 . The 
company tends, as noted before, to move people to higher graaes every 
two years. This means that about 1 percent per annum have the chance 
to be moved from wage grace five to wage grace four. -- 
Another interesting finaing is that only 9 out of the 264 people, *no 
were moved to wage graue four, got increases in their wae , es as a result 
(9) 
of being moved to a higher wa&e grade . According to the wages and 
salary structure there is, as noted in chapter U, a wide overlap vetween 
the starting of each wage grade and the maximum pay for the lower wage 
grade 
(10) 
. Becaus6 of that, a worker may oe moved to a hi6her wa6e graue 
but get no increase in his wage, which could be hikher than the starting 
of the higher wage grace to which he was moved. 
Promotion to Higher Jobs 
We depend on our survey to aemonstrate promotion to higher jobs, i. e. 
changes in responsibilities. Luring the fieldworK we made it clear to our 
responaents that we meant by 'promotion' changes in respon6iuilities ana 
not 'wage grade change'. 
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The responses revealed that 41 percent of our workers were promoted to 
jobs with different responsibilities. In order to test for the effects 
of some variables on workers' promotion, we used the analysis of variance. 
The independent variables in the equation are: education, hometown, 
occupation, and length of service as covariateo 'we entered hometown 
because 'having frienas or relatives in the companyl was mentionea by-. 
workers as an important reason for working with the company The 
results of ANOVA are reported in the following table: 
TABLE 8/1 
The Effect of Some Variables on Workers' Promotion 





Covariates 2.649 0.000 
Length of service 2.649 O. OOU 
Main Effects 1 2.166 0.134 
Occupation 1.023 u. u72 
Education 0.467 U. 489 
Hometown U. 015 U. 2Uýo 
Two-way interactions 2. ýi64 U. 496 
Occupation Education 0.785 U. b64 
Occupation Hometown 0.22b 0.879 
Education hometown 1.848 U. 148 




As can be seen from the table, the equation is significant at the 1 
percent level and it explains 31 percent of the total variance. Length 
of service has significant effect on worxers' promotion, at the 1 percent 
level, and occupation has significant effect at the 1U percent level. 
When we cross-tabulated length of service by 'whether workers have 
been promoted', we found that the percentage of workers who have been 
(12) 
promoted increases with length of service till 30 years then decreases 
This could be because a higher percentage of older workers are illiterate. 
For example, while 28 percent of workers aged less than 30 years are 
(13) 
illiterate, 79 percent of workers aged between 4U and 49 are illeterate 
Those illiterate workers cannot read production oruers or fill in the forms 
needed at work. Hence, it is more difficult for those illiterate workers 
to be promoted. 
Cross-tabulating 'whether workers were promoted' by occupation showed that 
the percentage of auxiliary workers who were promotea is less than the 
(14) 
percentages of Doth machine operatorsand maintenance workers . This cm 
is expected, because auxiliary workers' length of service is less than 
the length of service of both machine operators and maintenance workers. 
And as noted above, length of service has a significant effect on 
workers' promotion. 
As table 8/1 shows, the effect of eaucation on "whether womers have 
been promoted' is not significant. This could be because our analysis 
did not include production workers who were promoted to the supervisory 
level 
(15) 
. This truncation of the sample might have aepressed the effect 
of education on promoting worKers to higher jobs. 
We also asked workers who were promotea aDout the rjumber of times they I 
have been promotea. The responses reveal that 59 percent of our workers 
have never been promoted, 34 percent have been promotea once, ana 7 
(16) 
percent have been promotea twice 
In orcer to test for the effects of some variables on the Inumuer of times 
I of promotion', we used the analysis of variance- The inaeperiaent 
127 
variables are: eaucation, occupation, hometown, and length of service 
as covariate. The following, table shows the results of the analysis: 
TABLE 6/2 
The Effects of Some Variables on the Numoer of Times of' 'Workers' Promotion 





Covariates 5.317 O. OOU 
Length of service 5.317 O. (JUU 
Main Effects 3.684 O. U92 
Occupation 1.926 0.040 
Education 1.24o U. 24U 
Hometown 0.731 0.291 
Two-way Interactions 5.213 0.35u 
Occupation Eaucation 1.6b6 O. 4b4 
Occupation hometown 0.274 0.919 
Education hometown 2.959 U. 129 
Explained 30.522 U. OUU 
Residual 51. b96 
Total 82.218 
We can see from the table that the equation is significant at the I 
percent level, and it explains 37 percent. of the total variance. Len&th 
of service has a significant effect at the 1 percent level, ana occupation 
effect is significant at the 5 percent level. 
The responses reveal that 'number of times of workers promotion' increases 
with length of service. For example, none of the workers with lu years 
or less was promoted twice, while aDout 16 percent of the workers with 
21 to 30 years of service were promotea twice(17) 0 
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Cross-tabulating 'number of times of promotion' by occupation shows that 
only 1 out of 117 machine operators was promoted twice, 2 out of 34 
auxiliF-rY workers were promoted twice, but 2U percent (h=lU) of 
maintenace workers were promoted twice This result is not surprising, 
for some maintenance workers may have started as auxiliary workers, and 
were transferred to machine operators. 
As noted above, 2 auxiliary workers were promoted twice. It may be 
wondered, how a worker can be promoted twice and still be an auxiliary 
worker. This is because some macnine operators become unaule to exert 
the needea effort when they get olaer. But the company cannot fire them 
or ask them to retire early. Therefore, the company management transfer 
such workers to an easy job, such as collecting empty cones. Thosetwo 
auxil. iary workers who wer6 promoted 'twice, are of those ola woricers 
who were promoted beforep but because of a&eing they were transferred to 
easier jobs. 
To summarise, changes in workers' responsibilities are not necessarily 
related to wage grade changes. The data obtainea from the records of 
the company showed that the chances for moving workers from wage grade 5 
to wage grade 4 is about 1 percent per annum. On the other hand, 59 
percent of our workers have never been promoted. Ana among the other 
41 percent, 34 percent were promoted once. These results indicate that 
both 'wage grade change' ana 'promotion to higher jobs' are limitea in 
the company. 
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Perceptions of the Importance and Chances of Promotion in the Company: 
As noted before, there are wide overlaps in the company wages ana salary 
structure. As a result, a worker can stay in the same wage grade for 
a long time before reaching the maximum, of that wage grade. For example, 
a worker can spena about 20 years before reaching the maximum of wage 
grade five 
(19). 
- Because of that, we thought it would Ue more interesting 
to focus in our survey on 'promotion to higher jobs', ie. changes in 
workers' responsibilities rather than on 'wage graae chan&es'. Therefore, 
our following analysis is about promoting workers to jobs with aifferent 
responsibilities. 
In order to avoid confusing 'wage grade chan&es' with 'promotion to 
higher jobs', we told every interviewee before talking about this section 
in the questionnaire that we meant the latter not the first chan6es. In 
the following analysis we use tne term 'promotion' to mean chang-es in 
workers' responsibilities. 
Workers' Interest in being Promotea : 
Workers were asxed about their interest in being, promoteu to jous with 
different responsibilities. Ike also asked management about their 
perceptions of workers' interest in promotion. In chapter 5 while 
management ranked promotion third in importance to workers, workers 
(20) 
ranked it sixth, ie. the least important job-relatea characteristic 
The results obtained here confirm the previous results. For management 
think that workers are interestea in being promotea more than the 
workers themselves said, as the following taole shows: 
130 
TABLE 8/3 
Workers' and Eanagement Perceptions of 1ý; orkers Interest in being Promotea 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher levels Total Supervisors of management 
Interested N% 11 % N /a N ", a 
Not at all 91 45.3 13 15.1 6 9.4 110 31.3 
Not much 30 14.9 16 18.6 11 17.2 57 16.3 
Very much 80 39.8 57 66.3 47 73.4 184 5 
Total 201 lou 86 1UU 64 lou , 351 100 
2 
Note X= 44.723 1,01 
In order to examine the effects of some variables on workers' interest 
in being promoted, we usea the analysis Of variance. The independent 
variables in the equation are: education'p- occupation'g''hometown, and' 




The Effects of some Variables on Workers' Interest in being Promoted 





Covariates 0.278 0.542 
Length of service 0.278 0.542 
Main Effects 15.447 U. 006 
Occupation 0.820 0.578 
Education 9.517 0.006 
Hometown 0.562 0.667 
Two-way interaction 6.661 0.900 
Occupation Education 2.725 0.723 
Occupation hometown 0.250 U. 9b7 
Education Hometown 1.605 0.904 
Explained 39.155 0.002 
Residual 131.24 
Total 170.397 
As can be seen from the table, the equation is significant at the 
I -percent level, and explains 23 percent of the total variance in 
workers' interest in being promoted. Ihe table also shows that eaucation 
is the only variable which has a significant effect, at the 1 percent 
level. 
Cross-tabulating workers' interest in being promoted by education shows 
that a higher percentage of more educated workers are interestea in being 
promoted. For example, while about 27 percent of illiterate workers said 
that they were very much interested in being promotea, about 7U percent 
of workers with preparatory education, and 82 percent of workers with 




Some workers were interested in being promoted, because this meant to 
them leaving the machines to become maintenance workers. I'viaintenance 
work had two advantages for thoseworkers; (1) less effort needed, and 
(2) an opportunity to acquire skills which help them to have a second 
job with higher earnings in the private sector. Other workers were 
also interested in promotion because they thought it would help them 
to reach higher positions in a shorter time. 
On the other hand some workers did not like the idea of being promoted 
to higher jobs, because it meant to them more responsibilities, with 
no or not a considerable increase in wages. The following are typical 
of those workers' comments: 
"I woulan't like to be a foreman, it is not an easy 
jou. -ývhen the work is Cgooa, , 
it is higher levels 
success! But 
, 
if there are problems, the foreman 
is responsible". 
"The foreman nowadays is grouna between two millstones; 
management asking for procuction and shortage of labour". 
"Yesterday one of the auxilLary workers did not turn 
up. Our foreman was helping the other auxiliary 
worker. fie was working with him, bringing empty 
cones ana collecting full ones". 
Some other workers were not interestea in promotion, because they 
thought it is difficult to be promoted. As one worker put it: 
"I have no hope at all of being promoted. I see people 
, %ho have been here for more than 20 years in the sar-,, e 
job. I expect to stay in my job till retirement or 
death" 
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Chances of 'ýýorkersl Promotion: 
lo-le asked both workers and management about the chances of workers' 
pronotion. The two-groups agreed together that the chances are hopeless 
or poor, -as the-following table shows: 
TABLE 8/5 
Workers and bianagement Perceptions of the Chances of 14orkers' Promotion 
Foremen higher Total 
Occupation Workers Supervisors Levels 
Chances N 5b N 14 0. . 10 14 
Hopeless 94 47.0 7 8.2 9 14.0 110 31.5 
Poor 77 38.5 b9 81.2 49 76.6 195 55.9 
Average 22 11.0 b 9.4 6 9.4 36 10.3 
Good 7 3.5 1 1.2 0 0 b 2.3 
Total 200 100 b5 100 64 lou 349 1GU 
2 Note x= 64.877 P /-. Ul 
In order to test for the effects of some variables on worKers' perceptions 
of the chances of promotion, we used the anaL, sis of variance. The 
inaependent variables in the equation are: education, Occupation, hometown, 
(23) 
ana length of service as covariate . As can be seen from table S/b, the 
equation is significant at the 1 percent level ana it explains 28. b 
percent of the total variance. Eaucation, occupation, and the interaction 
tern between education and occupation have a significant effect on 
workers' perceptions of their chances of promotion. 
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TABLE 8/b 
The Effects of some Variables on Workers' Perceptions of Chances of 
Promotion 





Covariates 0.001 0.962 
Length of service O. Oul U. 9o2 
kain-effects 12.672 (J. UO2 
Occupation 5. lUQ 0. ()Ub 
Education 3.8U9 O. Ubb 
iiomeýtown 2.072 U. 136 
Two-way Interaction lU. 5lU u. 221 
Occupation Euucation 7.436 U. 03U 
Occupation hometown 3.318 u. 176 
Eaucation -hometown 5.525 (). Iub 
Explained 3e. 633 U. 0UG 
Residual 
Total 127.179 
The responses reveal that a higher percentage of maintenance workers 
said that they have good or average chances of promotion, than auxiliary 
(24) 
workers and machine operators . With regard to education, workers' 
perceptions of the chances of promotion improve as their level of 
(25) 
education increases . The significance of the interaction effect 
of occupation and eaucation is aue to the fact that most maintenance 
workers are more eaucateu thazi auxil, 'iary workers and machine operators. 




l%oreover, we asked the workers whether they expect to be doing the same N 
(27) job after 5 years hile 53 percent saia 'yes', 47 said 'no'. 
We askea the two groups, why? Iýot surprisinely 49 percent of the workers 
said that they expect to be aoing the same job because they ao not see 
any possibility of being promotea. 
135 
On the other hana, 31 percent of the workers saiG tnat they will not 
(28) be Going the same job after five years because they will leave the'company 
The responses reveal that a lower percentage of secondary graduates said 
(29) 
that they will leave the company . This could be because this group's 
expectations of being promoted is, as noted before, higher than the 
expectations of workers with lower levels of eaucation. 
Factors Usea in Identifying korkers for Promotion: 
We first asked both workers and management whether the company has a 
promotion policy. A higher percentage of management answered in the 
affirmative, 69 percent of management and one thira of the workers. As 
might be expected, the percentage of workers who said that the company 
(3U) 
has a promotion policy increases with level of eaucation This 
could be because hi6her eaucatea workers are r-ore interestea in promotion, 
anct they think that they have better chances for promotion tnan illiteraze 
workers, as noted before. 
Startingly, when we asked the workers ana management about the contents 
of promotion policy, 77 percent of foremen anC SuPcrvisOrs, ana 64 
percent of the higher levels of management said that theydo not know. 
In this case it is not surprising that vU percent of the workers also 
(31) 
saia that they ao riot know the contents of promotion policy 
We askea both workers and mana4, xement aDout the factors which were usea 
in iaentifying workers for promotion. Four factors were mentionec oy 
workers ana management. These factors are: (1) competence in work, 
39 percent of management responses and 35 percent of workers' responses, 
(2)length of service, 35 percent of mana, ý,, ement responses ana 30 percent 
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of -workers responses, (3) education, 21 percent of management responses 
and 11 percent of workers' responses, and (4) relations with management, 
5 percent of mana6ement responses and 24 percent of workers' responses. 
In order to examine workers' and mana, 6ement perceptions more closely, 
we asked them: what is the most-important factor in identifying workers 
for promotion? The responses indicate tnat a higherpercentage of the 
workers thought that relations with management was the most important 
factor, 4U percent of the workers, 11 percent of foremen anu supervisors, 
(32) 
and 3 out of 64 higher levels of management 
Noreover, some workers thought that some of their fellow %orkers bribe 
their managers in order to promote them to easier jobs. Ihe following 
are typical of the comments given by those workers: 
"To be promotea you have to Know somebody, or pay someuody. th e 1-sy children need/money which I have to pay to oe promoted, 
say thirty pounas! " 
"To be promotea you shoula know their houses, visit them 
with some vegetaUle5 or fruits if you are a farmer! " 
On the other hand, supervisors and managers, who selectea relation as 
the most important factor, said that if there are two worxers wno are 
equal in all other factors, they prefer the one who is more polite. 
The reason, as they said, is that it is unfair to promote a trouble- 
maker and leave another who concentrates only on his uorx. Therefore, 
those supervisors ana mana&ers, althoubh they are small in numr; er, 
use promotion as a means of motivation ana control over their worKers. 
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As noted-before, higher educatea workers considered their chances of 
promotion better than other workers. This is also reflected in 
management replies, as 44 percent of foremen and supervisors, and 47 
percent of the higher levels of*r. anagement, said that education is the 
most important factor I in identifying workers for promotion 
(33) 
. 
Management said that the purpose of giving educatea workers priority 
in promotion is to encourage them to continue with the company, for the 






Our results reveal that promoting a worker to a higher job with different 
responsibilities does not necessarily mean getting a higher wage. For 
., 
e grade charuýes are not related to changes in responsibilities. wag 
At the same time, chances for wage grade changes and changes in respons- 
ibilities are limited in the company. Only aoout 1 percent per annum 
haa the chance to De movea from wage graae. 5 to wage iraae 4 in 1961. 
Moreover, because of the overlaps in wages and salary structure, workers 
may be moved to higher wage grades without gettin6 an increase in their 
wages. Therefore, our first hypothesis that promotion has an incentive 
effect on workers in the company is not supported. 
The second hypothesis isý confirmed. For a higher percentage* of mana, ý-, ement 
considered education the most import-ant factor in iaentifying workers 
for promotion. On the other hand, workers thought that relations with 
management are more important. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, nearly half of the workers interviewed were 
not interestea in promotion, either because they thought it is impossiDlet 
or because promotion meant to them more effort or more responsibility 
with nooor an insignificant, increase in their wa, 6es. Other WOrKers 
were interestea in promotion because it meant to them less effort or a 
better career. These results inaicate that our thira hypothesis is not 
supported by our findings. 
Higher educated workers thought that they had oetter chances for promotion. 
lnanaýgement responses revealea that eaucatea workers are given higher 
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priority in promotion Cecisions, in oraer to encourage them to continue 
with the company. Therefore, the fourth hypothesis also is not 
supportea by our finairiý; s. 
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL IN THE COMPANY 
In a bureaucratic mode management depend on a structure of rewards and 
sanctions for control purposes, as noted before. In order to motivate 
performance, management decisions regarding rewards and sanctions should be 
seen to be based on workers' performance. Performance appraisal is a means 
of (1) establishing a basis for an instrumental relationship between 
performance and rewards, and (2) it is also a symbolic and ideological 
assessment of management's belief in the importance of that relationship. 
Our purpose in this chapter is to establish whether performance appraisal is 
effectively used in the'company as a basis for management decisions 
regarding rewards and sanctions. First, we examine the clarity of the 
appraisal system to both workers and management, and how it a6tually works 
in practice. Next, we examine workers' and management perceptions of the 
fairness of the appraisal system. 
Three hypotheses will be examined in the present chapter. These hypotheses 
are: 
First: Workers understand how the appraisal system works in the company. 
Second: Workers consider the appraisal system in the company to be fair. 
Third: Management consider the appraisal system in the company an effective 
control device. 
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Clarity of the Appraisal System and how it works: 
(1) 
By Law, workers' appraisal should be performed four times per year .. In 
ESCO, workers' appraisal is performed every three months. The average 
(2) 
of the four times is considered a workers' appraisal for the year 
Regarding the factors used in the appraisal, 'the appraisal form is divided 
into two parts. The first part includes four factors: (1) amount of work, 
(2) quality of production, (3) co-operation, and (4) behaviour. This part 
is to be filled in by-department management. The second part includes: 
(1) time-keeping, and (2) days of absence. This part is to be completed 
(3) 
by personnel department staff in each plant . After completing appraisal 
forms they are sent to the performance appraisal section in the main 
personnel department. 
According to the company policy, appraisal should be performed by a 
workerls'immediate supervisors. -''If a worker's appraisal is either poor 
or excellent, the-form should-be signed by the department manager. 
Workers who are rated poor in performance appraisal should be informed. 
(4) 
This is done by the appraisal section in the main personnel department 
Workers have the right to appeal within twenty days of being informed. 
A committee is set up to examine workers' appeals. This committee is 
composed of three members who have not participated in the appraisal process, 
and a representative from the union. 
With regard to the purpose of performance appraisal, the law states that 
a worker whose rating is 'poor' gets half of the annual increment, and 
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(5) 
must, not. be promoted the following year Workersýwhose rating is 'excellent' 
get a Ietter of commendation from the company chairman, and their names 
(6) 
can be announced in the company bulletin 
In order to examine workers' and management understanding of the appraisal 
system, we first asked them about the purpose of workers' appraisal. 
Workers' responses reveal that 29 percent of our workers do not know the 
purpose of appraisal. -, Regarding management, 7. out of 86 foremen and 
supervisors,. and 3 out of 64 higher levels of management said that they 
(7) 
do not know the purpose of appraisal; 8 percent and 5 percent respectively 
The responses of workers and management who said that they know the purpose 
of appraisal show that-it is used only for annual increment and promotion 
(8) 
decisions . This means that they think that appraisal is used in the 
company for judgmental rather than developmental purposes. We also asked 
our interviewees about the number of times of performing appraisal per 
year. While 32 percent of the workers said that they do not know, 7 out 
of 86 foremen and supervisors (8 percent) and I out of 64 higher level 
(9) 
of management said that they do not know . Although the company policy 
states that appraisal should be performed fdWtimes per year, a high percentage 
of workers, foremen and supervisors, and higher levels of management said 
that it is done once or twice per year (62 percent, 66 percent, and 67 
(10) 
percent respectively), 
There are, as noted before, two appraisal forms for the year; each fDrm is for 
six months and is divided into two periods to be filled in at different 
times. But managers said that they usually fill in the form for the two 
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periods at one time. Moreover, some managers said that sometimes the 
appraisal section send the forms for all the year to be filled in before 
the annual increment decisions, which should be made not later than June. 
The annual increment is awarded in July every year. 
Workers and management were, also asked about the supervisors' role in the 
appraisal process. The responses reveal that 39 percent of the workers, 
44 percent of foremen and supervisors, and 27 percent of the higher levels 
(11) 
of management said that appraisal is performed by supervisors As can 
be seen, a higher percentage of foremen and supervisors than the higher 
levels of management said that supervisors do workers' appraisal. This, 
difference could be because in some sections the supervisor fills, in the 
form and the section or sections manager signs it. Because of this, higher 
percentages of the higher levels of management considered appraisal their 
responsibility, as they sign, the form. 
Furthermore, we asked our informants whether they know the factors used 
in performance appraisal. A lower percentage of workers than foremen and 
supervisors, and the higher levels of management answered in affirmative, 
as the, following table shows: ,, 
TABLE 9/1 
Whether Workers and Management Know the Factors used in Appraisal 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Levels Total Supervisors of Management 
Know N% NA N% N% 
Yes 101 -50.2 60 69.8 54 84.4 215 61.3 
4 
No 100 - -49.8 26 30.2 10 15.6 136 38.7 
Total 201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 
Note x' = 27.299 P4.01 
146 
Both workers and management who said that they know the factors used in workers' 
appraisal were asked: 'What are these factors? ' Management responses show that 
the factors are: behaviour, days of absence, and effort at work (35 percent 
of the responses, 35 percent and 19 percent respectively). Wor I kers, on the 
other hand, said that the important factors are: behaviour, effort at workf 
and absence (37 percent of the responses, 30 percent and 29 percent 
respectively). Comparing these factors with the factos which are'actually 
used suggests that both workers and management have a good idea about 
(12) 
appraisal factors 
To sum up, our results suggest that appraisal is used in the company for 
judgmental purposes. Workers are not involved in the process'. Only 
workers who are rated 'poor' are informed'in order to be able to appeal, 
(13) 
as stated by the law . Workers are informed by'a formal letter signed 
by the head of the administrative staff, without involving the supervisory 
staff at all. 
Moreover, the company is not concerned about training supervisors or 
section managers on the appraisal task. The supervisory staff do not have 
any records for'appraisal purposes, but depend completely on their memory. 
All these shortcomings are expected to affect workers' perceptions of the 
fairness and the importance of appraisal. This is what we try to explore 
in the next section. 
workers' and Management Perceptions of the Fairness and Importance of Appra 
We started by asking our interviewees about the opinions with respect to 
the openness of appraisal. Workers' responses reveal that, 56 percent agreed 
on the openness, 33 percent did not agree and 11 percent said that it makes 
147 
no difference whether it'is secret or open. Management, on the other hand, 
51 Percent agreed on the openness, 37 percent did not'agree, and 12 percent 
said it makes no difference. Those who did not agree on openness or 
secrecy of appraisal said that this is because appraisal is unfair, as 
will be demonstrated below. 
We asked both workers and management why they agree on the openness. Three 
reasons were given. First, 'so that workers know the reasons for being 
rated at a lower lev 1 and try to change their behaviour' (48 percent of 
workerslresponsesý69 percent of management responses). Second, 'to give 
workers who are dissatisfied with their rating a chance to appeal' '(29 percent 
of workers' responses and 11 percent of management responses). Third, 
'so that workers improve their performancel-(21 percent, of workers' 
responses and 11 percent of management responses). 
Startingly, all the respondents, of both workers and management, who did 
not agree on the openness of appraisal gave one reason. That is, to avoid 
problems with workers or among workersý They said that most workers will 
not be satisfied with their rating, which will create problems at the 
workplace. Therefore, they think it is better that appraisal rating be 
secret. 
An interesting result was obtained when we asked our informants, both workers 
and management, whether appraisal in the company is fair. A higher percentage 
of the higher levels of management than both workers and foremen and 
supervisors said that appraisal is unfair (69 percent, 37 percent and 41 
(14) 
percent. respectively) We asked them why appraisal is unfair. 
Management gave two reasons: (1) 'management help poor performers in order 
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to get their annual increment' (34 percent of foremen and supervisors 
and 56 percent of the higher levels), and (2) 'appraisal is done without 
attention (6 out of 86 foremen and supervisors and 8 out of 64 interviewees - 
about 13 percent - of the higher levels). Workers, on the other hand, 
gave two reasons: (1) 'appraisal is based on relations (21 percent of 
workers), and (2) Imanagement. help poor performers' (14 percent of 
(15) 
workers) 
As can be seen a lower percentage of workers said that 'management help 
poor performers'. But we think that management responses with regard to 
this point represent the reality, for two reasons: (1) not all workers 
who were helped by management in order to get their annual increment 
admit that, and (2) management knows what actually happens. 
The data obtained from the records of the company suggests that there is 
a leniency error in the results of the appraisal, as the following 
table shows: 
TABLE 9/2 
Distribution of Ratings given to Workers in 1980-1982 
(16) 
Year 1980 1980/81 1981/82 
Ratings 
(17) 
N% N% N 
Excellent 3983 24. ý3905 - 24.6. 3442 22.4 
Satisfactory 12354 74.3 11889 74.9 11869 77.3 
Poor 279 1.7 78 0.5 39 0.3 
Total 16616 100 15872 100 15350 100 
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As can be seen from the table, while more than 22 percent are placed in the 
upper half, less than 2 percent are rated in the lower half. At the 
same time, approximately three quarters are rated satisfactory every year. 
The following are typical of management comments on the fairness of the 
appraisal: 
"If a worker deserves to be rated poor, I find it difficult 
to do so, because this means that the worker will lose half 
of his annual increment while his wage is actually low" 
"Since I joined this section, nine years ago, only one' 
worker was rated poor because he argued with the plant 
manager". 
"If a worker is going to lose more points because of absence, 
we usually give him higher points in the other factors, 
so that he can get his annual increment". 
"Frankly, I start by stating the total points; following 
that, I divide that total among the different factors in 
the appraisal form". 
"If a worker is rated poor, th6perionnel office return the 
form to us to add some points, so that the worker does 
not lose half of his annual increment". 
Furthermore, we asked our respondents whether appraisal is important. A 
higher percentage of the higher levels of management also said that 
appraisal is not important, than supervisors and workers; 50 percent, 
33 percent and 31 percent respectively. This could be because, as 
mentioned previously, a higher percentage of 
& higher levels said that 
appraisal is unfair. This was confirmed when we asked workers and 
management why they said that appraisal is not important. The important 
iso 
reason mentioned by both workers and management is that appraisal does 
not affect poor performers, and there is no advantages for good, performers. 
I 
The following table shows the different reasons mentioned by workers 
and management: 
TABLE 9/3 
Reasons mentioned by Workers and Management for the Unimportance of Appraisal 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels 
Reasons N N N N % 
- No advantages to good 
performers 23 11.4 2 2.3 4 6.2 29 8.3 
- Poor performers are 
not affected 1 0.5 1 1.2 3 4.7 5 1.4 
- Neither poor performers 
nor good performers 
are affected 29 14.4 21 24.4 24 37.5 74 21.0 
- Workers do not know 
the results of the 
appraisal 9 4.5 4 4.7 1 1.6 14 4.0 
- Appraisal is important 109 54.3 54 62.8 31 48.4 194 55.3 
- Do not know 30 14.9 4 4.6 1 1.6 35 10.0 
Total 201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 
Note x' = 39.885 P L. 01 
In summary, performance appraisal practices in the company have different 
shortcomings. The factors used in the appraisal are vague and subjective. 
Workers are not involved in the process, and only workers who are rated 
poor can appeal in writing to an 'appraisal appeals committee'. Supervisors 
or section managers do not conduct any kind of discussions with workers 
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regar ding their appraisal. Supervisors or section managers have not 
been trained on how to perform the appraisal task, but have learned 
by experience how to 'fill in the form'. The data indicates that managers 
take the more comfortable way and rate most workers satisfactory. 
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CONCLUSION 
Our findings indicate that there is no link between appraisal and rewards 
and sanctions. It could be argued that appraisal affects promotion 
and the annual increment, but this is not true. With respect to promotion, 
while over 20 percent of the workers receive'lexcellent', the chances 
of promotion in the company are limited. For example, about 1 percent 
pei annum of workers in wage grade 5 have a chance to'be moved to wage 
grade 4. Regarding the annual'increment, a worker is rated 'poor', 
hence, is awarded half of the annual increment only if he has been 
charged with a serious offence, such as theft. 
Hiýher percentages of both workers and management considered appraisal 
unfair. This can be interpreted in the light of Gouldner's 'Mock 
(18) 
Bureaucracy' type The law sets out rules for appraisal, but they 
are not enforced by management. Workers, on the other hand, know that they 
will: not be rated poor unless they commit a serious offence. Therefore 
appraisal'is not an effective control device in the company. Perhaps 
it could become effective if it is changed from 'Mock Bureaucracy'f to 
Gouldner's other type 'Punishment-Centred Bureaucracy'(19). In this 
case, workers should know that management will punish them for misconduct 
through appraisal. This change could be a part of a whole programme 
for reform, as discussed in chapter 13. 
Since workers understand how the appraisal system works in the company, 
our first hypothesis is confirmed. The second hypothesis is not supported, 
as a higher percentage of workers considered appraisal to be unfair. 
The last hypothesis also is not supported because appraisal is not 
effective as a control device in the company. 
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CHAPTERTEN 
THE' EFFECTIVENESS OF DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS IN THE COMPANY 
The previous results indicate that length of service is the most 
important 'factor in wage determination, and that the scope for 
rewarding good performance either through the incentive scheme or 
through promotion is limited. Therefore, it might be expected 
that management would depend on discipline to control shop-floor 
workers, and to this we turn our attention in the present chapter. 
our purpose is to examine the effectiveness of disciplinary sanctions 
in the company as another managerial tool for labour control. To 
fulfil this purpose, we shall first demonstrate management approach 
to discipline in the company. Second, we examine workers' understanding 
of the disciplinary rules and procedures. Third, we explore workers' 
and management perceptions of the a#pTW±sVr system as it works. 
In this chapter, we shall examine the following hypotheses 
j 
FIRST : Discipline is used in the company in a punitive rather than 
corrective manner. 
SECOND.: Workers believe that sanctions are significant. 
THIRD : Management view discipline as an effective means of control 
over workers. 
Discipline Rules and Objective in the Company : 
According to the Law No. 48 of 1978, if the penalty is not more than 
three days, the disciplinary action can be taken by the supervisory 
staff. If more than that, the disciplinary action should be 
taken by the legal section. 
(2) 
With respect to serious offences, 
iss 
such as fighting at the workplace, the security department is 
responsible for recording what has happened. A report about the 
case should be sent to the legal section. In cases -for 
which more 
than three days' penalty is warranted, the offence should be 
discussed with the offender by the legal section. The offender can 
name others to give witness on his behalf. 
The Law also states that a worker should not be suspended more 
than six months per year, and gets only half of his wage during that 
period. 
(4) 
Also, a worker should not be unpaid because of 
disciplinary actions more than five days per month. 
(5) 
With regard to the grievance procedures, the law states that workers 
can complain to the Chairman of the company within 15 days of being 
penalized. The latter examines the complaint and takes a decision. 
The penalties given by the Chairman of the company can be examined 
by a committee composed of three members, one of them from the 
workers' union board. This committee is set up by the company 
board of directors, if workers complain about the penalties given 
(6) 
by the Chairman of the company. 
According to the Law 
(7) 
the board of directors of each company should 
determine the offences and the penalties, in accordance with Law 
No. 117 df 1958, regarding administrative courts. 
(8) 
our first purpose was to examine management perceptions of the 
functions of discipline in the company. We asked them : 'What 
do you think is the primary function of discipline in the company? ' 
The responses indicate that management thoughtthat the function, 
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of discipline in the company is 
(1) 
(2) 
for fear of breaking the rules again, 55 per cent of management 
punishment for breaking rules, 25 per cent, and 
17 per cent. 
(9) 
(3) to protect the company property, 
Following that, we asked management whether discipline is a sanction 
of last resort. The majority answered in the affirmative, 91 per 
cent of foremen and supervisors, and 86 per cent of the higher levels 
of management. They gave three reasons for considering discipline 
a sanction of last resort : 
(1) when a worker is given a chance, he may change his behaviour, 
36 per cent of the responses 
(2) disciplinary actions affect workers' earnings, 34 per cent of 
the responses, and 
(3) discipline has negative effects on a workeris performance, 
24 per cent of the responses. 
This result could be related to a previous result. That is, 
management agreed that workers earnings are low. At the same time, 
the incentive element in workers' earnings is low. Therefore, 
management, think that penalizing workers will affect their desire 
to work. As one supervisor put it : 
"The most important factor to workers is wage. If you 
cut any part of it because of discipline, the worker 
won't work the rest of the day. He may even say bad words 
to the person who penalized him. " 
The other group, who said that discipline is not a sanction of 
last resort, gave two reasons for that. First, workers may feel 
that there is acceptance of the offence, 9 interviewees out-of 150. 
Second, immediate discipline is important to protect the company 
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property, 7 out of 150 respondents., 
To examine the management--approach to disciplinezmore closely, we 
asked an indirect question. Foremen, supervisors and managers 
were asked whether they agreed or disagreed that a supervisor's 
basic-task is-to ensure cooperation, and make workers feql that 
they are useful. The, responses reveal that while only 11 per 
cent of foremen and supervisors agreed, 39 per cent of the higher 
levels of management agreed with the statement. 
(11) 
To examine 
the effects of length of service, education, occupation and home- 
town on management -perceptions of supervisors basic task, we 
used the analysis of variance with regression approach. The results 
are presented in the following table: 
TABLE 10/1 
THE EFFECT OF SOME VARIABLES ON PERCEPTIONS 
OF WHETHER SUPERVISORS' BASIC TASK IS TO ENSURE COOPERATION AMONG WORKERS 
Source of variation Sum of Squares Significance of F 
Covariates 0.069 0.507 
Length of service 0.069 0.507 
Main Effects 3.597 0.003 
Occupation 2.606 0.000 
Education 0.404 0.630 
Hometown 0.066 0.810 




As can be seen from the table# the equation is significant at the 
. 01 level. It explains 
14.9 per cent of the total variance. Only 
occupation has a significant effect on the dependent variable, that 
is management perceptions of the supervisors'-basic task. As 
mentioned previously, a higher percentage of the higher levels of 
management agree that the supervisors' basic task is to encourage 
cooperation among workers, than the percentage of supervisors. 
I 
To further examine this point, we asked supervisors and managers who 
did not agree that a supervisor's basic task is to encourage cooperation, 
why? Two reasons were mentifted: 
(1) a supervisor's basic task is to achieve the anticipated 
amount of production (41 per cent of formen and supervisors, 
and 20 per cent of the higher levels of management), and 
(2) a supervisor's basic task is to solve any problem which 
affects the work in his section (48 per cent of foremen and 
supervisors, and 30, per cent of the higher levels of 
management). 
The previous responses suggest that supervisors are task oriented. 
I 
The difference between foremen's and supervisors' perceptions, 
and the perceptions of the higher levels with regard to this point 
could be because of the lack of training in the company. 
(13) 
It may 
also mean that-supervisors are realistic. Since workers are 
instrumentally oriented, as noted before, and are undisciplined, 
as demonstrated in this chapter, supervisors think that their 
basic task is rather to achieve the production plan. 
on the other hand, we asked the workers whether they know the. - 
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offences for which a disciplinary action can be taken. A large 
majority of the workers answered in the affirmative, 98 per cent. 
Workers who answered in the affirmative were asked to give some 
examples of the offences. The examples mentioned include : poor 
performance, unmannerly behaviour, absence from work, causing damage 
to company property, leaving the workplace without permission, and 
sleeping at the workplace. 
(14) 
Poor performance means, as the 
workers said, that the quality control staff found some faults in 
a worker's production which are not due to the machine or the 
material, but to the worker. Workers are fined for their faults 
according to a fixed rate including all the possible faults. 
(15) 
This applies especially to machine operators such as weavers. 
When we asked workers how they had learned of these offences, the 
majority said by experience, 98 per cent. At the same time, we 
asked the workers whether they knew the penalty for each offence. 
Only 53 per cent said 'yes'. The majority of those workers said 
that they had learned of the penalties by experience, 99 per cent. 
Related to discipline are the regulations for disputes over 
disciplinary actions. We asked the workers whether they knew the 
formal procedures of complaint. Most workers answered in the 
affirmative, 81 per cent. The procedures mentioned by workers are 
(1) to complain in writing to the legal section, 37 per cent of 
the responses, 
(2) to complain orally to section manager, 32 per cent, and 
(3) to complain in writing to sectionsmanager, 31 per cent. 
(16) 
The majority of. those workers said that they had learned these 
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procedures by experience, 96 per cent. 
The previous responses indicate that discipline is used in the 
company in a punitive, rather than corrective manner. For the 
functions of discipline, as mentioned by management are : fear 
breaking the rulesp or punishment for breaking the rules. The 
majority of foremen and supervisors did not agree that their basic 
task was to ensure cooperation and made workers feel that they 
were useful. Many supervisors, when asked about the purpose of 
discipline, put it this way 
"Beat the one who is'caught so that the threat reaches 
others. " (17) 
The responses also indicate that workers know the offences for which 
a disciplinary action can be taken. However, nearly half of them 
do not know the penalty of each offence. This could be because of 
the inconsistency of penalizing workers. The majority of the 
workers have learned the offences, the penalties, and the procedures 
of complaint by experience. 
Practice and Perceptions of Discipline : 
To examine workers and management perceptions of the disciplinary 
system, our first question was whether the system is easy-going, 
about right, or too strict. Not surprisingly, a higher percentage 
of management said that the system is easy-going, than of workers. 
It is expected that, although the system may be easy-going, the 
workers may not say so. Surprisingly, however, a higher percentage 
of both workers and management said that the system is easy-going 
than said it was about right or too strict, as the following table shows: 
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TABLE 10/2 
WORKERS' AND MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE STRICTNESS 
OF THE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM (18) 
Occupation : Workers Supervisors Higher Total 
& Foremen Levels 
The System : N N N% N- 
Easy-going 109 54.5 63 73.3 42 65.6 214 61.1 
About right 54 27. o 16 18.6 15 23.5 85 24.3 
Too strict 37 18.5 7 8.1 7 10.9 51 14.6 
1 
200 100.0 86 100.0 
1 
64 100.0 350 100.0 
Note X= 10.626 p< . 05 
The, following are typical of the comments of foremen, supervisors 
and managers who said that-the system is easy going : 
"Workers don't care, they think that they can't get worse: 
'A monkey can't be changed to a gazelle'. " (19) 
"When a worker is penalized he says 'when you poke a 
one-eyed man in his blind eye it doesn't matter' (20) 
and he may argue with the foreman, or the supervisor, 
and refuse to work. " 
"If I penalize a worker and he argues with me, the company 
will not protect me. " 
"If a worker argues with the foreman or the supervisor 
who penalized him, both may be transferred to the legal 
section, who usually punish the two individuals. " 
"How can I penalize a worker for misconduct, while I 
cannot reward him for good performance". 
"I caught a worker sleeping at the workplace fourtimes. 
I can issue a penalty, but he might not turn up for 
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some days and work outside the company while we need 
him. " 
The responses obtained by another question confirmed the previous 
result. We asked both workers and management whether workers work 
hard to avoid punishment. The majority of the two groups said 'no', 
87 per cent of workers and 87 per cent of management. They gave 
two reasons for that : 
punishment is not the right way to encourage workers to 
work hard, 62 percent of management and 76 per cent of workers, 
and, 
(2) workers can work outside the company and get more than what 
a 
they lose because of disciplinary action, 38 per cent of 
management and 24 per cent of workers. 
An important point to be mentioned here is that management 
disagreement that punishment is not the right way to mo tivate workers 
is not because discipline is used. in a positive way, or because 
management think that self discipline is better. The actual 
reason is that discipline may create problems ij the work. Not 
only losing friendship, but also workers may be absent for some 
days while the company suffer shortage of 1- abour. 
(21) 
This inter- 
pretation is supported by a result obtained previously. That is, 
foremen and supervisors said, that their basic task is to solve 
problems of work and achieve the anticipated amount of production, 
rather than to-ensure cooperation and make workers feel that they 
are useful. 
Furthermore, we asked workers whether any disciplinary action was 
taken against them. We used the analysis of variance to examine 
---- - ---I 
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the effects of occupation, education, hometown, marital status 
and earnings on 'whether a disciplinary action was taken against 
a worker'. The ANOVA indicates that the equation is significant 
at the 1 per cent level, and it explains 12 per cent of the total 
variance. occupation is the only variable which has a significant 
effect (at the 1 per cent level) on 'whether a disciplinary action 
has been taken against a worker. 
(22) 
Cross-tabulating 'whether a disciplinary action was taken against 
a worker by occupation indicates that a higher percentage of 
auxiliary workers than both machine operators and maintenance 
workers said that a disciplinary action was taken against them. 
The following table shows workers' responses : 
TABLE 10/3 
WHETHER DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AGAINST 



















T otal 34 100.0 117 100.0 1 50 loof 201 100.0 
2 
Note X= 11.225 p< . 01 
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As can be seen from Table 10/3 disciplinary'actions wer 
Ie taken 
against 54 per cent of our workers. This percentage may seem 
high. But it should be noted that most of the penalties are 
either quarter or half day without pay. 
(23) 
The responses indicate that absence from work, and leaving the 
workplace without permission were the most frequent reasons for 
penalizing workers, 45 per cent of workers' last offence. The 
reason could be that, according to the company rules, a worker 
should ask for a leave of absence two days in advance. He may be 
given permission orhot, according to the situation in the workplace 
and his relations with the supervisory staff. If a worker does 
not manage to get leave, he usually compares what he will lose 
because of absence with the purpose of absence. For example, 
(24) 
workers who farm in addition to their work in the company find 
that in certain periods of the year, they have to be absent, because 
they need a week or more as leave, but management refuse. These 
are the periods of gathering the crops and preparing the land for 
new ones. At the same time, workers may have unexpected reasons 
for absence When they Come back to work, it might or might not 
be considered leave'of absence, depending on a workers' behaviour 
and his relations. The following are the last offences for which 
workers were penalized 
(1) absence from work, 23 per cent, 
(2) leaving the workplace without permission, 22 per cent. 
(3) poor 'performance, 22 per cent. 
(4) altercation with a foreman or a shift supervisor, 14 per cent, 
and 
(5) causing damage to the company property, 14 per cent. 
The responses indicate that maintenance workers were less satisfied 
with the last disciplinary action taken against them# than both 
auxiliary workers and machine operators. For, while 29 per cent of 
auxiliary workers and 27 per cent of machine operators said that 
they were satisfied, only 6 per cent of maintenance workers gave 
the same answer. 
(25) 
This could be because most maintenance 
workers are educated, and this may affect their expectations. 
Therefore,, when they commit an offence, although the penalty may be 
less than-what is stated in the company rules, they, may be, dissatisfied. 
For example, if a worker causes damage to property he may argue 
that it was unintentional, and expect that he will not be penalized. 
Workers gave four reasons for dissatisfaction with the last 
disciplinary action. Some said thatýthe reason for the offence was 
beyond their control, 4. % per cent of*the respon'ses. others said 
that management refused to consider their explanation for the offence, 
35 per cent of the responses. The third reasonwas that a worker 
did not commit an offence to be penalized, 15 per cent of the 
responses. And the last reason was that, it was the first time 
to commit an offence, 7 per cent of the responses. As an example 
of the third reason, a worker said : 
"The section manager asked me to bring for him rice 
and soap from the company store. I couldn't say to him 
no, but I didn't go. He penalized me for another 
reason which was not true. He said that I left the 
workplace without permission. " 
We asked workers about the best thing to do when they felt that 
they had been treated unjustly. The responses show that 65 per 
cent of auxiliary workers, 37 per cent of machine operators, and 
48 per cent of maintenance workers said that they keep their 
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problem to themselves. 
(26) 
When we asked them-why they do.., not 
complain, 61 per cent of the responses stated that complaints , 
rarely yielded results, 
(27) 
and 39 per cent were that management 
tended to favour foremen and supervisors. 
(28) Workers', typical 
comment on this point was 
"Water does not go up a hill without pushing. " 
(29 
1 
Furthermore, we asked both workers and management, whether the 
grievance procedures, provided adequate. protection for workers. Not 
surprisingly, the responses indicate that a higher percentage of 
the higher levels of management than workers, and foremen and 
supervisors answered in the affirmative. . 
(Table 10/4). 
The reason could be that management examine workers' complaints 
in the light of the rules. Therefore, a complaint'might not yeild 
a result because it is against the rules. ' In such worker 
will not be satisfied and thinks that complaints are useless. 
TABLE 10 A 
WHETHER THE PROCEDURES OF COMPLAINT PROVIDE 
ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR WORKERS BY OCCUPATION 



















83 loo. 0. 
1 
64 100.0 304 100.0 
Note X 65.187 p< . 01 
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The responses also indicate that a lower percentage of maintenance 
workers said that the procedures of complaint provide adequate 
protection than both auxiliary workers and machine operators. 
(Table 10/5). 
(30) 
This could be, interpreted in two ways. First, 
maintenance workers are better educated than auxiliary workers 
and machine operators. Hence, they may think about things in a 
different way from the other two groups of workers. The other 
interpretation could be that maintenance workers complain about 
things which are more difficult to change, such as promotion decisions. 
TABLE 10/5 




















Total 23 100.0 93 100.0 41 100.0 157 100.0 
Note :x=8.589 OS 
We asked the workers and management why they consider the procedures 
of complaint adequate or not adequate. Management gave two reasons 
for considering the procedures adequate : 
(1) any complaint is studied and a worker is given his right, if 
there is any, 89 per cent of the responses, and 
(2) management cannot treat the workers unjustly because of the 
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shortage of labour, 11 per cent. 
Workers, also gave two reasons : 
(1) management and workers are controlled by the rules which the 
law lays down$, ' 69 per cent, and 
(2) any complaint is studied and a worker is given his right, 
27 per cent of the respons. es. 
(31) 
Management and supervisors, who-did not agree that the procedures 
were adequate said that this As due to two"reasons : 
(1) management ignore workers corAplai;, 79 per cent of the 
responses, and 
(2) complaints are sent back to the immediate supervisor, 16 per 
cent of the responses. ' ' 
Workers, on the'other hand, gave''three reasons : 
(1) management ignore the complaint, 63 per cent, 
(2) management distrust workers, 23 per cent, 
-and 
(3) a complaint is sent back to the immediate supervisor, 15 per 
cent of the responses. 
(32) 
With regard to ignoring workers' complaints, management said that 
some workers complain while they know that they have committed the 
offences for which they were punished. Moreover, the penalty may 
be reduced, and workers still complain. In such cases, management 
said that they ignore the complaint. ' 
Furthermore, we asked the workers who was involved in the last offence. 
The responses indicated that those who were involved were : 
(1) section manager, 39 per cent of the responses, 
(2) shift supervisors, 28 per cent of the responses, 
I 
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personnel department, 24 per cent of the responses, and 
(4) legal section, 15 per cent. 
(33) 
The legal section is involved if the warranted penalty is more than 
three days, and the personnel department is involved in the 
penalties for absence and turning up late. 
On the other hand, we asked foremen, supervisors and managers 
whether they had ever been involved in taking disciplinary actions. 
A lower percefitage of foremen and supervisors than the higher level 
of management answered in the affirmative. For, while 40 per cent 
of foremen and supervisors siad that they had been involved, 70 per 
cent of the higher levels said 'Yes'. This could be because 
supervisors do not like to penalize workers, in order to be able to 
achieve the plan of production and to avoid altercation with workers. 
As a supervisor put it : 
"The section manager does not get in touch with the workers 
as much as I do. He does not know their problems either. 
I was a worker and I know how to encourage them. If I 
penalize them they may work hard only when they see me, 
but I don't have a hundred eyes to see everybody. " 
To examine whether workers are warned when they make a mistake in their 
jobs, we asked both workers and management about this point. The 
results are presented in the following table : 
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TABLE 10/6 
ARE woRKERS, TOLD ABOUT THEIR MISTAKES AT. WORK? 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
N N N N 
Never 23 11.4 0 -0 
01 0 23 6.6 
Rarely . 11 5.5 00 00 11 3.1 
Sometimes 43 21.4 4 -4.7 4 6.3 51 14.5 
Usually 124 61.7 82 95.3 60 93.7 266 75.8 
Total 201 100.0 86 100.0 1 64 100.0 1351 100.0 
Note :x2= 53.022 p< . 01 
As can be seen from the table, all foremen and supervisors, and the 
higher levels of management said that workers are told about their 
mistakes usually or sometimes. Regarding workers, 17 per cent said 
that they were 'never' or 'rarely' told about their mistakes. 
We asked those workers and management who said that workers were told 
about their mistakes, another question. That was, who tellsvworkers 
about their mistakes? The replies indicate that 87 per cent of 
workers' responses and 96 per cent of management responses was 
that workers were told about their mistakes either by foremen or 
supervisors. Also, 13 per cent of workers' responses indicate that 
workers were told about-their mistakes by a fellow worker. 
(34) For 
example, a machine operator may tell his helper about the mistakes 
which he makes during work. 
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All workers and management said that workers were warned orally. 
No written warnings were used at all, and it was found that foremen 
and supervisors depend completely on memory. Hence, in the case 
of a recurrence of the incident, they do not have any recorded facts 
about what happened before. 
Workers who said that they had never been told about mistakes were 
asked, why? They gave two reasons : 
(1) nobody cares because it is public sector, 16 out of 201 
workers, and 
they have enough experience, 7 out of 201 workers. 
on the other hand, we asked both workers and management, whether a 
worker who had done particularly good work was praised. The results 
are reported in the following table. 
I 
TABLE 10/7 
WHETHER WORKERS ARE PRAISED WHEN THEY DO PARTICULARLY 
GOOD WORK 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
Praised N N% N N 
Never 137 68.2 31 36.0 20 31.2 188 53.5 
Rarely 37 18.4 8 9.3 9 14.2 54 15.4 
Sometimes 25 12.4 14 16.3 15 23.4 54 15.4 
Usually 2 1.0- 33 38.4 20 31.2 55 15.7 
Total 201 100.0 86 100.0 64 100.0 351 100.0 
Note :X2= 91-907 p4 . 01 
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As can be seen from the table, a higher percentage of workers said 
that there has never been praise, or that workers were rarely 
(35) 
praised. This could be because workers pay more attention to money. 
As one worker put it : 
"Saying 'good' or 'thank you' does not mean anything. 
I can't feed my children on these words. Can I go to 
.a shop 
to get what I need and say 'good' instead of 
paying? " 
If we compare Tables 10/7 with Table 10/6, we find that while 95 
per cent of foremen and supervisors and 94 per cent of the higher 
levels said that workers are usually told about their mistakes, 
only 38 per cent of foremen and supervisors and 31 per:.. cent of higher 
levels said that workers who have done particularly good work are 
praised. This confirms a result obtained previously. That is, 
management consider getting the anticipated amount of production 
as the supervisor's basic task. 
Interestingly, management responses show that they use 'cash money' 
to praise workers, (22 per cent of management responses). This could 
be because management recognize the importance of. money to workers, 
as noted before. 
(36) 
Due to this also, management use other means 
which. affect workers' pay for praise, such as 'to consider a worker's 
absence, leave of absence' (26 per cent of management responses). 
(37) 
We asked workers whether they had ever been praised. The responses 
indicate that 10 per cent of all our workers had been praised. 
Maintenance workers were praised for two reasbns : 
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(1) setting up new machines, 20 per cent of maintenance workers, 
and 
(2) getting machines to work, 14 per cent of maintenance workers. 
Machine operators were praised because they exceeded the anticipated 
amount of production (3 out of 117 machine operators). 
(38) 
CONCLUSION 
Discipline is used in the company from a negative point of view. 
In other words, it is not used in a corrective manner* For, the 
majority of management said that it is used either as punishment 
for breaking the rules or for fear of breaking the rules. Therefore, 
our first hypothesis is supported by these findings. 
Our results also indicate that disciplinary sanctions are far from 
being an effective device for labour control in the company. 
Discipline is considered a sanction of last resort. Even when 
management decided to penalize a worker, they issued the least 
possible penalty. This was supported by workers and management 
responses which indicated that discipline was 'easy-going' in the 
company. Moreover, management was more concerned about telling 
workers to correct their mistakes, than to praising outstanding 
performance. These results mean that our second and third hypotheses 
are not, confirmed. 
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CHAPTERELEVEN 
WORKERS' INTENT TO LEAVE, TURNOVER AND SECOND JOB 
The responses presented in the previous chapters revealed that workers 
rated pay the first in importance among six job-related characteristics. 
However, the majority said that the present level of their earnings 
was low. At the same time, the wages structure did not differentiate 
among workers on the basis of effort or performance, but rather 
rewarded length of service. Neither performance appraisal, nor 
disciplinary sanctions appeared to have a positive effect on labour 
control at the workplace. 
our purpose in this chapter is to examine the impact of the policies 
and practices, discussed previously, on workers' intent to leave, 
turnover, and having a second job in the private sector. 
As noted in Chapter 6, workers' wages increase with their age rather 
than effort or performance. The question which emerges now is whether 
family responsibilities are related to age. In other words, do older 
workers have more family responsibilities than younger workers. To 
examine this point we take, as an example of family responsibilities, 
types of workers' residence and how much rent is paid by each group 
per month. 
workers' responses reveal that So per cent of workers aged over 50, 
44 per cent of workers aged between 41 and 50, and 24 per cent of 
(1) 
workers aged between 31 and 40, own houses. This indicates that 
higher percentages of older workers, who get higher wages, do not pay 
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rent. The responses also indicate that 21 per cent of the workers 
who migrated to Cairo from villages have set up their own houses in 
(2) 
Cairo. At the same time, about three quarters of single workers, 
and 11 per cent of married workers live with parents. 
(3) 
With regard to the amount of rent, cross-tabulating rent by workers' 
earnings indicated that a higher percentage of workers who get 
lower earnings pay higher rent, as TAble 11/1 shows. 
As can be seen from the table, workers whose monthly earnings were 
EE60 or less represent 42 per cent of workers who pay between 7 and 
10 pounds rent, and, they represent 44 per cent of workers who pay 
rent between 11 and 15 pounds per month. But, for example, workers 
whose earnings are between EE81 and 100 represent only 18 per cent 
of the first group. 
We also computed the percentage of monthly rent to workers' earnings. 
The results indicate that the percentage of rent to workers monthly 
earnings is higher for younger than older workers, as reported in 
Table 11/2.. 
Table 11/2 indicates that 58 per cent of workers who own houses are 
over 40 years old. At the same time about three quarters of workers 
who live with their parents are less than 30 years old. Regarding 
the percentage of rent to earnings, we can see, for example, that 
workers aged between 31 and 40 represent 54 per cent of those who pay 
between 21 to 30 per cent of their earnings as rent. Also, workers 
aged less than 30 represent 71 per cent of those who pay over 30 per 
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In order to further examine the relationship between rent and some 
of our workers' characteristics, we used the following specification 
for'201 workers 
Rf (X, E, L, C) 
where: 
R monthly rent in Egyptian pounds. 
A age 
E earnings 
L level of education in dummy form 
L no education (base) 0 
L1 primary level 
L2 preparatory level 
L3 secondary level 
C1 Cairo born workers (CO non-Cairo born, dummy base). 





COEFFICIENTS ON AGE, EARNINGS, EDUCATION AND PLACE OF BIRTH 











* significant at the 1 per cent level. 
The table shows that age and place of birth have a significant 
relationship with the amount of rent. The coefficient on age 
suggests that older workers pay lower rent; EEO. 12 less in rent 
for an extra year in age. At the same time, workers who were 
brought up in Cairo pay less rent. The coefficient on place of 
birth indicates that Cairo born pay EE4.17 less than non-Cairo 
born per month. This is because two thirds of the workers who 
were brought up in Cairo either own houses or live with their parents. 
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Rent as an example of family responsibilities demonstrates 
that younger workers, whose earnings are lower, pay higher rent. 
Also, non-Cairo born pay higher rent than Cairo born workers. 
A mission sent to Egypt by the World Bank reported that : 
"The rapid and sustained'growth of the urban 
population, the public commitment to the promotion 
of equity, and the low level of resources available 
for housing and urban utilities'have all contributed 
to poor conditions in the cities, particularly in 
Cairo. Urban housing in particular seems to have 
steadily deterioriated since the early 1960s .... 
in no year did the number of units built keep pace 
with the formation of new households about 90,000 
per year. " (4) 
At the same time, the, increases in workers' earnings have been 
less than the increases in the costs of living. The consumer 
price index shows that in 1978 the, costs of living were more than 
double the costs'of living in 1967. 
(5) 
However, changing 
wages and salary structure in 1978 by Law 48 increased wages 
and salaries only 5 per cent for the top grade, to . 33.3 per cent 
for the lowest grade. 
(6) 
As a result, workers' behaviour was affected in two ways. First, 
they try to go to work in an Arab oil country, or to get a better 
job in another company in Egypt. Second, they have another job, 
in addition to their job in the company, in order to cover their 
needs. In the next section we examine workers' intent to leave 
and turnover. Then we explore workers' propensity to have a 
second job. 
183 
Workers' Intent-to Leave and Turnover : 
The mission sent to Egypt by the World Bank stated that : 
"The relaxation of Egyptian policies governing the 
exit of nationals and the increasing demand for 
expatriate labor by Arab oil exporting countries have 
caused many Egyptians to seek jobs in Libya and the 
Persian Gulf States, a movement that began to accelerate 
in 1974. Although exact information on the number of 
migrant Egyptian workers is not available, estimates range 
from a quarter to half a million, and one estimate 
puts it as high as one million, that is between 2.5 and 
10 per cent of the labor-force. " (7) 
Regarding our workers, we first asked them whether they had ever 
thought of leaving the company. In order to examine thd-effects 
of some variables on workers' responses, we used the an alysis of 
variance. The independent variables in the equation'are : 
education, occupation, marital status, hometown,. and earnings 
as covariate. The ANOVA results indicate that the equation is 
significant at the 5 per cent level, and it explains 8.8 per cent 
of the total variance. Earnings is the only variable which has 
a significant effect, at the 5 per cent level, on 'whether workers 
have ever thought of leaving'. 
(8) 
Cross-tabulating 'whether workers have ever thought of leaving the 
company' by earnings reveals that there is an inverse relationship 
between the percentage of workers who thought of leaving and earnings. 
For example, 72 per cent of the workers who get EE60 or less per month, 
63 per cent of the workers who get between EE61 and 80, and 57 per 
cent of the workers who get between EE80 and 100, said that they 
had thought of leaving the company. 
(9) 
To examine whether workers who intend to leave have done anything, 
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we asked them 'Have you done anything to leave? ' The percentage 
of workers who answered in the affirmative represents 36 per cent 
of all our workers. Some of those workers said that they are looking 
for another job in Egypt, 12 per cent of all our workers. Others 
said that they are trying to go to work in an Arab oil country, 10 
per cent of all workers. This latter group said that they have 
prepared the necessary certificates, and they have written to friends 
or relatives working in Arab countries. A third group said that 
they had already applied for another job, 14 per cent of all workers. 
Furthermore, we asked the workers how long they expected to be 
working for the company. The following table shows the mean period 
by age: 
TABLE 11/4 
EXPECTED PERIOD FOR WORKING WITH THE COMPANY BY AGE 








- 25 4.75 10.2 10.4 20 
26 - 35 10.29 17.3 10.3 70 
36 - 45 21.07 13.7 9.1 68 
46 + 27.16 5.7 5.2 43 
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15.54 p< . 01 
18.5 
The interesting result in Table 11/4 is that workers aged less 
than 25 intend to work for the company for shorter periods than older 
workers. The responses reveal that 40 per cent of those workers, 
aged 25 or less, plan to leave after a short period, because they 
expect to get a better job. 
(10). 
Also, 30 per cent of the workers 
who are between 26 and 35 years old, will be leaving for the same 
reason. At the same time, 13 per cent of workers aged between 
26 and 45 will be leaving to work in an Arab oil country. Another 
reason mentioned by 21 per cent of workers aged over 45 is that they 
will set up a private workshop. 
To examine workers' intent to leave further, we put the question in a 
different way. We asked them whether they intended to leave if 
they found a better job. In order to examine the effects of some 
variables on workers' intent to leave, if they found a better job, 
we used the analysis of variance. The independent variables are 
occupation, education, marital status, hometown and earnings as 
covariate. The ANOVA results indicate that the equation is significant 
at the 1 per cent level, and it explains 16.9 per cent of the total 
variance. Earnings, education and marital status have a significant 
effect at the 5 per cent level. 
(13) 
Cross-tabulating 'whether workers intend to leave if they find a better 
job' by earnings, indicates that the percentage of workers who 
(14) intend to leave decreases as earnings increase. This result is 
expected, since our workers are instrumentally oriented, as noted 
before. 
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Regarding education, the responses reveal that the percentage of 
workers who intend to leave, increases with level of education. 
(15) 
This could be because higher educated workers have different 
expectations with respect to work rewards, such as wages and promotion. 
A higher percentage of single workers, 89 per cent, than married 
workers, 53 per cent, said that they will leave if they find a better 
job. (16) This is not surprising for the latter group of worker3 
have constraints on their behaviour, such as schogls for children 
or accommodation problems. 
Furthermore, we asked workers who said that they do not intend to 
leave if they find a better job, why is that? The impoktant reason 
mentioned by workers aged over 35 is, their age and their tenure, 
87 per cent of this group. Workers aged 35 or less said that they 
do not intend to leave because the company will not agree, and in 
this case, if they leave they lose their previous service in the 
company. According to Labour Law, a worker cannot leave without 
the agreement of the employer. If a worker leaves without the employer 
accepting his resignation, he loses his years of service with the 
company. 
(17) 
What actually happens is that, because the company 
suffers from shortage of labour, management do not agree to resignation 
or transfer. This affects workers' decision to leave. Unless the 
other opportunity is good, workers do not sacrifice their years of 
service with the company, for it affects their pension. 
Thus far, workers' responses indicate that a higher percentage of workers 
who get higher earnings do not intend to leave the company. Workers 
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who have lower earnings intend to'leave the company if they find a 
better job. They try to find better jobs in Egypt, or leave to 
work in an Arab oil country. 
The data obtained from the records of the company on worker turnover 
confirms the previous results. Table 11/5 shows turnover rates 
for production and production services workers during the last six 
years. 
As can be seen from Table 11/5, the turnover rate among maintenance 
workers and technicians was over 20 per cent during the last six 
years. The table also shows that turnover among production services 
workers is higher than among production workers. This could be 
because there are more opportunities for technicians than for manual 
workers to find another job. * For example, the first group can 
find better jobs in other public companies, or in joint-venture 
companies, or in Arab oil countries, which is more difficult for the 
latter group. 
We can also see from the table that the percentage of workers who 
quit their jobs is higher than leaving for other reasons. As noted 
before, because of the shortage of labour in the company, management 
do not agree to transfer workers either to public or to private 
companies. Also, if a worker finds a chance to go to work in an 
Arab oil country for a year or two, and sometimes more, the company 
management do not agree to give him leave of absence. In such cases 
if the worker thinks that the other opportunity is better he does 
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Workers who cannot find a better job, or find an opportunity 
to go to work in an Arab-oil country, try to have a second job 
in the private sector. They work in the company and outside 
the company in order to cover their needs, and to this we 
now'turn. 
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Workers' Second Job: 
While the costs of living are increasing, 
(20) 
younger workers 
are paid-less according, to the wages and salary structure. At 
the same time, they have their ambitions to marry and have separate 
accommodation, rather than staying with their parents. But their 
earnings from the company are not enough for them to live 
comfortably. 
Older workerslare not better off. The costs of living are 
increasing continuously, but their earnings do not increase by 
the same rate. 
(21) 
They get, as noted in Chapter 6, a fixed amount 
of money called 'inflation payment' which depends on wage grades 
rather than changes in costs of living. 
, 
Workers also get an 
annual increment which is on average EE3. 
(22) 
But what actually 
happens is that, in August every year, which is the time of awarding 
the annual increment, prices go up. Employees and workers always 
complain that they pay because of the increases in prices more than 
the annual increment or any exceptional raises awarded to all 
workers by Presidential decrees. 
(23) 
Because of that, the government always try to control the prices. 
But was this control effective? Although, to my knowledge, there 
is no empirical evidence on this point, I would say, as an Egyptian 
watching what was going on, that the control of prices has not 
been effective. For example, sometimes the government fix the 
prices of certain goods. The shops react by hiding these goods to 
give a feeling that there is a shortage in these types of goods. 
Later, they start selling' them secretly to those who can afford to 
pay more. In such cases, the working class suffers. 
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As a result, some workers have a second job in the private sector, 
and some other workers are trying to have a second job. Having 
a second job is important because workers' wages are low and most 
of their wives do not have jobs. Workers' responses reveal 
that only 5 out of 174 wives, go to'work (2.9 per cent). When we 
asked workers whether they would let their wives work if they could 
get a suitable job, only 10 per cent answered in the affirmative. 
The reasons given by workers who said that they would not agree to 
let their wives work are : 
(1) 'it is against our custom', 40 per cent of married workers 
(2) 'wife has to look after the family', 36 per cent of married 
workers, and 
(3) 'wife is'old', 11 per cent-of'married workers. 
(24) 
The previous results indicate that for most workers' families, the 
worker's job-is the source of money to cover their needs. As a 
result, workers try to increase their earnings by having a second 
job in the private sector firms, workshops or shops. 
Before examining our workers' responses about the second job, an 
important point should be mentioned. Workers are not allowed, by 
Law, to have a second job. 
(25) 
Because of that we suspect that the 
percentage of the workers who said that they have a second job is 
less than the rbality. Another reason, mentioned by foremen and 
supervisors, for which some workers may deny that they have a second 
job is that they fear envy. 
(26) 
According to the Longman Dictionary 
of Contemporary English, 'envy' means 'feeling one has towards 
someone when he wishes that one had his qualities or possessions'. 
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Because of those two reasons, i. e. fear of'envy and having a 
second 'job is'illegal; we reckon that-some workers did not admit 
to having a second job. 
Workers' responses reveal that 45 per cent have a second job. 
The following table shows the types of second job our workers 
have. 
TABLE 11/6 
TYPES OF WORKERS' SECOND JOBS' 
Type of Job N 
1. Similar job in a private firm- 21 23.3 
2. A job in a private workshop, e. g. 
welding and electrician 20 22.2 
3. Farming 16 17.8 
4. Labour on construction sites 9 10.0 
5. Plumber 6 6.7 
6. Carpenter 5 5.6 
7. Grocery 5 5.6- 
8. Ironing cloth 4 4.4 
9. Coffee-house keeper 2 2.2 
10. Bicycle hire shop 1 1.1 
11. Tailor 1 1.1 
90 100.0 
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In order to test the effects of some variables on having a second 
job, we used the analysis of variance. The independent variables 
are: occupation, education, marital status, hometown,. and earnings. 
The results of ANOVA indicate that the equation is significant at 
the 5 per cent level, and it explains 10.2 per cent of the total 
variance in the dependent variable. Only earnings have a significant 
effect on having a second job, and'it-explains 5.9 per cent of the 
total variance. 
(27) 
Cross-tabulating 'whether workers have a second job' by earnings 
indicates that the percentage of workers who have a second job 
goes down as earnings increase. For example, while 53 per cent of 
the workers who get EE60 or less have a second job, 15 per cent 
of the workers who get over EE100 have a second"Job in the private 
sector. 
(28) This could be because, workers who get lower earnings 
are the younger workers who have-more energyr and can find opportunities 
outside the company. At the same time, younger workers, who rent 
accommodation, pay higher rent, and others who live with their 
parents hope to have separate accommodation. On the other hand, 
older workers, who get higher earnings, pay low rent or no rent at 
all, which means that they have lower family responsibilities, as 
noted before. 
Regarding workers' earnings from the second job, the analysis of 
workers' responses reveals, that the mean earnings for machine 
operators is, less than both auxiliary workers and maintenance workers' 
mean earnings, as table 11/7 shows. 
(29) 
This could be because 
machine operators have to exert more effort in the company. Therefore, 
they may be less able to work outside the company, than maintenance 
Aýt 
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and auxiliary workers. 
TABLE 11/7 
WORKERS' EARNINGS FROM SECOND JOB BY OCCUPATION 
Occupation Mean EE Std. Dev. N 
Auxiliary workers- 44.12 26.65ý 17 
Machine operators '39.78 17.79 46 
maintenance workers 49.44 24.63 27 
All 43.50 21.97 90 
The responses also indicate that the mean earnings from the second 
job for secondary graduates is higher than for other levels of 
education. 
(30) 
This could be because most secondary graduates work 
in maintenance, in private, firms or-in private workshops. Therefore, 
they are paid higher than other workers. 
Furthermore, we asked the workers who said that they do not have a 
second job, whether they would like to have a second job. In 
addition to the 45 per cent who have a second job, another 21 per cent 
said that. they are interested in having a second job. We used the 
analysis of variance to examine the-ýeffects of some variables on 
workers' interest in having a second job. The independent variables 
are: occupation, education, hometown, marital status and earnings as 
covariate. The results indicate that the equation is significant 
at the 1 per cent level, and it explains 18.3 per cent of the total 
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variance (N = 201). Earnings, marital statusý home town and 
occupation have significant effects on workers-interest in having 
a second jo - 
(31) 
As might be expected, higher percentages of workers with lower 
earnings are interested in having a second-job, than workers with 
(32) 
higher earnings. With-regard to marital status, two thirds 
of married workers and 63 perýcent of'single workers are interested 
in having'a second job. As can be'seen;, "the difference between 
the percentages of single and married workerst, who are interested 
in having a second job is not wide. This could be because 
married workers have family responsibilities, and single workers 
have their ambitions to marry'and'have children. - Therefore, both 
marrie&and single workers look for more money. 
With regard to'occupation, the responses indicate-that higher 
percentages of maintenance and auxiliary workers are interested 
in having a second job than machine operators. 
(33) 
This could 
be because'the effort exerted by machine operators is more than 
the effort which the other-two groups put on their jobs in the 
company. 
The responses also indicate that a lower percentage of workers who 
come from villages are interested in having a second job, than 
workers who come from towns or from Cairo. 
(34) 
This could be 
because 49 per cent of workers who come from villages are aged over 
46. (35) Therefore, they get higher earnings from the companYp 
and at the same time, pay no, or low rent. As noted before, 21 
per cent of workers who migrated to Cairo from villages have set up 
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their own houses in Cairo. 
(36) Added to that, 29 per cent of. 
workers who come from villages are aged between 26 and 35 
(37) 
which suggests that they do not have enough experience and/or do- 
not know people to help them get a second job. - 
Furthermore, we asked workers who are trying., to find a second job 
in the private sector, which type of job they would like to have. 
A higher percentage of maintenance workers said that they would 
like to have a similar job to what they do in the company, 22 per 
cent of maintenance workers, than auxiliary workers and machine 
operators. Auxiliary workers and machine operators said that they 
would like to have a job which needs less effort than their jobs 
in the company, 12 per cent of both auxiliary workers and machine 
operators. 
(38) 
Finally, we asked workers who are looking for a second job whether 
they expect to find the-job which they wouldIike to have. A higher 
percentage of maintenance workers answered in the affirmative, 18 
per cent of maintenance workers, 4 per cent of machine operators 
and none of the auxiliary workers answered in the affirmative. 
(39) 
This could be'because work opportunities formaintenance workers 
are better, as they can work either in private workshops, or in 
private textile companies. At the same time, there is a shortage 
of technicians in Egypt now', because they can go to work in Arab 
oil countries more easily than manual workers. 
The company gives workers guaranteed wages and pension. But the 
wages, as the majority of workers and management said, are low. As 
a result, workers bargain their effort in the way which maximises 
their earnings. They give the company only a part of their labour 
power' , and save the other part for a second job. In the second 
job, i. e. in the private sector, workers are paid on the basis of 
their effort or the results they achieve. Hence, workers try 
to conserve their capacity for the second job rather than 
e'xerting iton their jobs in the company. The following figure 
illustrates workers' behaviour 
FIGURE 11/1 





(Public Sector) (Private Sector) 
2! 
Effort - Behaviour- Results 
Figure 11/1 shows that workers are getting from the company a 
guaranteed wage and benefits. The wage depends on attendance 
rather than the effort exerted or the work performed (Line 1 
Because of that workers try to put the least possible effort 
(oscillating line 2) into this. In the second job, workers are 
paid according to their efforts or results. The sequence of the 
directions of the arrows in Figure 11/1 is important. in the 
company, wages are paid, and after tha* comes, as a secondary matter, 
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. 
effort and behaviour. But in the second job, effort and results 
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come first, and on the basis of effort and results payment is 
determined. Therefore, there is a direct relation between workers' 
effort and their earnings from the second job, but not in the 
company. 
CONCLUSION 
The results presented in this chapter indicate that workers respond 
in different ways to absenceiof control in the company. Older 
workers get higher earnings, pay no or low rent, and are settled 
with their families near the company. Because of that, in 
addition to age, many of them do not have a second job and do not 
intend to leave the company. Some other workers who get lower 
earnings but have more financial responsibilities, plan to quit and 
are trying to find better opportunities either in Egypt, or in Arab 
oil countries. At the same time, some other workers have a second 
job in the private sector, and, others try to have a second job. 
In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to sketch out the 
workers' 'typical' response to that situation, where labour control 
mechanisms are ineffective. 
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CHAPTE R' TWELVE 
CONTROL MECHANISMS IN THE COMPANY AND THE WORKERS' RESPONSE 
in this chapter we highlight the'state of labour motivation and 
control devices in the company. Then we sketch out the workers' 
response to the situation. 
organizations always need to use some mechanisms in order to transfer 
workers' potential capacity to labour. To clarify the importance 
of using some mechanisms of motivation and control over workers in 
the textile industry, we shall first illustrate the nature of th6se 
workers' jobs. 
As noted before, shop-floor jobs in the textile industry could be 
divided into three broad groups; machine operators, maintenance 
workers, and auxiliary workers. Machine operators are responsible 
for feeding of material and observing machines. The significant 
point is that a spinner, for example, can run when he sees a red lamp 
indicating a fault which means a machine stoppage, or he can walk 
slowly, or he may not see it, or pretend that he hasn't seen it. With 
regard to machines which do not have such lamps, a spinner has to be 
moving around the machines all the time to correct any faults. At 
the same time, a spinner can correct a fault, for example, tie the 
yarn if there is a cut in it, he can do that in a few seconds, or in 
a minute or more. 
This applies also to weavers, although the nature of the job is 
different. For, if a weaver pays more attention to the machines, 
there will be less stoppage which affects the amount of production. 
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Another example, because of the shortage of labour, especially 
of technicians, cleaning the machines is the. -. responsibility of the 
weavers, not the maintenance workers. A weaver can keep his 
machine clean or he may not care, which affects machine stoppages. 
An important point should be raised here. That is, although 
supervision is important, motivating workers is essential for two 
reasons. First, in practice, a foreman or a supervisor cannot 
observe all the workers at the same time. Second, a worker can do 
a task slowly and if a foreman or a supervisor talks to him he can 
find different excuses, such as 'my leg is hurting me', or 'I 
didn't see the fault'. 
With regard to maintenance workers, they can carry out a repair which 
needs two hours in only one hour, or they can do it in four hours. 
Also, they can think of alternatives to get a machine to work if 
there is a shortage of spare parts, especially for old machines, 
or they can say it is impossible to repair the machines without spare 
parts. 
Auxiliary workers do unskilled work, such as delivery of materials 
from one stage to the next. This group of workers also can work 
hard or take it easy. Therefore, machine efficiency depends not 
only on machine operators' effort, but also on maintenance and 
auxiliary workers' performance. 
The pr I evious illustration indicates that technical control is a 
partial means because the technology available in'the textile industry 
is a man - machine system. Hence, it does not eliminate the effects 
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of human resources# motivation and consciousness. Therefore, 
there is a need for using other means of control over our workers. 
it was demonstrated quite clearly in Chapter 5 that our workers 
are instrumentally orientated. They consider 'earnings' the 
most important job-related characteristic. And they emphasized 
the importance of 'pay' whenever they talked about their jobs. 
Therefore, we concluded that material incentives could be significant 
means of motivation and control over those workers. 
According to the human capital theory, education and on-the-job 
training, i. e. experience, increase an individual's productive 
capacity. Therefore, in order to encourage people to invest in 
education and on-the-jbb training, a rational wages and salary structure 
rewards those two factors up to a certain point. As noted before, 
the earnings curve flattens after a certain number-of years of 
experience, and after that may start to turn downwards. At the same 
time, since organizations are interested in performance, responsible 
behaviour which fits in with management objectives needs also to be 
reflected in the wages and salary structure. Annual increments and 
promotion are incentives which could be used for this purpose. In 
order to establish an instrumental relationship between performance, 
on the one hand, and annual increments and promotion, on the other 
hand, they have to be seen to be based on performance. Performance 
appraisal could be used as a basis for giving or withholding these 
rewards, which helps establish an instrumental relationship between 
performance and rewards. Discipline also could be used as a means 
of control over our workers, who are instrumentally oriented, as it 
affects pay, but on the negative side. 
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In the next section we summarize the state, of, labour-control, 
mechanisms in-, the-company, which were discussed-in detail in, the 
previous chapters. 
The Effectiveness of Labour Control Mechanisms in the Company 
(1) The Payment System : 
The wages and, salary structure of the company is governed 
, by the public sector Labour Law.. Pay differentials are 
mostly determined by years of employment experience. At 
the same time, earnings profiles do not seem to be turning 
downwards at any point before retirement. While older,,. 
workers considered this to be fair, younger workers said it 
was unfair, because they do jobs similar to those of older 
workers but get lower wages. ý Hence, it seems that wages and 
salary structure-motivates only older workers who consider 
it fair., 
The company management uses a piece-rate system as a means of 
motivation and control over machine operators. The main 
problem in this system is that the rate is too low to encourage 
younger machinists, who are healthy-ý: and fit, to exert more 
effort. _-With respect to older machinists, piece-rate payment 
represents a low percentage of their earnings-which also 
reduces its effectiveness. 
Management also introduced another incentive scheme which covers 
all production workers, including machine operators, and 
management. According to this scheme, machine operators get 
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an additional incentive on top of piece-rate payment. This 
additional incentive is paid in mid-month, and depends on the 
amount of production on an individual basis. The average 
of machinists' additional incentive is the basis of calculating 
the incentives of other production workers and management. 
The main shortcoming in that scheme is that the amount of 
incentives is too low. Both-! workers and management said that 
the-present amount of incentives paid to workers is insufficient 
and proposed about-three times that amount. 
(2) Promotion : 
Our findings suggest that promotion does not have an incentive 
effect on most workers, for three reasons. First, wage grade 
changes are notýnecessarily related to changes in workers' 
responsibilities. ý Second, chances of wage grade changes are 
limited. For-example,, l per cent per annum, have the chance 
to be moved from Grade 5 to Grade 4. Third, because of the 
wide overlaps in the wagesýand salary structure, a worker can 
be moved to a higher wage grade but get no increase in his wage. 
Nearly half of our workers were not interested in promotion, 
either because they thought it was difficult to be promoted, or 
because promotion meant more effort. Others were interested 
in being promoted because the higher jobs need less effort, 
or give them an opportunity to learn skills which could be useful 
in the private sector. 
(3) Performance Appraisal :. 
Workers' rating in performance appraisal affects promotion 
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decisions and-awarding'the annual increment. But, as noted 
above, promotion opportunities'are limited in'the company. 
Regarding the annual increment, a worker whose rating is 'poor' 
is awarded, by Law, half of his annual'increment. During the 
last three years, less than 2, per'cent per annum of production 
workers were rated 'poor'. ' Workers are rated 'poor' only 
for serious offences such as theft or fighting in the'workplace. 
Even fighting is sometimes tolerated, unless it was with one 
of the higher level management. 
(4) Discipline 
Management agree that the present level of workers' earnings 
is low. At the same time, the company sufferjfrom a shortage 
of labour. Because of those two reasons management turn a blind 
eye to workers' offences most of the time. 
Workers, on the other hand, are aware of the fact that the company 
suffer from a shortage of labour. And they are also aware of 
the protection against dismissal provided to them by Law. As 
a result, when a disciplinary action is taken against a worker, 
he may argue with the individual who took the action, or he may 
refuse to work, or he may not turn up for some days. 
Supervisors are aware of these difficulties and of their 
responsibility for production. Hence, they do not take disciplinary 
action unless the offence is serious. And even in these cases, 
they give the least possible penalty. 
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(5) The Socialization Process : 
Lack of training in the company indicates that no planned 
programmes to socialize workers are carried out. 
(') 
What 
sometimes happens is that section managers decide to see 
new recruits for five to ten minutes before they start to 
work for the company. From observation, managers warn the 
new recruits not to believe what older workers say, and 
advise them to ask supervisors when they want to dnquire 
about anything, rather than asking older workers, i. e. workers 
(2) 
who have longer length of service. Within a few weeks 
new workers get to know other workers, talk with them and know 
the reality. They begin to learn the effort required, they 
may get to know some workers who have become deaf as a result 
of the noise levels, and at the end of the month, they get their 
first pay packet. 
I By and large, our results reveal the absence of an effective 
system of labour control in the company. Vatikiotis stated 
that Nasser : 
"blurred national with social and economic objectives 
on the grounds that there could be no class divisions 
in Egypt, only national solidarity. His assumption 
of total responsibility rendered most people 
irresponsible. " (3) 
In the next section we sketch out the workers' 'typical' response 
to that situation where mechanisms of labour motivation and control 
are ineffective. 
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The Workers' 'Typical' Response to Labour Control Mechanisms in 
the Company : 
our respondents could be divided into four 'typical' categories. 
These are : 
First : stayers with no second job 
Second : stayers with a second job 
Third : workers planning to quit 
Fourth : victims of the system. 
The comparison among these four categories will be based on 
(1) Family responsibilities 
(2) Level of earnings from the job 
(1j) 
(3) Work opportunities outside the company 
(4) Relationship with the company. 
FIRST : Stayers with no second job : 
This category includes workers who intend to continue with the company# 
and do not have a second job. They are aged over 50 and they represent 
about 10 per cent of our workers. They depend on their earnings from 
the company. Now, we shall look at this group in detail. 
Family Responsibilities 
Workers in this group are old, and their children have grown up. 
Therefore, their financial responsibilities have decreased. Also, 
some of those workers do not pay rent, because they live in their 
own houses (50 per cent of this group live in their own houses). 
Others rent their accommodation or live in the company residence 
where they pay low rent (Mean rent for this group is EE5.46 per 
month and range is 14. Mean rent for all the sample is EEB. 26). 
In this group 36 per cent live in accommodation rented from a 
private owner, and 14 per cent live in the company residence. 
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Therefore, workers in this category have lower family responsibilities. 
Level of Earnings from the Job : 
Workers in this group have longer length of service (mean total 
experience for this group is 30 years, and mean for all our workers 
is 18.4). Hence, they get higher, earnings than other workers 
(mean earnings for this group is EE102, and mean earnings for all 
workers is EE72.37). However, most of them did not say that the 
level of their earnings is high, but rather, tended to sayýthat 
their earnings, are 'Just enough', 
(5) 
to cover their family needs. 
This could be because, it is human nature that some people ask for 
more, especially, when it comes to money, i. e. some people are 
never satisfied. 
Work, Opportunities, outside the Company : 
Workers in-this group do not have-the capacity to do a second job. 
Theyýbecome exhausted after their shift in the company, and they 
need to rest in order to be able to come to work the following day. 
At the same time, private sector firms do not recruit this type 
of person., They prefer younger workers who are still fit and 
healthy. 
(4) Relationship with the Company : 
This category of workers started to work in the factories which 
belong to the company, when these factories were private, i. e. 
before nationalization, in 1961. According to their comments, they 
were trained to factory life better than workers these days. 
(6) 
In this category, workers get, as noted above, higher earnings. 
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They have low family responsibilities,, and they do'not have a 
second job. As a result, they turn up on time, ' they concentrate 
on their jobs, and do not usually cause problems at the workplace. 
(Disciplinary actions were taken against 32 per cent of workers 
aged over 50, while disciplinary actions were taken against 60 
per cent of workers aged 30 or less). 
In this category, workers are not interested in promotion, because 
they find it difficult to be promoted, and also because of their 
age they do not have the capacity-to be promoted to higher jobs, 
such as f+n. Nowadays, foremen in the company are responsible 
for production, and at the same time, because of the shortage 
of labour they usually help workers in their jobs. 
Those workers intend to continue with the company either because, 
as they said, it is not easy to leave the factory where they have 
spent their lives, or because'it is difficult to find another job 
at that age. 
SECOND : Stayers with a Second Job 
This category is heterogeneous, and respresents about 45 per cent of 
. our workers. 
It includes younger and older workers, and also single 
and married workers, as demonstrated below. 
(1) Family Responsibilities : 
Family responsibilities of this group are higher than the previous 
group. There are workers in this category who do not pay rent 
because they own houses (27 per cent of this group own houses), 
but their children are still at schools. Others have girls 
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'waiting for marriage' which will. require some money. 
(7) 
There 
are also workers in this group who rent their accommodation (43 
per cent of this category), and becuase they rented it recently 
as they are younger, they pay higher-rent (mean rent for this 
group is EE8.48, range = 24, mean rent for all the sample is EES. 26). 
Those younger workers also married recently and in some cases still 
require to complete the furnishing of their homes. 
(8) 
(2) Level of Earnings from the Job :- 
In this category, workers' earnings are lower (mean earnings of 
this group = EE66.56, and mean earnings for all the sample - EE72.37). 
They said that they-considered it a guaranteed income which covered 
the necessities of their families. They then tried to get an 
additional amount of money from a second job in order to cover their 
needs. 
(3) Work Opportunities outside the Company : 
Some of the workers who come from villages near the companyt 
i. e. Cairo suburbs, have their own land which they farm (18 per 
cent of this categoryi. other non-migrant workers who do not own 
land, and migrant workers have a second job in a private textile 
firm (23 per cent of this group of workers). At the same time, 
some of those workers have a second job in a private workshop 
(22 per cent of this group), in addition to some other jobs such 
as plumber, carpenter and grocer (37 per cent of this category). 
Workers who have enough experience in the company, i. e. about 10 
years, find it easier to get a second job in a private textile 
firm. Some of those firms are close to the factories of the 
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company, and workers who have a second job in those firms walk 
to it after their shift in the company. 
workers' earnings from the second job are between EE40 and 50 
per month. It represents about 50 per cent on average of workers' 
earnings from the company. 
(4) Relationship with the Company : .1 
Three reasons were mentioned by those workers for their intent to 
continue with the company. First, to guarantee a pension. 
Second, they had settled down near the company where they had their 
own houses, or their rented accommodation. Third, their second 
job enabled them to cover their needs. 
Those workers bargain their effort in the way which maximizes 
their earnings. They try to give the company part of their 
labour power and save the other part for the second job. As a 
result, they prefer to have easier jobs in the company, or jobs 
which give them an opportunity to learn skills which could be 
useful in the private sector. 
Workers in this category have other commitments outside the 
company as they have a second job. Because of this they 
sometimes absent themselves from the company. They are penalized 
because of their absence, but they do not care much about these 
penalties because they earn from the second job more than the 
deductions because of absence. They also sometimes come to their 
work in the company exhausted, and sleep at the workplace. They 
are not always penalized for that because, as noted before, 
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discipiine is 'easy-going' in the'companY- 
THIRD" : 'Workers Planning to Quit 
This group includes workers who do not intend to continue with the 
company. They represent about 30 per cent of our workers. 
Family Responsibilities 
Workers in this group are single or married. Most single workers 
live with their parents (11 per cent of this category). But they 
hope to marry and have separate accommodation. Their earnings 
from the company, however, are low because they have a shorter 
length of service. 
Married workers who live with their parents (10 per cent of this 
group) want to have separate accommodation. But, in order to 
get separate accommodation they have to pay an amount as 
(9) 'Key Money' to the owner, which they do not have. Other 
workers pay high rent, because they rented their accommodation 
recently (mean rent paid by this group is EE8.9, range - 24, 
mean rent for all workers = EE8.26). 
Therefore, this group has more financial responsibilities than 
the previous groups. 
(2) Level*of Earnings fý8ýi'týe Job 
Workers in this group have shorter lengths of service than the 
previous groups of workers. Hence, they get lower earnings 
(between EE40 and 70 per month). Both single and married workers 
in this group considered the level of their earnings as low. 
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(3) Work Opportunities outside the Company : 
This group of workers prefer to leave the company rather than 
, 
to have a second job. According to workers', comments, some 
have chances to go to Arab oil countries, because they know, 
people who can help them (25 per cent of this category). 
others said that they were trying to find another job in Egypt 
which gives them higher earnings (48 per cent of this group 
of workers). These jobs could be in a private sector firm 
or in a joint venture scheme. 
(4) Relationship with the Company 
Those workers consider their jobs in the company temporary. 
They are waiting till they get a better job. Some agree to 
work overtime, but this is because they cannot find another 
alternative outside the company at the present time. 
Promotion does not have any meaning for them for they plan to 
leave, and because what they need is money. 
Because those workers do not intend to stay, they usually argue 
with the supervisory staff. Foremen and supervisors said that 
whenever they talk to those workers about their unmannerly 
behaviour, or misconduct, they usually say they 'will leave it', 
i. e. they will leave'the company. Because of that, and also 
because sometimes those workers give rude replies, foremen and 
supervisors said that they tolerate their behaviour only because 
of the shortages of labour in the company. 
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FOURTH : Victims of the System': 
included in this group are younger workers, who have high family 
responsibilities, but have'low earnings and do not have a second job. 
Their age is less than 30 and they represent about 15 per cent of 
our workers. 
Family Responsibilities 
This category includes workers who migrated to Cairo recently. 
Married workers'pay-high rent, but do not have suitable 
accommodation. 
(10) (Mean rent paid by this group - EE12, range 
22, mean rent for all the sample =-EES. 26. ) Single workers, 
from Cairo and from outside, Cario, are no better off (13 per cent 
of our workers are single). Their earnings are just enough to 
cover their essential needs, such as food and accommodation, 
and they cannot save-to marry. 
(2) Level of Earnings from the Job : 
Those workers get low earnings (mean earnings - EE54 per month). 
They consider their earnings low, and some of them said it was 
Iless'than low'. 
(") 
(3) Work Opportunities outside the Company 
Workers in this group do not have good opportunities for a second 
job outside the company. Most of them are new arrivals, they 
do not have enough experience, and they do not have contacts 
to help them get a second job. The only thing available to them 
is temporary work, such as carrying bricks on construction sites. 
(4) Relationship with the Company 
Those workers have to continue with the company, because they 
do not have any other alternative. They said that they are 
like 'a mouse in a snare', 
(12) 
they want to get out of it, but 
cannot. Their earnings from the company are the main source 
to cover their family needs. Temporary work outside the 
company is typical manual labour which is hard. Because of 
that, they cannot work everyday. They agree to work overtime in 
the company when they do not find temporary work. 
The situation of this group of workers is reflected in their 
behaviour and performance in the company. They get low earnings, 
while their family responsibilities are high. They have jobs 
similar to older workers, but get lower earnings. As a result, 
they fight in the workplace, they argue with foremen and 
supervisors, they hide and sleep in the workplace and pretend 
that they are sick and ask to see the doctor. 
(13) 
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In summary, our results reveal that material incentives are'not 
used effectively in the company as means of, motivation and-control 
over workers. At the same time, human resources in the company 
are floundering. Worker turnover rates and intent to leave, 
discussed in Chapter-11, demonstrate this point quite clearly. 
(14) 
Our findings also suggest that the 'bureaucratic socialism' in, 
Egypt resulted in dividing the working class into sub-groups. Some 
workers are on top of the working class, some are in the middle, 
and others are at the bottom. While those on the top live comfortably 
others at the bottom are fighting to survive. 
On top of the working class are those workers who have higher earnings. 
not because of the nature of their jobs, but as, a result of their length 
of service. Those workers not only get higher wages, but they also 
own houses, or pay low rent. Moreover, some of them get part of 
the younger workers' earnings as rent. According to the comments of 
our workers, some younger workers rent a room, or a small flat, from 
a fellow worker, who is old, and they pay him over 20 per cent of 
their earnings in rent. 
The sub-division in the middle includes workers who have a second job 
in the private, sector. Their-earnings from the company are not 
enough, but they are lucky to have a second job which enables them 
to cover their needs. However, there is a difference between 
this group and those at the top of the working class. Those in the 
middle are always exhausted. They finish their shift in the company 
to run to the second job, and after they finish their work in the 
private sector, they run back home. They may get home to find 
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a problem waiting for them, such as a sick child. - Therefore, 
having a second job is rather a necessity for those workers to 
cover the needs of their families. 
Workers at the bottom, have lower earnings because they have had 
shorter lengths of service. They may be doing similar jobs to older 
workers, but this does not matter in our bureaucratic socialism. 
What is important is length of service. We agree that length of 
service is a factor in wage determination, but it is not the only 
factor. Nature of work is another important factor, but it is 
forgotten in the rigid grade system of Egyptian bureaucratic 
socialism. 
it could be argued that Egypt is a traditional society where age is 
respected. However, as noted in Chapter 6, younger workers considered 
higher payment to older workers unfair. They said that they do 
similar jobs and sometimes jobs which need more effort, but their 
earnings are lower than those of older workers, and they did not agree 
with that. It is clear that when there is a need to cover the 
necessities of families, respect to age becomes irrelevant. Due to 
the increases in the costs of living and inequality, even among 
workers, the society is becoming more materialistic. Nowadays 
everybody is mote: concerned about himself and his family than with 
ideals. Waterbury, for example, says about the 'bulk of the bureaucracy' 
in Egypt, that 
"It would appear that the bulk of the bureaucracy, or 
some 2.4 million employees, hovers on the brink of 
poverty if it has not fallen into the pit already. A 
walking tour through Sayyida Zainab or Shubra in Cairo 
would provide ample visual evidence of the precarious 
material conditions of these subordinate groups ... 
The day-to-day scramble ... to meet their basic needs 
and maintain a modicum of dignity, undermines any tendency 
towards class or group awareness. It is rather a question 
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(15) 
of each man and woman for him or herself 
Finally, does this mean that Arab socialism in Egypt has not 
been successful? our study focussed on labour control 
mechanisms at public enterprise level. There are other purposes 
of Arab socialism which might or might not have been achieved. For 
example, there are the purposes of : providing jobs to citizens, 
social and welfare services, and price subsidies on essential . 




The company employed over twenty thousand people, 'but spent 
only EE1275 on training activities in 1981-82. These 
programmes included : (i) Computer Studies, (ii) English 
Language, (iii) Safety, and (iv) Applications of Socialist 
Laws related to wages and salaries. ' The total number of 
trainees who participated in those programmes was 14, all 
of them clerks and supervisory staff. With regard to 
training activities carried out inside the company, only one 
programme was executed in May 1982. This programme was 
carried out 'free' by the Co-operative Association for 
Petroleum. The trainees were 31, maintenance workers (ESCOj 
training section records, 1981 82), 
(2) When I asked some managers about the reason for that warning, 
they said that this is because some older workers warn new 
recruits not to work for the company, or even the textile 
industry generally, because the work is hard but wages are 
low. 
Vatikiotis, P. J., op. cit., p. 198. 
(4) We focus on earnings because, as noted before, our workers 
are instrumentally oriented. 
(5) As the workers said in. colloquial Egyptian 
(6) This category of workers said that when those factories were 
private, one of the owners used to see every day 30 workers 
for half an hour before the end of the shift. In this half 
an hour, he used to talk to them about what workers should 
do and what they should not do, in-addition to incentives 
and penalties. For example, a worker said that the owner 
of the factory where he was working used to go around in the 
factory several times per shift. If he saw a piece of cotton 
on the floor beside the machines, it meant 'half a day without 
pay' penalty to the worker. The worker continued to say 
'but look now how much cotton is on the floor, but nobody 
cares1l. 
(7) In Egypt, the man gives 'bride's marriage portion' but usually 
it is not enough to cover the costs of marriage. Because of 
that, the parents try to prepare some money to cover the costs 
of their daughter's marriage. 
Some men may not have enough money to give 'bride's marriage 
portion', or the parents of the girl may not have the means 
to complete the furniture for their daughter's house. In 
such cases, the new couple try to complete the furnishing 
of their house after marriage. 
Due to the shortage of accommodation in Cairo, and also because 
people who set up houses need sometimes to buy material from 
222 
the black market at higher prices. 'Key money' has to be 
paid by those who wish to get accommodation. This amount 
of money is lost, i. e. it is not considered as part of the 
rent. Although this 'key money' is illegal, it is necessary 
to pay it in order to get accommodation in Cairo nowadays. 
our workers who looked for separate accommodation said 
that they needed between EE400 and 500 for that. 
(10) For example, a married worker with two children. He pays 
EE15 per month (about 25 per cent of his earnings) as rent 
for one room. In this room the whole family live; they 
cook, eat, sleep and even take a shower in that room. 
(11) As workers said in Arabic 
(12) As workers said in Arabic 
IL 
CP 
(13) There was a proposal from workers to set up a mosque for prayers 
in one of the factories of the company which employed four 
thousand people. But management refused, saying that workers 
might hide there and sleep or take a ; est. 
(14) In February 1983, the People's Assembly in Egypt decided to 
set up a committee to investigate the causes of the problems 
of the public. textile industry in Egypt. As usually happens, 
such committees see only top management of some companies, 
who usually focus on financial and machinery difficulties and 
give little, if any attention, to human resources problems. 
(That Committee visited the company which is the basis of this 
study, during the interview survey. ) 




ARAB SOCIALISM AND THE QUESTION OF LABOUR CONTROL 
AT WORK : IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
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The findings presented in Part II showed. that workers respond in, 
different ways to the ineffectiveness of labour control mechanisms. 
These results give evidence that there is a need to rednfine the 
role of the state. It is time to examine seriously the problems 
of human resources management in order to revive control at the 
workplace in public enterprise. 
Part III of the study is divided into two chapters. In Chapter 13, 
we assess the impact of class conflict in Arab socialism on public 
enterprise. Then we offer two proposals to revive control at 
the workplace. Our purpose is to analyse the two proposals, but 
we do not intend to favour one alternative over another. Chapter 
14 presents the conclusions and final implications of the study. 
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CHAPTERTHIRTEEN 
CLASS CONFLICT IN ARAB SOCIALISM AND SOME SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 
In Arab socialism in Egypt class conflict exists but in a different 
way from that in the capitalist system. With respect to public 
enterprise, three strata can be identified : 
(1) the workers 
(2) the bureaucratic elite, and 
the political elite. 11 
The bureaucratic elite and the political leadership try to control 
public enterprise in such a way as to guarantee stability in the 
system in addition to the power and other benefits which the two groups 
gain from the system. Control over workers is a key factor in 
achieving these purposes. This is because workers constitute a large 
group which can either cause trouble to the system, or be used according 
to the interests of the other two groups. As a result, any unrest 
among workers which is expected to cause difficulties in the continuation 
of the system is usually solved, sometimes by irrational decisionso 
(2) 
at the highest level. Hence, there-is a sort of ad hoc crisis 
management. Waterbury, for example, demonstrates the interests of 
the bureaucratic elite in public enterprise, as he states that : 
"Egyptian bourgeoisie could finally contemplate a state 
truly worth seizing. But that state had, by the middle 
1960s, its own vested interests, and its own class, many 
of whose members were the scions of bourgeois families 
done in only a few years before. State autonomy was 
now underwritten by the growing presence of a large 
managerial class whose interests lay in its control - 
not ownership - of the means of production. " (3) 
At the same time, because the bureaucratic elite and the political 
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leadership have similar interests, there are always interchanges 
in the positions between the two groups. Moreover, Ayubi states 
that : 
"Engineer Uthman Ahmad Uthman whose prominence started 
under Nasir. . Probably among the richest 
handful of 
individuals in Egypt ... When Uthman's expanding empire 
was criticized in 1978, the President went out of his 
way in his subsequent speech to defend at great length 
the 'patriotic' qualities of Egypt's millionaire, and 
to confirm that the involvement of public personalities in 
dubious financial dealings was not as widespread as the 
press maintained. " (4) 
Workers, on the other hand, get guaranteed, but low wages. Because 
of that they do not give public enterprise all their labour power. 
The bureaucratic elite and the political leadership know this reality 
but they are not able and/or do not have the desire to face it. 
The reason is that they are interested in the continuation of the 
system, but any confrontation with workers'may lead to the collapse 
of that system. 
For example, there was a general strike in Egyptian industry in 1977. 
The reason for the strike was that the government decided to increase 
the prices of some goods. This strike was 'put down only by the 
intervention (for the first time since the early fifties) of the 
armed forces'. 
(6) 
And because the strike was gauged heavily by 
the size of the noise of the demonstration, the government did not 
find any alternative but to abolish its decision to increase the 
prices. This strike could be an indication of what may happen if 
a confrontation occurs between the bureaucratic elite and the 
political leadership on the one hand, and the workers on the other. 
Because of this complex situation, both the wqrkers and the bureau- 
cratic elite take the easy way out and often say : 'live and let 
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(7) 
live' .A striking example on this point 
is given by Ayubi 
who states that : 
"... a number of members and chairmen of boards of 
directors were found to be carrying out activities which 
represented a major part of the jurisdiction of the public 
companies in which they were employed, or they were 
forming similar firms in Egypt or in other countries that 
were in direct competition with the activities of the 
public companies which employed them. Some high personnel 
were found to be utilizing the means of transport and 
communication of the public sector as well as its staff 
- some of them were given leave of absence for the purpose 
- in order to promote and market their own private products. " 
(8) 
The efficiency of public enterprise is affected by the conflict 
between the bureaucratic elite interests and workers' interests. 
Both the workers and the bureaucratic elite are more concerned 
about their own interests, than the efficiency of public enterprise. 
At the same time, the bureaucratic elite can find enough reasons to 
justify any failure; reasons such as controlled prices or socialist 
laws. And this is an important difference between class conflict 
in the capitalist system and that in Arab socialism in Egypt. 
Capitalists look after their interests which cannot be achieved without 
improving the efficiency of the enterprise. 
(9) 
Workers, on the 
other barLd, cannot get higher wages easily without increasing their 
productivity. But in Egypt, each class can work according to its 
interests, and the government is ready to back up public enterprise 
with subsidies. This has bad effects on the economy of the country 
as discussed later in this chapter. 
on the whole, the bureaucratic elite are occupied by their interests, 
for which public enterprise is used as a means. Workers watching 
what is going on decided to do the same. The question regarding the 
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future remains'unanswered, and to this we now turn. 
Some Scenarios'for'the Future-: 
It could be argued that the present study was carried out in one 
public enterprise, hence it would'seem difficult to talk about reform 
in'public enterprises in general on the basis of one case study. 
However, we'reckon that the situation in'our case study is similar 
to that-in other textile'companies for three reasons. ' First, all 
the companies are controlled by'the same set of laws. Second, all 
the companies, work in the same environment. Third, there is a Higher 
Council which supervises all textile companies. -Hence, our discussion 
about reform could be-applied to other textile companies. 
We also recognize that rewards and sanctions in'other, 'industries are 
subject to the same constraints imposed upon the company which is 
the basis of the present study. ' 'For all public sector manufacturing 
enterprises are controlled by the same set of laws and regulations 
enforced by the government. However, our suggestions for reform 
do not necessarily apply to other industries. This is due to three 
reasons. - First, we do not have information about workers' orientation 
to work in-other industries, which'is important for the assessment 
of the effectiveness of management policies as a means of control 
over workers. - each industry uses different technology 
which influences technical control as a partial means of control over 
workers. Third, we have seen how workers in the textile industry 
react to management policies, but we do not have information about 
workers' reactions in other industries. Therefore, our discussion 
is rather concerned with public textile enterprise. 
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We would propose two alternatives for the future. The first 
proposal is to denationalize public enterprise, and the second is 
to reform human resources development policies. 
De-nationalization of Public Enterprise : 
The first argument could be that denationalization will result in 
the exploitation of workers by capitalists who will concentrate on 
accumulation of capital rather than workers' interests. But by 
socialist laws, workers became part-owners of public enterprise, 
however, there was dissipation instead of accumulation of capital. 
One of the reasons for this is socialist laws which could be considered 
the essential reason for the absence of control at work. 
(10) it 
could be said that control is a managerial job, hence it is not 
related to socialist laws. But how can managers play their roles 
while, as noted in the first chapter, they occupy positions like that 
of civil servants. For they serve at the discretion of the political 
elite to a great extent. 
Also, it may be argued that denationalization is against the benefits 
awarded to workers by socialist laws. But we should differentiate 
between work organizations and social welfare organizations. To be 
sure, public enterprise in Egypt has been serving the two purposes 
for two decades, since the early sixties. Workers wages are related 
neither to the nature of the job, nor to performance. Disabled 
workers, for example, get high wages than other workers who have 
shorter lengths of service. Ad hoc decisions are usually taken by 
the political leadership to face any general unrest among workers. 
For example, on some occasions all workers were awarded exceptional 
rises by political decision, for reasons unrelated to productivity 
in any way. Moreover, it is nowadays a usual expectation that 
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workers are givenp by political decision, fifteen or twenty days 
extra pay on certain occasions, such as the Workers' Festival, 
the beginning of the academic year and the Feast of Ramadan. 
Such decisions have their effect on the efficiency of public 
enterprise. At the same time, we could not consider them as 
rational economic behaviour, although they may be felt to be politically 
rational. 
Additionally, it may be argued that denationalization will bring 
back the class system to Egypt. But it cannot be denied that this 
system exists in Egypt today. There are businessmen, professionals 
and the bureaucratic elite. At the same time, as a result of the 
open door policy, a new class was created in Egypt. in the late 
1970s this new class were known as the 'fat cats'. This class 
includes a group of people who managed to accumulate wealth through 
the 'open door' policy. Abdel Khalek states that : 
"Analysis has shown that a change in the entire social 
pyramid is now in progress, thanks to infitah. (12) 
Comprador elements are riding high in the new 
environment, and to this group now belong many of the 
leading figures of the post-1952 regime, in addition 
to the old families which are making a comeback. "(13) 
Furthermore, it could be argued that public enterprise is important 
for the purpose of development. However, if we examine the situation 
deeply, a serious problem will appear. One of the essential reasons 
for that problem which will be discussed in a moment, is the 
relationship between wages and productivity. Kitching says about 
this relationship in a capitalist system that : 
it remains true that in a competitive world capitalist 
system, so-long as its real productivity remains 
comparatively low, the British working class will experience 
a comparatively slow growth in its real wage level ... 
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.... If the 
bosses, don't have the, money, they can't 
pay, -can-they? If they are making losses, they must 
lay people off, musn't they? , Yes, they must. " (14) 
But in Egypt., workers get their wages, annual increments, and 
benefits, irrespective of their productivity or the results of the 
activities of the enterprise., Also, because of socialist laws 
and government intervention, labour costs may go up while productivity 
is going down. At the same time, the government fix the prices of 
some products below costs for different reasons. Because of all 
these reasons, the government subsidize the companies which are trading 
at a loss. As a result, public enterprise has. been unable to 
provide the capital required for programmes of development. Therefore, 
the government has to resort to borrowing abroad to finance its 
economic development projects. This may lead to trouble in the 
future because of debt servicing and the increasing burden on Egypt's 
balance of payments. What occurred in Brazil could be a good 
example in this context. A report on Brazil states that 
the military coup of 1964 inaugurated first a period 
of rigorous economic stabilization and then almost a 
decade of very rapid growth .... An unprecedented marriage 
of Private capitalism and state intervention produced a 
growth spurt unmatched in recent Latin American history. 
But the situation of Brazil in the 1980s is different. Humphrey and 
Wield state that : 
the rise in the price of oil and because of 
the increase of imports ... combined with the outflow of 
profits, dividends and interest from earlier loans, created 
a balance of payments problem that was resolved by more 
and more borrowing .... in 1980 the government was forced 
to abandon its policy of 'growth at any price' ... The 
eighties look rather more difficult for Brazil than were 
the seventies. " (16) 
Egypt may face a situation similar to that of Brazil with regard to 
foreign loans. Hansen and Radwan state, about Egypt, that : 
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"With-traditional exports declining, if anything, and 
imports continuing to grow as a condition for increased 
domestic expansion, non-traditional revenues must continue 
increasing at the same rate as during the past five years 
lest the'country become ever more dependent upon aid and 
fo 
, 
reign loans. Should non-traditional revenues fail to 
grow sufficiently fast, other sources of exchange 
revenues would have to take their place. Should these not 
be forthcoming, the country would be in, trouble with,, (17) 
regard to investments, employment and food supplies. 
Perhaps Peru provides an example of denationalization in the Third 
World countries. The Peruvian model for development introduced 
in the late sixties and early seventies included nationalization 
of some industries. Ferner stated that 
"By mid-1975, the state controlled over two-fifths of 
'modern-sector' economic activities (i. e. excluding 
subsistence farming, crafts, the urban 'informal' 
sector, etc. ). " (18) 
The Peruvian model discouraged private capital to increase its 
investment in industry. This was due to : 
...... the threat to the private sector posed by the expansion 
of the state ... (and) the negative effects of some of the 
regime's policies, especially those concerned with 
workers' participation, on the bourgeoisie's ability to 
control and discipline. the working class. " (19) 
In 1975 President Velasco was overthrown by General Morales. The 
latter's regime carried out a process of reform to reduce state 
intervention. Parts of the state sector were opened to private 
investment and the social property system was replaced by a simple 
profit sharing scheme. At the same time there was an attempt to 
control and discipline the working class. In one year, 1978, real 
wages declined 38 per cent in the private sector and 50 per cent 
in the public sector. 
(20) 
The working class responded by two 
'successful general strikes' in 1977 and 1978, but a general strike 
called for January 1979 was a 'failure'. 
(21) 
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An important lesson can be learned from the Peruvian case. That is, 
if a process of denationalization is decided on in Egypt, workers' 
responses should be considered well before taking any action. It 
should also be recognized that there may be-covert responses from 
the beneficiaries of the existing system. Bruton states correctly 
that 
"To suggest that Egypt should simply remove all its price 
controls and subsidies, sell (or give away) all its 
public sector companies, etc. .... is to act as if a 
fundamental constraint were not, present .... Similarly 
efforts to move the system towards greater reliance on 
general market signals-is opposed by those groups now 
able to influence allocative decisions and controls to 
their advantage. "-(22) 
Moreover, Egypt is not the only country which faces problems in its 
socialist approach. Tanzania-provides another example in this regard. 
In 1967, as in 1961 in Egypt, a-large number of firms were brought 
under state control. Williams says about the system in Tanzania 
that :- 
"The objective of the planning system is to allocate 
resources across the board, control prices and wages, and 
generally control business activity in any other manner 
necessary ... The incentive-structure to which the 
parastatal manager responds offers little in the way 
of personal financial rewards and, in any case, may 
, focus on surpluses which are more related to windfall 
gains from the pricing system than to productive 
efficiency. " (23) 
Bureaucracy also exists in the Tanzanian public sector, like Egypt. 
Shivji states that : 
the bureaucratic method of decision-making and 
the technocratic method of implementing are two sides 
of the same coin. They in fact reflect in ideology, the 
very material conditions of reproduction of the 
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' : The control of the state, 
on the one hand and the state control of the economy, on 
the other. " (24) 
Furthermore, Hyden points out that 
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"The whole matter of manpower utilization has been 
tackled in Tanzania from the point of view of the system 
at large, Nyerere has ignored the micro-efficiences 
of individual organization in favour of the macro- 
efficiency of the policy-making system as a whole ... 
The entlarged public sector was conceived by the Tanzanian 
leadership as the principal instrument for generation 
of surplus capital ... it is clear that the performance 
of the public sector has been below expectation. " (25) 
Comparing the Tanzanian case with what is mentioned in the first 
chapter about the public sector in Egypt indicates that there are 
some similarities in the two cases. At the same time, the three 
examples of Brazil, Peru and Tanzania indicate that Egypt is not 
unique with respect to the problems of state intervention and her 
socialist approach. 
Hansen and Radwan, talking about reform. in Egypt, say that : 
't-public enterprise autonomy will not be fully 
re-established without a fundamental change in 
attitudes from the supervising ministries, separating 
clearly the functions of ownership and management from 
one another, with ownership functions handled by the 
ministry and management functions reserved for the 
enterprise management... The solution to all these 
problems seems simply to be to let all public 
enterprises 'go private' (they do, of course, remain 
public property subject to ownership control by the 
Government) (26) 
Discussions are going on in Egypt today about a proposed body called 
a 'holding company', to replace the Higher Council. It is proposed 
that a 'holding company' will carry out the functions of ownership 
with regard to public enterprise. But, in the light of the previous 
experience in Egypt, it seems to us that this change may not achieve 
the hoped for results, and will be only a change in name from 
'Higher Council' to 'Holding Company'. 
This is due to the fact that bureaucrats in ministries will continue 
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to exist, with their interests in both power and benefits. Therefore, 
although the intention may be to free public enterprise, the proposed 
organization may work differently. Because of this we do not agree 
with Hansen and Radwan that the separation of ownership and management 
functions alone will solve public enterprise problems. 
Moreover, there is a contradiction in Hansen's and Radwan's proposal. 
They talk about 'fundamental change' and following that they propose 
only separation between ownership and management of public enterprise. 
It seems that they did not recognize, that changing attitudes is not 
an easy process, especially in a bureaucracy which 'has been 
entrenching itself for 5,000 years, while that of other countries 
has had much less time*to dig in". 
(27) It could be argued that 
the public sector started in Egypt, only about twenty years ago, 
hence, bureaucracy does not go back to that time. But Hansen and 
Radwan themselves say that public organizations. interfered in the 
minute details in the enterprises. They state that 
"Public enterprise in Egypt were from 1961 to 1975 
subordinated to 38 public organizations. .... These 
years witnessed an over-all collapse of management 
efficiency in the public sector, with government 
bureaucracy increasingly restraining and substituting 
for enterprise management proper. .... A new organizational 
system was introduced, the effect of which so far has been 
to replace bureaucratic with political predominance-128) 
We do not agree with Hansen and Radvan that 'political predominance' 
in public enterprise came after 1975. our disagreement is due to 
the fact that public enterprise was used from the very beginning 
as a means in the political struggle. And most, if not all, 
the decrees and laws which provided guaranteed wages, protection 
and benefits to workers were for political purposes in the first 
place. 
(29) 
At the same'time, Hansen and Radwan failed to 
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recognize that, like most bureaucracies, the Egyptian bureaucracy 
is difficult to challenge. Waterbury, for example, states that : 
"It has always been difficult in all systems, including 
revolutionary and/or Marxist states, to indoctrinate 
and mobilize bureaucrats. Even in socialist, party- 
dominated states, the apparatchiki tend over time to (30) 
reduce the party to yet another bureaucratic agency. " 
I 
To be more straightforward, the 'fundamental change' proposed by 
Hansen and Radwan could be achieved through a process of denationalization. 
This can be a real solution to improve the efficiency of Egyptian 
enterprises and put an end to irresponsibility. Obviously this 
requires more than just a decision to denationalize public enterprises. 
It should be decided which enterprises will be denationalized first. 
How? And when? We would suggest that denationalization can be 
started with some enterprises. This is because, to be realistic, 
sudden change is impossible for political, and perhaps symbolic, 
reasons. The criteria of the selection of some enterprises have to 
be decided by the Egyptian planners. Examples of these criteria 
could be : type of products, capital investment and markets of 
distribution. 
The question may also be raised about workers' and management responses 
to denationalization. Management is also mentioned in this context 
because, although some managers may desire responsibility, many may 
be happy with the present situation which provides them with authority 
and security with little, if any, responsibility. This may point 
to a need for further study of the attitudes of management towards 
the organization form of public enterprise. Regarding workers, 
the results of the present study clarify an important point. That 
is, it is argued that public enterprise provides workers with a 
237 
guaranteed job, i. e. security. But our results reveal that workers 
perceive security in terms of their earnings, rather than as a 
guaranteed job only. And it is because of low wages that workers 
leave public enterprise and go to Arab oil countries. Therefore, 
workers may welcome any change which gives them a substantial 
increase in their earnings. At the same time, a decision of 
denationalization could be accompanied by an enactment of Labour Law, 
but a rational one, to control the relationship between workers 
and employers. 
Finally, although denationalization may seem a radical proposal, 
it is not an impossible one. Hansen suggests that a citation of 
the non-socialist orientation of the Egyptian elite was provided 
by Sadat who : 
a decade later could play down Arab socialism so 
easily without changing anything of substance in the 
edifice that Nasser built, except, perhaps - to the 
benefit of the establishment - opening the door to 
corruption (oil money in particular) and increased 
inequality of distribution of income and letting foreign 
capital in on the fringe of the system, the system itself 
remaining unchanged. " (31) 
Moreover, Ayubi states that : 
"It is suggested that Egypt's open door policy represents 
the outcome of developments on three distinct levels 
the domestic, the regional and the international. 
Domestically, it was a result of Nasser's development 
experiment of 'socialism, without socialists'. Nasser's 
experiment, which relied heavily on the managers and 
technocrats in a mixed economy that boasted a private, 
as well as a public sector, was bound under the slightest 
hardship or the slightest temptation to turn its back to 
its socialist ideals. " (32) 
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Reform of Human Resources Development Policies : 
The second alternative to revive control at the workplace is to 
reform human resources development policies. The first reform 
required is to secure an independent base for public enterprise 
management as professionals. To achieve this purpose the first 
problem which should be considered is ad hoc decisions which are 
usually imposed upon public enterprise for macro-economic and/or 
political purposes. This is an obstacle to the efficiency of 
public enterprise, because, for example, companies may suffer 
losses but by political decisions workers get a 'profit share'. 
This occurred in ESCO in the last three years. This affects not 
only labour costs, but also the behaviour of enterprise management 
and workers. managements may find political intervention an excuse 
to cover inefficiency in their enterprises, such as failure in 
planning or marketing. Workers, on the other hand, are not 
affected by enterprise profits or losses, for in both cases they get 
their wages and benefits, and even 'profit share' even when the 
company has losses! 
Reform of wage and salary structure should be the next step. This 
reform could be considered the cornerstone of the reform of all 
human resources development policies. Ways should be found to relate 
wages to performance, instead of the present rigid grade system. 
Machine operators' wages should be based on a real bonus system. The 
existing system requires revision in order to remove inequity and 
motivate performance. Work standards should be established on the 
basis of work study instead of guess-work used now. Piece-rate needs 
to be examined, as the present rates do not motivate machinists because- 
they are low. As noted before, rates have not been changed since 
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1962, after nationalization, unless a new machine was introduced. 
It is also important that changes in costs of living and the private 
sector wages should be taken into consideration in determining 
basic wages. The percentage of bonus payment to total earnings 
should also be high enough to encourage machine operators to improve 
their performance. This indicates a need for an examination of the 
existing system of 'guaranteed-wage'. With regard to maintenance 
and auxiliary workers, their wages should be based on a job 
evaluation programme, added to that, a group incentive scheme. 
Using a group incentive scheme is important because, as noted before, 
co-operation among workers in the textile industry is essential for 
improving productivity. 
Regarding performance appraisal, at the present time appraisal forms 
are, filled in more than once per year for all workers, even disabled 
people. But comparing the costs of the clerical jork required and 
the costs of printing the forms with its real use, shows that it is 
actually a waste of time and money. It would be better that 
supervisors assess and reprimand or praise workers as performance 
occurs, and fill in appraisal forms only once per year. There is also 
a need to consider the appraisal traits used at the present time, 
which are all subjective. It is, of course, difficult to establish 
and execute a completely objective system. However, any move towards 
objectivity will be better than the existing situation. Nowadays 
workers get their annual increment as a routine, and this should be 
considered with a view to using the annual increment as an incentive. 
Reform should also include an examination of Job security policy. 
As noted before, workers perceive job security in terms of their 
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earnings. At the present time, management sympathize with workers, 
because they agree that workers' earnings are low compared to the 
cost of living and private sector wages. This reduces the 
effectiveness of disciplinary sanctions to the lowest level. Therefore, 
to change, tthe present practice of discipline, the wages level should 
be raised, and management should be given more freedom to set the 
disciplinary rules which suit the nature of the work. 
At the same time, a system should be established to relate company 
performance to incentives for top management. This is required to 
encourage management initiative and to persuade capable managers to 
continue with public enterprise. Finally, it is essential to start 
the process of revision by explaining its purposes to workers in 
order to get their acceptance and support. Also, training and 
development programmes should be planned and carried out to prepare 
employees and managers for the process of revision and change. The 
proposed revision requires a political decision and complete support 
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CHAPTERF0URTEEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study has examined and attempted to throw into relief the impact 
of socialist lawý on the effectiveness of human resources development 
policies, as a means of labour control at the workplace in the Egyptian 
textile industry. At the beginning, we examined workers' orientation 
to work. The results indicate that our workers are instrumentally 
oriented, for they consider earnings from the job by far the most 
important job-related characteristic. The data also reveal that 
management understand the importance of money to workers. However, the 
two groups agree together that the present level of workers' earnings 
is low. 
In spite of the instrumental orientation of our workers, the payment 
system is not used effectively as a managerial tool for control purposes. 
For it is indicated that the workers' starting wage is fixed according 
to the level of education and they are awarded an annual increment 
depending on grade. Therefore, older workers get higher earnings than 
younger workers, despite the fact that they may be doing the same job. 
Multiple regression analysis indicates that the return for experience 
is higher than the return for education, and that experience explains 
a higher percentage of variance in earnings than the percentage explained 
by education. Piece-rate payment does not encourage younger machinists 
to exert more effort because the piece-rate is low. it also does not 
encourage older machinists because piece-rate payments represent a low 
percentage of their total earnings. Moreover, the incentive scheme 
effect is low for two reasons. First, the supervisory staff get a 
higher a unt of incentives than the workers and workers think that this 
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is unfair. Second, to get a considerable amount as incentives, 
workers need to work overtime, which they do not like as this limits 
the number of hours they can work outside the company, getting 
higher or equal pay to that which they would earn doing overtime 
for the company. 
At the same time, promotion policy does not have an incentive effect, 
because wages depend on grades rather than jobs. Therefore, a worker 
may be promoted to a higher job without getting an increase in his 
wage as long as his grade has not been changed. Moreover, because 
grade wages overlap considerably, a worker may be moved to a higher 
grade without getting an increase in his pay. In addition, workers 
and management agreed together that the chances of workers' promotion 
in the company are poor, or hopeless, which is confirmed by the 
company records. 
Regarding workers' appraisal, it serves the purpose of awarding the 
annual increment. But workers and management said that appraisal 
is unfair, because management help poor performers to get their annual 
increment. The company records reveal that less than 2 per cent 
of the workers were rated poor in the last three years. Also, 
appraisal has no effect on promotion. According to Labour Law a 
worker must be rated excellent in consecutive years in order to 
be considered for promotion. But the company records indicate 
that on average 20 per cent of the workers are rated excellent every 
year. 
Disciplinary sanctions are also not used effectively as a means of 
labourcontrol in the company. Discipline is considered a sanction 
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of last resort, mainly because the company suffer from a shortage 
of labour as a result of the low level of wages. In addition, 
workers are pro'ý-ected by socialist laws. Over 50 per cent of 
workers and management agreed that discipline is easy going- The 
important reason - as management said is that workers feel, that 
they cannot get worse. Hence, they react to disciplinary actions 
by argument or absence from work, which creates problems for the 
supervisory staff in the company. 
our results indicate that low wages and absence of control affect 
workers' behaviour in different ways. For example, some plan to 
quit and others have a second job in the private sector. High 
turnover rates led to shortage of labour in the company. At the 
same time, having a second job affects workers' input effort in 
the company, for they try to save their labour power for the second 
job where they are paid only on the basis of their effort. 
Therefore, it is evident that public enterprise management have 
limited control over rewards and sanctions. This can be traced back 
to the massive nationalization decisions in the early sixties, and 
the process of bureaucratization which brought public enterprise 
under the operational sphere of the Civil Service. The political 
leadership is the only force that stands between workers and public 
enterprise, since the possibilities for any betterment in 'work 
rewards' depends on political decisions. Besides, the interests of 
the bureaucratic elite can affect the decisions which are related 
to public enterprise. As a result, public enterprise management have 
become powerless even to enforce work - rules established by Labour 
Law. At the same time, because of centralization, public enterprise 
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management who know the problems do not have the power to change 
the situation. 
Daily newspapers and magazines in Egypt are filled with stories about 
the importance of productivity. But, this is a far cry from real 
solutions, because with the absence of effective means of labour 
cI ontrol at work, any improvement in labour productivity is impossible. 
in this-regard, moral incentives are not enough, for our findings 
reveal that what workers actually need is material incentives. 
Therefore, there is a need to reform human resources development 
policies in public enterprise. But is change possible? In other 
words, can the groups who have the power correct the errors and change 
the situation in public enterprise? It is indicated in our dispute 
that class conflict which exists in capitalism is also present in 
Arab socialism. But there is an important difference between the two 
systems. Capitalists always try to accommodate class conflict 
depending on economic criteria to the greatest possible extent. In 
Arab socialism, on the other hand, the groups who control the means 
of production, and who gain privileges from the existing situation, 
also try to accommodate class conflict but not on the basis of economic 
criteria. They are interested in the continuation of the 
establishment rather than profits or accumulation. And for this 
purpose, they are always ready to make any decisions, irrespective 
of economic rationality. 
Egypt is not unique in her experience with public enterprise. In 
Third World countries the adoption of socialism was rather based 
on rejection of colonialism and dependence. Public enterprise was 
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created by revolutionary movements in order to pull out of the 
capitalist system which colonized their countries. 
(2) 
Therefore, 
in addition to political purposes, public enterprise was intended 
to help those countries in their efforts to achieve development. 
But the experience of Egypt and other countries such as Tanzania, 
indicates that public enterprise has not been successful in its 
role in economic development. This is due to many reasons. Public 
enterprise production, prices, wages and investment are determined 
by central authorities. As a result, problems at public enterprise 
level are usually sacrificed in order to solve macro-economic problems, 
as indicated in the Egyptian and Tanzanian cases. 
What makes the situation in public enterprise wotse, is that while 
these regimes usually pump workers up with increases in wages, it is 
not easy to establish self-discipline amongst workers. Instead, 
irresponsibility appears and publid enterprise management find it 
difficult to maintain discipline at the workplace, as indicated in 
the Egyptian and Peruvian cases. The natural result of these problems 
is inefficiency of public enterprises. Because of that, states 
have to subsidize those enterprises to offset their commercial failure. 
This in turn, has undesirable effects on investment and the need for 
foreign loans. 
Additionally, the experience of Tanzania, Cuba and Burma are similar 
to our results regarding the importance of material incentives to 
motivate the labour force. 
(3) 
Revolutionary regimes cannot depend 
on moral incentives for a long time. For workers' consciousness 
starts to appear, especially after the strata who gain privileges 
from their control of the means of production become publicly known. 
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It is our belief, in the end, that Egypt's economic development 
cannot be achieved by importing modern technology alone. Unless 
the problem of labour control at work is solved, in addition to 
solving the financial and pricing problems of public enterprise, ' 
sluggish economic growth will1continue. 
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Number of Nationalised Companies Until 1963-64 
Type of Activity No. of Companies 
Manufacturing and Mining 303 
Agriculture 27 
Communications 22 
Trade and Commerce 426 
Housing and Social Welfare 79 
Cultural Amenities 
Total 865- 
Source: O'Brien, P., The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System, 
Oxford University Press, 1966, pp 180-181 
Table (2) 
Percentage Distribution of Income, and Household Consumption Expenditure 
(Nationwide) 
Consumption . 
Income group expenditure 
Income Inc ome 
_ 1974-75 1975 1976 
Lowest 60 percent 33.62 34.9 33.7 
Middle 30 percent 37.86 30.2 31.7 
Top 10 percent ý28.52 34.9 34.6 
Source: El-Issawy, I H, Employment Inadequacy in Egypt, International 
Labour Organisation, Geneva, 1983, p 6. 
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Table (3) 
Employment in the Four Industrial Sectors Supervised by the Ministry of 
Industry in 1979 
A 
Sector Number 
Textiles 295474 50 
Food 90175 15.2 
Chemicals 62776 10.6 
Metallic products 120925 20.6 
Mining 22072 3.7 
Total E 591422 100 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, Cairo, 1980, p 37. 
Table (4) 
Percentages of Gross Value added by-the Four. Industrial Sectors Supervised 
by the Ministry of Industry 1977 to 1979 
Sector 1977 1978 1979 
Textiles 38.7 40.8 37.7 
Food 14.8 15.9 15.1 
Chemicals 13.7 13.4 12.9 
Metallic products 29.9 27.1 30.8 
Mining 
- 
2.9 2.8 3.5 
Totals 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, Cairo, 1979, p 117,1980, p 113 
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Table (3) 
Employment in the Four Industrial Sectors Supervised by the Ministry of 
Industry in 1979 
Sector Number 
Textiles 295474 50 
Food 90175 15.2 
Chemicals 62776 10.6 
Metallic products 120925 20.6 
Mining 22072 3.7 
Total 591422 100 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, Cairo, 1980, p 37. 
TAI-Oda IAI 
Percentages of Gross Value added by. the Four. industrial Sectors Supervised 
by the Ministry of Industry 1977 to 1979 
Sector 1977 1978 1979 




Chemicals 13.7 13.4 12.9 
Metallic products 29.9 27.1 30.8 
Mining 2.9 2.8 3.5 
Totals 100 100 100 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Annual Report, Cairo, 1979, p 117,1980, p 113 
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Table (5) 





Labour cost1per unit 
of production 
oun ry 
UK = 100 US 100 us = 100 UK = 100 us 100 
UK 100 56 96.6 100 141 
Belgium 155 87 173.8 139 196 
France 132 74 95.3 ill 157 
West Germany 155 87 168.1 137 193 
Holland 154 86 170.0 152 215 
Italy 136 76 124.8 107 151 
USA 179 100 100.0 71 100 
Japan 132 74 82.2 72 101 
Portugal 75 42 27.7 45 64 
Egypt 25 14 6.2 30 43 
Pakistan 23 13 5.7 33 46 
Turkey 73 41 18.0 34 48 
(a) Value of output per man 
Source: Werner, based on 1980 comparisons, in: Cable, Vincent and Baker# Bf 
World Textile Trade and Production, Special Report No 152, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., London, 1983, p 56 
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Table (6) 
ESCO Local Sales and Exports in 1981/82 
Unit of Local Sales Exports 
Type of product Measurement Amount Value EE Amount Value EE 
Cotton yarn Ton 7987 13977087 3267 7734663 
Rayon yarn Ton 1110 2134106 is 35970 
Finished cotton 
cloth 1000 meters 66809 22951559 449 386732 
Remainder of finished 
cotton cloth Kilogram 93365 171067 
Finished wool cloth 1000 meters 654 3357400 
Towels 1000 dozen 96 776375 
Cotton sheets 1000 units 13 75364- 
Work done for clients 905697 
Total 44573127 8157365 
Source: ESCO, Annual Report, 1981/82, pp 11-12 
Table (7) 
Total Number of Respondents by Activity 
Activities N % 
Cotton spinning 108 30.8 
Cotton weaving 105 29.9 
Cotton dyeingand finishing 58 16.5 
Wool spinning, weaving and finishing 46 13.1 
Rayon spinning 34 9.7 
Total 351 100 
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The Effects of some Variables on Workers Perceptions of whether they work 
only for Money 





Covariates 0.003 0.816 
Age 0.003 0.816 
Main Effects 0.586 0.075. - 
Education 0.120 0.497 
Hometown 0.309 0.048 
Marital status 0.115 0.131 




Whether Workers Work only for Money by Homelýown 
Hometown Village Town Cairo Total 











Total 75 100 8 100 118 100 201 100 
Note x2= . 185 P 4ý. 05 
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Table (14) 
Workers Perceptions of the Level of Earnings by their Earnings 
Earnings -60 61-80 81-100 101-120 121+ Total 







































Total 68 100 71 ' 100' 42' 100** -14' 100'' 6 100 201 100 
Note x2= 16.55 
Table (15) 
Pe-. 05 
Perceptions of Fairness of Management by Occupation 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels, 
Level, of fairness N N 
__ 
N, % N% 
Low 36,17.9 8-9.3 3 4.7 47 13.4 
Moderate 132 65.7- 51 59.3 35 54.7 218 62.1 
High 
. 
33 16.4 27 31.4 26 40.6 86 24.5 
Total 201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 
2 
Note x=2.667 P 4.01- 
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Table (16) 
The Effects of Some Variables on Workers Perceptions of, the level of Security 
in their Jobs 





Covariates 2.241 0.003 
Earnings 2.241 0.003 
Main Effects 2.269 0.336 
Occupation 0.142 0.752 
Marital Status 1.333 0.021 
Education 0.726 0.405 
Hometown 0.459 0.398 




Workers Perceptions of the Level of Security in their Jobs by Earnings 
Earnings -60 61ý-: 80 81-100 101-120 120'+ Total' - 






































Total 68 100 T 71 100 T42- 100 14 100- 
T6 
100 201 100 
Note x' = 21.431 P 4.01 
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Table (18) 
Perceptions of Present Level of Security in Workers Jobs by Occupation 
Occupation Workers 
Foremen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels 
LevbI of security N N% N N 
Low 25 12.4 6 7.0 5 7.8 36 10.3 
Moderate 149 74.2 65 75.6 37 57.8 251 71.5 
High 27 13.4 is 17.4 22 34.4 64 18.2 
Total 201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 
Note x' = 15.994 
Table (19) 
P /-. Ol 
Workers-Perceptions of the Chances of Promotion by Education 
Education Illiterate 'Primary 
& 
Secondary Total Preparatory 
Chances of 
Promotion N% N% N% N% 
Low 123 96.1 47 92.2 15 68.2 185 92.0 
Moderate 5 3.9 4 7.8 6 27.3 15 7.5 
High 0 0- -00 1 A. 5 .10.5 
Total 128 100 51 100 22 100 201 100 
Note x' = 23.473 p 4.01 
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Table (20) 
Things which Workers think about after Work by Occupation 
Occupation 
Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total Workers Workers Operators 
Things N N N % N 
Workers do not think about 
their work 29 85.3 98 83.7 30 60.0 157 - 78.1 
Things other workers think 
about: 
Effort at work 4 11.8 10 8.5 0 0 14 7.0 
The work done during the 
shift 0 0 7 6.0 7 14.0 14 7.0 
A problem related to the 
work itself 1 2.9 0 0 11 22 12 6.0 
Low income 0 0 1 0.9 2 4.0 3 1.4 
Effort and Low income 0 0 1, - -. ""0., 9 0.5 
Tot I al 34 100 117 iOO 
7 
50 'ý 1-00 201 100 
Note x' = 27.341 
Table (2 1) 
P4.01 
Workers Preference of Doing Another Job in the Company 
Occupation Auxiliary -Machine Maintenance Total Workers Operators Workers 
Prefer N% N% N% N 
Yes 9 26.5 38 32.5 5 10 52 25.9 
No 25 73.5 79 67.5 45 90 149 74.1 
Total 34 100 10 '100 50 100 201 100 
Note x' = 9.410 P /'. oi 
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Table (22) 
other Jobs which Workers Prefer to do in the Company by occupation 
Occupation 
Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total Workers Operators Wor kers 
Preference N N % N % N 
Workers do not prefer 
other jobs 25 73.6 79 67.5 45 90 149 74.1 
Other jobs preferred 
other workers: 
Production 1 2.9 8 . 6.8- 1 2 10 5.0 
Clerical 2 5.9 4 3.4 2 4 a 4 
Maintenance 5 14.7 17 14.5 0 0 22 10.9 
Security staff 0 0 3 2.6 0 0 3 1.5 
Company transportation 1 2.9 6 5.2 2 4 9 4.5 
Total 34 100 117 100 50 100 201 100 
Note xl = 13.093 Not significant 
Table (23) 
Reason of Prefering to do another Job by Age 
Age -35 36+ Total 
Reasons N % N N % 
Workers do not prefer to do 
another job 62 68.9 87 78.4 149 74.1 
Reason given by other workers: 
To get more money 2 2.2 4 3.6 6 3.0 
Less effort needed 16 17.8 11 9.9 27 13.4 
More money and less effort 0 0 4 3.6 4 2.0 
More suitable job 9 10.0 4 3.6 13 6.5 
More respectable job 1 1.1 1 0.9 2 1.0 
Total 90 100 111 100 201 100 
Note X2 = 9.621 p 4. lo 
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Table (24) 
Wages and Salary Structure for Public Sector Enterprise (EE pa) 
Law 48,1978 Law 114, Law 31, 
1981 al 1983 % 
Grades Salary Scale Annual - - Increment 
Excellent 2100 - 2483 + 2543-+ 
High 1500-2040 75 1560-2373 1620-2433 
Executive 1320-1920 72 1380-2244 1440-2304 
First 960-1680 60 1020-2028 1080-2088''' 
Second 660-1500 48, then 60 720-1848 780-1908 
from 876 
Third 360-1200 24, then 36 456-4548 516-1608 
from 480, and 
48 from 660 
Fourth 240-900 18, then 24 336-1152 396-1212 
from 360 
Fifth 216-720 12, then 18 312-864 372-904 
from 240 
Sixth 192-540 12, then 18 300-684 360-744 
from 240 
Percentage change (1978-81) (1981-83) 
Top grade 18.2% 2.4% 
Second grade 9.1% 8.3% 
Lowest grade 56.0% 20.0% 




Unadjusted Age-Earnings Profiles by Levels of Education (EEp'. m., ) 
Age 
Level 




Illiterate 39.3 54.3 71.1 83.2 105.4 116.8 44 193 
Primary 47.8 62 68.6 82.3 107.5 142.5 38 43 




Secondary 52 64.9 93.8 100.9 117.6 1,68.5, 37_ 57 
University - 64 99.6 129.6 182.5 ý155 40 27 
Mean Earn-T 
ings 
44 59 78 92 110 121 41 351 
Table (26) 
Machine Operators and Management Perceptions of the Present Rate 
Status Workers Management Total 













Total 68 100 65.. 100 133 100 
Note x' =. 8.243 PZ-. 01 
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Table (27) 
Machine Operators and Management Perceptions of the Fairness of the 
Standards 
Status Workers Management, Total 









Total 92 100 90 100 182 100 
Note x' = 12.674 
Table (28) 
P4.01 
Machine Operators Incentives in Cotton Spinning Plants (EE) 
Incentives on top of piece-rate payment* 
Piece-rate payment Drawing, roving, combing, spinning & 
per month winding, and doubling twisting 
13.910 2 2.5 
14.207 2.5 3.125 
14.504 3 3.75 
14.866 3.5 4.375 
15.229 4 5 
15.591 4.5 5.625 
15.954 5 6.25 
16.727 5 -6.875 
16.980 6 7.125 
17.042 6.5 7.50 
17.405 7 8.75 
17.768 7.75 9.68 
18.131 8.50 10.625 
18.493 9.25 11.560 
18.856 10 12.500 
19.218 11 13.750 
19.581 12 15 
Source: ESCO, the incentive scheme, 1983 
*These incentives are paid in mid of the following month. 
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Table (29) 
Workers Understanding of the Incentive Scheme 







ing N N% N% N 
Not at all 11 32.4 15 12.8 10 20 36 17.9 
Fairly 16 47.0 70 59.8 21 42 107 53.2 
Very well 7 20.6 32 27.4 19 38 58 28.9 
Total 34 100 117 100 50 100 201 100 
Note x2 = 10.505 
Table (30) 
P h. o5 







Importance N % N% N% N % 
Unimportant 15' 7.5' 10' 11.6 6' - 9.4 31 8.8 
Important 6 3.0 12 14.0 5 7.8 23 6.6 
Very important 15 7.5 64 74.4 53 82.8 132 37.6 
Workers who under- 
stand the scheme 165 82.0 00 00 165 47.0 
Total 201' 100 86' 100 64' '100' 
1'351 to 
-0 
Note x' = 253.164 P ZL. 01 
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Table (31).. 
What was done to Explain the Incentive Scheme to Workers 
occupation Foremen & Higher Total Sup ervisors Levels 
What was done N % N N 
Section managers explained 
the scheme 5 5.8 14 21.9 19 12.7 
Shift supervisors explained 
the scheme 4 4.7 8 12.5 12 8.0 
The scheme was only 
announced to workers 38 44.2 28 43.7 66 44.0 
Nothing was done to explain 
the scheme 35 40.6 13 20.3 48 32.0 
Do not know 4 
- 
4.7 1 1.6 5 3.3 
Total 
F 
86 100 64 100 150 100 
Note x' = 16.115 
Table (32) 
pI.. oi 
Effort which Workers have to Exert to Earn an Incentive 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
Effort N N %- N % N % 
Incentives not 
related to effort 88 43.8 24 27.9 3 4.7 115 32.8 
Work not very hard 1 0.5 6 7.0 4 6.2 11 3.1 
Work about right 48 23.9 33 38.4 34 53.2 115 32.8 
Work too hard 64 31.8 23 26.7 23 35.9 110 31.3 
201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 
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Workers Promotion-býr Length of-Service 
Length of 
i ( ) 
-10 11-20 21-30 31+ Total 
serv ce yrs 















I 63 100 
-- 
49 100 [77 100 12 100 
1201,100 
Note x' = 30.865 
Table (35) 
Workers Education by Age 
PdL.. O1 
Age 
ý-30 31-39 40-49 ý'50+ 
Total 
Education N N % N N N 
Illiterate is 28.3 44 64.7 42 79.2 27 - 100 128 63.7 
Primary 12 22.6 9 13.2 7 13.2-- --0 0 28 13.9 
Preparatory 11 20.8 10 - 14.7 2 ý. 8 0 0- 23 11.5 
Secondary 15 28.3 5 7.4 2 3.8 0 0 22 10.9 
Total 53 100 68 100 53 100 27 , 100 201 100 
Note X2 = 56.027 
Table (36) 
Workers Promotion by Education 
P L-01 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 













Total 128 100 28 100 23 100 22 100 201 100 
Note x' = 9.017 p 1-. 05 
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Table (37) 
Workers Promotion by Occupation 
Occupation Auxiliary 
Machine Maintenance Total 
Workers Operators Workers, 
N Promoted 
Yes 4 11.8 52 44.4 27 54 83 41.3 
No 30 88.2 65 S5.6 23 46 118 58.7 
Total 
[-34 
100 117 100 50 100 201 100 
Note x' = 16.039 
Table (38) 
PL. O1 
Number of Times of Workers Promotion by Occupation 
Occupation 
Auxiliary Machine Maintenace Total 
Worker Operator Wo rker 
Number of times N % N N N' 
Have never been promoted 30 88.2 65 55.5 23 46 118 58.7 
Promoted-once 2 5.9 51 43.6 16 32 69 34.3 
Promoted twice 2 5.9 0.9 10 20 13 6.5 
Promoted three times 0 0 00 1 2 1 0.5 
Total 34 100 117 100, 50 100 201 100 
N ote x' = 40.534 P /-. oi 
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- Table (39) 
Number of Times of Workers Promotion by Length of Service 
Length of -10 11-20 21-30 31+- Total 
service 
No of times N N N N N 
Have never been 
promoted 53 84.1 29 59.2 29 37.7' '7 '''58.3 118- 58.7 
Promoted once 10 15.9 19 38.8 36 46.8 4 33.3 69 34.3 
Promoted twice 0 0 1 2.0 12 15.5 0 13 6.5 
Three times 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8.4 1 0.5 
Total 63 100 49 100 77 100 12 100 201 100 
Notd x' = 54.725 01 
Table (40) 
Whether Workers know that the Company has a Promotion Policy by Education 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 
There is policy N % N% N N % 






























Total 128 100 28' '100 '23 100 22- '100 1201 100 
Note x' = 17.830 P4.01 
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Table (41) 
Contents of Promotion Policy as Mentioned by Workers and Management 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels 
Contents N % N N N 
Length of service needed for 
promotion 8 4.0 8 9.3 6 9.3 22 6.3 
Factors of identifying 
workers for promotion 7 3.5 7 8.2 14 21.9 28 8.0 
Promotion depend upon 
availability of grades 5 2.5 5 5.8 3 4.7 13 3.7 
Do not know 181 90.0 66 76.7 41 64.1 288 82.0 
201 100 86 100 64 100 351 100 




The Most Important Factor in Identifying Workers for Promotion 
Occupation Workers 
Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
Factors 
N N N N 
Length of service 28 14.4 13 15.1 10 15.6 51 14.8 
Education 26 13.4 38 44.2 30 46.9 94 27.3 
Relations with management 77 39.7 9 10.5 3 4.7 89 25.9 
Competence in-work 63 32.5 26 30.2 21 32.8 10 32 
Total 194 100 86 100 64 100 344 100 
Note x' = 65.136 PL . 01 
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Table (43) 
Workers Perceptions of the Chances of Promotion in their Sections Compared 
to other Sections by Education , 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 
Chances N N % N N N 
Worse than most 
The same as most 




























Total 112 100 22 100 23 100 21 100 1178 100 
Note xl = 24.481 
Table (44) 
Workers Interest in Being Promoted by Education 
Education illiterate Primary Prep! aratory Secondary Total 
Interested N % N% N % N % N 



































22 100 201 100 
Note x' = 35.335 
Table (45) 
PL. Oi 
Workers Perceptions of the Chances of Promotion'by Occupation 
occupation 
Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total 
Workers Operators Workers 
Chances N% N% N N% 
Hopeless 18 54.5 66 56.4 10 20 94 47 
Poor 10 30.3 42 35.9 25 50 77 38.5 
Average 3 9.1 8 6.8 11 22 22 11 
Good 2 6.1 1 0.9 48 7 3.5 





Note x' = 26.161 p /_. Ol 
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Table (46) 
Workers Perceptions of the Chances of Promotion by_Education' 
Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 
Chances N % N % N % N % N % 
Hopeless 70 54.7 14 50 a 36.4 2 9.1 94 47 
Poor 48 37.5 9 32.1 10 45.5 10 45.5 77 38.5 
Average 10 7.8 2 7.1 3 13.6 7 31.8 22 11.0 
Good 0 0 3 10.8 1 4.5 3 13.6 7 3.5 
Total 11 28 100 28 10 0 122 100 22 100 200 100 
-J 
Note x' = 35.338 
Table (47) 
L. oi 
Reasons for not Expecting to do the same Job after Five Years by Length of Service 
Length of service -10 11-20 21-30 31+ Total 
in yrs 
Reasons N N % N N N % 
Leaving the company 23 36.5 14 28.6 24 31.2 2 16.7 63 31.3 
Retirement 0 0 0 0 6 7.8 3 25 9 4.5 
Being promoted a 12.7 6 12.2 7 9.1 0 0 21 10.5 
Studying to get a 
certificate 1 1.6 1 2.0 0 0 0 0 2 1.0 
Will be doing the 
same job 31 49.2 28 57.2 40 51.9 7 58.3 106 52.7 
Total 63 100 49 100 77 100 12 100 201 100 
Note x' = 23.575 p L. OS 
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Table (48) 
Reasons for not Expecting to do the same Job after'Five Years by Education 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 
Reasons N % N N N, N 
Leaving the company 41 32 8 -28.6 9 39.2 5 22.7 63 31.3 
Retirement 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 4.5 
Being promoted 9 7 3 10.7 2 8.7 7 31.8 21 10.5 
Studying to get a 
certificate 0 0 1 3.7 1 4.2 0 0 2 1.0 
Will be doing the 
same job 69 54 16 57.0 -11 -- - 47.9 10 - - 45.5 106 52.7 









Note x' = 23.725 P L. 05 
Tahlp (491 
Purpose of Performance Appraisal 
Occupation Workers 
Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
Purpose N N% N N 
Promotion decisions 11 5.5 9 10.5 7 10.9 27 7.7 
Annual increment 108 53.7 48 55.8 31 48.5 187 53.3 
Promotion and annual 
increment 23 11.4 22 25.6 23 35.9 68 19.3 
Do not know '59 
29.4 7 8.1 3 4.7 69 19.7 
Total* 201 100 86' 100 64 100 351 100 
Note x2 = 43.428 P L. 01 
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Table (50) 
Number of Times of Performing Appraisal per Year 
occupation Workers 
Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervis ors Levels 
Number N % N N N 
Once 88 43.8 24 27.9 11 17.2 123 35.0 
Twice 37 18.4 33 38.4 32 50.0 102 29.1 
Three times 12 6.0 11 12.8 9 14.0 32 9.1 
Four times 0 0 11 12.8 11 17.2 22 6.3 
Do not know 64 31.8 7 8.1 1 1.6 72 20.5 
201 100 86 100 6 4" 100 351 100 
Note x2 = 97.505 
Table (5 1) 
ol 







Supervisors' role N% N% N% N 
Do not have role 57 28.4 36 41.8 32 50.0 125 35.6 
Help section manager 2 1.0 12 14.0 15 23.4 29 8.3 
Do the appraisal 79 39.3 38 44.2 17 26.6 134 38.2 
Do not know 63- 31.3 00 00 63 17.9 
Total 201 100 86 100 1 
64 100 351 100 
Note x' = 83.740 pd4.01 
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Table (52) 
Workers and Management Perceptions of the Fairness of Appraisal 
Occupation Workers Fo=emen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels 
Fair N% N% N N% 
Yes 41 20.4 24 27.9 18 28.1 83 23.6 
No 75 37.3 35 40.7 44 68.7 154 43.9 
Do not Know 85 42.3 27 31.4 2 3.2 114 32.5 
, 'Total 201 100 86 '100 64 100 351 100 
Note x' = 36.262 
Table (53) 
PL. 01 
Reasons of Unfairness of Appraisal 
Occupation Workers Foremen & Higher Total 
Supervisors Levels 
Reasons N N % N % N % 
Done without attention 4 2.0 6 7.0 8 12.5 18 5.1 
Management help poor workers 28 13.9 29 33.7 36 56.2 93 26.5 
Based on relations 43 21.4 0 0 0 10 43 12.3 
Appraisal is fair 41 20.4 24 27.9- 18 28.1 83 23.6 
Do not know 85 42.3 27 31.4 2 3.2 114 32.5 
Total 201 100 86 100 
-- 164 100 1351 11 C 0( 
: 
0: 
Note x' = 103.427 PZ-. 01 
Table (54) 
Distribution of Ratings Given to Workers by Plant in 1980/82 
Year 1980 
Ratings Excellent Satisfactory Poor Total 
Plant N % N N N 
Cotton spinning 1335 17.3 6239 80.8 143 1.9 7717 100 
Cotton weaving 1644 27.8 4166 70.4 108 1.8 5918 100 
Cotton dyeing 
& finishing 448 32.4 922 66.7 13 0.9 1383 100 
Wool 147 26.7 402 73 2 0.3 551 100 
Rayon 409 39.1 625 59.7 13 1.2 1047 100 
Total 3983 24 12354 74.3 279 1.7 16616 
Year 1980/81 
Ratings Excellent Satisfactory Poor Total 
Plant N N N N 
Cotton spinning 1631 22.4 5627 77.3 19 0.3 7277 100 
Cotton weaving. 1349 
- 
24 4219ý 75.1 50 0.9 5618 100 
*Cotton dyeing 
& finishing 535 27.4 1414 72.2 7 0.4 1956 100 
wool 
Rayon 390 38.2 . 629. -. 61.6.. 2 0.2 1021 100 
'S 15872 100 3905 24.6 11889 '' 74.9' 78 0. 
*The data for the two plants were added - together in 1980/81 and 1981/82 because 
the two plants are located in one place 
Year * 1981/82 
Ratings Excellent Satisfactory Poor Total 
Plant N % N N % N % 
Cotton spinning 1601 22.6 5460 77.1 Is 0.3 7079 100 
Cotton weaving 986 18 4464 81.7 is 0.3 5465 100 
*Cotton dyeing 
& finishing 
*Wool 399 21.6 1442 78.1 5 0.3 1846 100 
Rayon 
1 








Why Disciplineýis a Sanction of, Last Resort 
Reasons 
No of - 
Responses 
1. When a worker is given a, chanceý 
he might change his behaviour '61 35.5 
2. Disciplinary action affects a 
worker's earnings 58 33.7 
3. Discipline has negative effects 
'upon a worker's performance 42 24.4 
4. Because of the shortage of 
workers 11 6.4 
Total 172 100 
Table (56) 
Whether Supervisors' Basic Task is to Ensure Cooperation among Workers 
Occupation Foremen & Supervisors- Higher 
Levels Total 
N. N N 
Agree- 9 10.5 25 39.1 34 22.7 
Disagree 77 89.5 39 60.9 116 77.3 
Total 86 100 64 100 ISO 100 
Note. Corrected xl = 17.244 P 1-01 
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Table (57) 
Reasons for Disagreement that a Supervisor's Basic Task is to Encourage 
Co-operation 
Occupation Foremen & Higher Total Supervisors Levels 
Reasons N % N% N % 
" supervisor has more than 
one basic task 0 0 1 1.6 1 0.7 
" supervisor's basic task isý 
to solve any problem which 
affects work 42 48.8 19 29.6 61 40.7 
A supervisor's basic task is 
to achieve the antici- 
pated amount of production 35 40.7 19 29.7 54 36.0 
Agree on the statement 9 10.5 25 39.1 34 22.6 
Total 
1 
86 too 164' 100 
t 
150 100 
Note xa = 19.127 
Table (58) 
Pl- . 01 




Poor performance 154 36.8 
Unmannerly behaviour 94 22.5 
Absence from work 57 13.6 
Causing damage to the company 
property 56 13.4 
Leaving work place without 
permission 47 11.2 








To complain in writing to the 
legal department 90 36.6 
To complain orally to section 
manager 78 31.7 
To complain in writing to sections 
manager 77 31.3 
To complain orally to shift 
supervisor 1 0.4 
246 100 
Table (60) 
The Effects of Some Variables on Whether Disciplinary Actions were taken 
against workers 





Covariates 0.479' 0.151 
Earnings 0.479 0.151 
Main Effects 5.003 0.007 
Education 1.122 0.184 
Occupation 3.450 0.001 
Marital Status 0.098 0.515 
Hometown 0.871 0.153 





Whether Workers were Satisfied with the Last Disciplinary Action by Occupation 
Occupation Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total Workers Operators Workers 
Satisfied N% N N N 
Yes 10 29.4 32.27.4 
_3 
6.0 45ý 22.4 
No 12 35.3 38 32.5 17 34.0 67 33.3 
No disciplinary 
action was taken 
against a worker 12 35.3 47 40.1 30 60.0 89 44.3 
Total 34 100 117 100' "56 166 -' 201 
Note x2= 11.962 
Tabl e (6 2) 
. 05 
Best thing Workers do when they feel that they have been treated Unjustly 
by Occupation 
Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total 
Occupation Workers- Operators - Workers 
N N N N 
Keep my problem to myself 22 64.7 43 36.8 24 48 89 44.3 
Talk to a fellow worker 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 0.5 
Complain to section manager 8 23.5 66 56.4 22 44 96 47.8 
Complain to the next higher 
level of management 4 11.8 8 6.8 3 6 15 7 
Total 
1 
34 100 117 100 50 100-J 201 100 
2 
Note x= 15.086 p< OS 
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Table (63) 
Why the Procedures of Complaint Provide Adequate Protection for Workers 
Status Workers Management 
Reasons No of No of Responses Responses 
Any complaint is studied and 
a worker is given his right 18 26.5 118 88.7 
Workers and management are 
controlled by certain rules 




Management can not treat 
workers unjustly because of 
the shortage of labour 3 4.4 14 10.5 
Total 68* 100 133 100 
Table (64) 
Why the Procedures of Complaint do not Provide Adequate Protection for Workers 
Status Workers Management 
No of % No of % Reasons Responses Responses 
A complaint is sent back to 
the immediate supervisors 13 14.6 3 15.8 
management ignore workers 
complaints 56 62.9 15 78.9 
Managementdistrust workers 20 22.5 1 5.3 
Total 89 too 19 100 
2 8J 
Table (65) 




1. Section manager 37 32.8 
2. Shift supervisor 32 28.3 
3. Personnel department 27 23.9 
4. Legal section 17 is 
Total 113 100 
Table (66) 
Who Tells Workers about their Mistakes 
Management Workers 
No of No of % 
Who tells workers Responses Responses 
1. Foremen 105 48.6 84 41.2 
2. Supervisors 102 47.2 93 45.6 
3. A fellow worker 9 4.2 27 13.2 
Total 216 100 204 100 
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Table (67) 
How are Workers Praised 
Status Workers Management-, 
No of No of 
Responses Responses 
1. orally 42 63.6 46 34.1 
2. To give worker a rest from 
work 'at work place' if he 
is 'sick' 1 1.5 25 18.5, 
3. To consider workers absence 
as a leave of absence 7 10.6 35 25.9 
4. 'Cash money# 16 24.2 29 21.5 
Total 
1 
66 100 135 100 
Table (68) 
Why Workers are not Praised for Particularly good Work 
Workers Management 
No of % No-of Responses Responses 
1. Management pay attention only to 
workers mistakes 63 4Q. 1 5 9.1 
2. Management think that workers 
should work in return for their 
wages 84 53.5 26 47.3 
3. Department management have no 
'cash fund' to praise workers 9 5.7 13 23.6 
4. Workers prefer monetary rewards 1 0.7 11 20 
Total 157 100 55 100 
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Table (69) 
Workers who have been Praised and Reasons of Praise 
occupation Auxiliary 'Machine Maintenance Total- Workers Operators Workers, 
N N N N 
Workers have never been 
praised 34 100 114 97.4 33 66 181 90.0 
Reasons of praises*# 
Getting machines to work 00 00 7 14 7 3.5 
Setting up new machines 00 00 10 20 10 5.0 
Exceeding the antici- 
pated amount Of Pro- 
duction 00 3 2.6 00 3 1.5 
Total 34 100 117 100 50 100 201 100 
Note x2 = 57.788 
(Table 70) 
Workers Living Place by Age 
Pz-. 011 
Age -30 31-40 41-50 51+ Total 
Living Place N % N % N N % N % 
Company residence 0 0 7 9.2 7 14.0 3 13.6 17 8.5 
Public residence 0 0 2 2.6 0 0 0 0 2 1.0 
Rented accommodation 18 34.0 40 52.6 20 40.0 8 36.4 86 42.8 
Own House 6 11.3 18 23.7 22 44.0 11 50.0 57 28.4 
With parents 29 54.7 9 11.9 1 2.0 0 0 39 19.3 
Total 53 100 76 100 50 100 22 100 201 100 
Note x' = 75.660 p L. 01 
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Table (7 1) 
Workers Living_Place by Hometown 
Hometown Village'' Town Cairo Town- 
Living Place N N N N 
Company residence 9 -12 8 6.8' 17 8.5 
Public residence 1 1.3 1 -8 0. 2 1 
Rented private accommodation 49 65.3 7 87.5 30 25.4 86 42.8 
own house 16 21.4 1,12.5 40 33.9 57 28.4 
With parents ý39 39 
19.3 
Total 175 100 8 '100 118 100 201 ' 100 
Note x' = 54.061 PZ-. 01 
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Table (72) 
Workers' Living Place by Marital Status 
Marital status Single Married Total 
Living Place N N N 
Company residence 0 0 17 9.8 17 8.5 
Public residence 0 0 2 1.1 2 1.0 
Rented accommodation 6 22.2 so 46.0 86 42.8 
own house 1 3.7 56 32.2 57 28.4 
Live with parents 20 74.1 19 10.9 39 19.3 
Total 27 100 174 100 201 100 
Note x' = 60.762 - 
pýZ. 01 
Table (73) 
Consumer Price Index 
Year Urban Rural 
1967/68 102.0 101.8 
1968/69 106.1 105.6 
1969/70 109.2 113.5 
1970/71 113.6 117.9 
1971/72 116.3 117.6 
1973 122.4 131.2 
1974 135.7 149.6 
1975 148.9 167.9 
1976 171.6 195.3 
1977 191.1 220.7 
1978 208.0 236.0 
1979 226.0 248.7 
Source: Hansen, B and Radwan, S Employment Opportunities and Equity in 
Egypt, International Labour office, Geneva, 1982 p. 35 
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Table (74) 
Wage and Salary Structure by Law 61,1971 and Law 48,1978 
Law 61,1971 Law 48,1978 
Grade Miniminn-Maximum Grade Minimilm-Maximilm 
EE EE 
Excellent 2000 Excellent 2100 
High 1400-1800 High 1500-2040 
1 1200-1800 Executive 1320-1920 
2 876-1440 First 960-1680 
3 684-1440 
4 540-1440 Second 660-1500 
5 420'-ý66 
6 330-780 Third 360-1200 
7 240-780 
8' 180-360 Fourth 240-900 
9 162-360 Fifth 216-720 
10 144-360 Sixth, 192-5,40 
Percentage change (1971-78) 
Top grade 5% 
Lowest grade 33.3% 
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Table (75) 







Covariates 0.880 0.049 
Earnings 0.880 0.049 
Main Effects 2.291 0.258 
Occupation 0.814 0.166 
Education 0.449 0.573 
Marital status 0.017 0.782 
Hometown 0.403 0.409 
Explained 4.143 0.036 
Residual 42.870 
Total 47.014 - 
Table (76) 
Whether Workers have ever thought of Leavingýby Earnings 
Earnings EE . -60 
61-80 81-100 -101+ Total 













Total 00 71 100 42 100 20-100 201 
-100 
Note x' = 7.521 p /-. 10 
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Table (77) 
Reasons of Planning to Leave the Company by Age 
Age -25 26-35 36-45 46+ Total 
Reasons N N N N N 
Retirement age 0 0 19 27.1 29 42.6 30 69.8 78 38.8 
Getting better job 8 40 21 30 8 11.8 2 4.7 39 19.4 
Going to work in an 
Arab Country 2 10 9 12.9 9 13.2 0 0 20 10 
Having a private work 1 5 5 7.1 7 10.3 9 20.8 -22 10.9 
To serve for a period 
enough to get pension 1 5 16 22.9 15 22.1 2 4.7 34 16.9 
Going for obligatory 




0 0 0 0 0 0 8 4 
Total 2 0 100 
1 




Note x' = 127.938 
Table (78) 
P 1-01 
The Effects of some Variables on Workers Intent to leave if they find 
Better Jobs 





Covariates 1.061 0.027 
Earnings 1.061 0.027 
Main Effects 4.367 0.011 
Occupation 0.099 '0.793 
Education 2.146 0.020 
Marital Status 0.911 0.040 
Hometown 0.209 0.614 
Explained 8.310 0.000 
Residual 40.744 
Total 49 1 054 
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Table (79) 
Workers' Intent to Leave if they find Better Job by Earnings 
Earnings -60 61-80 81-100 101+ Total 













Total 68- 100 71 100 42 100 20 100 201 100 
Note x2 = 17.521 
Table (80) 
Workers' Intent to Leave if they find Better Job by Education 
Education Illiterate Primary Preparatory Secondary Total 













Total 128 100 28 100 23 100 22 100 201 100 
Note x' = 22.344 01 
Table (81) 
Workers' Intent to leave if they find better Job by Marital Status 
Marital Status Single Married Total 









Total 27 100 174 100 201 100 
Note Corrected x2 = 10.991 P/-. Ol 
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Table (82) 
Why Married Workers do not agree to Let Wife Work by Age 
Age -30 31- 40 41-ý50 51+ Total 
N N N N N 
Wife work 2 7.7 3 3.9 0 0 0 0 5 2.9 
Agree to let wife 
work 6 23.1 4 5.3 5 10.0 2 9.1 17 9.8 
Reasons of disagreement 
to let wife work 
Against our custom 11 42.3 33 43.4 23 46.0 3 13.6 -70 "40.2 
To look after the 
family 7 26.9 35 46.1 17 34.0 4 18.2 63 36.2 
Old wife 0 0 1 1.3 5 10.0 13 59.1 19 10.9 
26 100 76 100 50 100 22 100 174 100 
Note x' = 76.026 
Table (83) 
P 4.. 01 
The Effects of Some Variables on Having a Second Job 
Source of variation Sum of Squares Significance of F 
Covariates 2.957 0.000 
Earnings 2.957 0.000 
Main effects 2.534 0.219 
Occupation. 0.917 0.143 
Education 1.148 0.182 
Marital Status 0.459- 0.163 






Workers' Earnings from the Second Job by Education 
Level of Education Mean Std., Dev. N 
Illiterate 38.91 19.97 55 
Primary 52.06 26.81 17 
Preparatory 40.0 18.03 9 
Secondary 58.89 18.33 9 
All 43.50 21.97 90 
Table (85) 
The Effects of some Variables on Workers' Interest in Having a Second Job 
Source of variation Sum of Squares Significance of F 
Covariates 3.369 0.000 
Earnings 3.369 0.000 
Main effects 5.059 0.002 
Education 0.186 0.811 
occupation* 2.359 0.003 
Marital status 0.902 0.032 
Hometown 0.973 0.084 





Table (86) , 
Whether Workers are Interested in Having a Second Job by Earnings 
Earnings -60 61-80 81-100 101+ Total 
Second job N N N, N N 
Have a second 
job 36 52.9 36 50.7 15 35.7 3 15.0 90 44.8 
Interested'in- 
having a 
second job 16 23.6 15 21.1 7 16.7 4' '' 20.0 42 '20.9 





71 100 42 100 
-1 
20 100 201 
-- 
1007 
Note x' = 17.632 
Table (87) 
PL.. Ol 
Whether Workers are Intersted in Having a Second Job by Occupation 
occupation Auxilliary Machine Maintenance Total Workers Operators Workers 
Second job N% N% N N% 
Have a second 
job 17 50.0 46 39.3 27 54.0 90 44.8 
Interested in 
having a 
second job 7 20.6 19 16.2 16 32.0 42 20.9 









Note x' = 15.849 Pl-. OI 
295 
Table (88) 
Whether Workers are Interested in Having a Second Job by Hometown 
Hometown Village Town Cairo Total 











Total 75 100 8 100 118 100 201 100 
Note x' = 5.943 PL. 10 
Table (89) 
Workers Hometown by Age 
Age, -25 26-35 36-45 ý46+_ _Total_ 



















Total 20 100 70 100 68 100 47 100 201 100 
Note :e= 16.472 P 1-05 
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Table . (90) 
Type of Second Job which Workers would like to Have 
Occupation Auxiliary Machine Maintenance 
Workers operators Workers 
Total 
Job N N N % N 
Similar job in a private 1 2.9 3 2.5 11 22.0 is 7.5 
company 
Job demanding less effort 4 11.8 14 12 4 8.0 22 10.9 
Private work 2 5.9 2 1.7 1 2.0 5 2.5 
Workers have a second job, 27 79.4 98 83.8 34 68.0 159 79.1 
or are not interested 
Total 34 100 117 100 50 100 
1 
201 100) 
Note x' = 22.390 
I 
Table (9 1) 
p L. O1 
Workers Expectations of Getting a Second Job 
occupation Auxiliary Machine Maintenance Total Workers Operators Workers 
Expect to have N% N% N% N% 
Yes 00 5 4.3 9 is 14 7.0 
No 7 20.6 14' 12'. 0 7 14 28 13.9 
Have a second job or 
not interested 27 79.4 98 83.7 34 68 . 159 79.1 
Total 34 100 117 100 So 100 201 100' 











,. _. , 7 30/9 1/10 31/12 
Part 1: To be filled in by the 
supervisory staff: 
1. Amount of work 30 
2. Quality of work 20 
3. Co-operation 10 
4. Behaviour 
75 
Part 2: To be filled in by the 
Personnel department: 
1. Time-keeping 10 








This form is for six month, and a typical form is used for the other six 
months of the year. 
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Form (2) 
The bases of Filling the Second Part in the Appraisal Form 
1. Half point is subtracted for each day of absence, or turning up late, 
for the first five days. A point is subtracted for each day after that. 
2. ' A worker who is suspended for more than fifteen days loses fifteen points. 
3. Other incidents for which a worker does not get pay for one or more days, 
a point is subtracted for each day. 
Form (3) 
Typical Letter to Inform a Worker that his Level in Appraisal is Poor 
mr 
File No. 
According to Law 48,1978, we inform you that your Level in performance 
appraisal for the period from 1/7/19 to 30/6/19 is 'poor'. The reason is 
that 
you can complain within twenty days to the complaints committee. 




The Questionnaires in English 
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I am interested in your ideas about your Job and some of the company 
policies but first, I would like to ask you some questions about yourself. 
1. How old are you? 
2(a) How many years of regular education did you have? 
2(b) What type of leaving certificate do you have? 
- Primary - Secondary 
- Preparatory . General 
. General . Technical 
. Technical - Other (specify) 
3(a) What is your present job? 
4. How long have you worked for this company? 
5(a) Have you worked in any other company before you came here? 
! -- Ye s - No 
5(b) If yes, how many years have you worked in other company(s)? 
5(c) What was this company(s)? 
- Company Type of industry - No of jobs 
6(a) Have you worked in any Arab country(s) before you came here? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
6(b) How many years have you worked in Arab country(s)? 
6(c) What was this country(s)? 
6 (d) Have you worked in any Arab country after you came here? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
6(e) How many years have you worked in Arab country(s)? 
6(f) What was this country(s)? 
7(a) How much is your average income in your present job? 
7(b) Could you tell me the breakdown of your average income? 
- Basic wage 
- Incentives 




Nature of work'payment 
Other (specify) 





9(a) How many dependent children do you have? 
9(b) How many other'dependents, are you responsible for? 
10(a) Does your wife, go out to work? 
- Yes - No - Not applicable 
If yes, 
10(b) How much does she earn? 
If no, 
10(c) If your wife could get a job, would you let her go out to work? 
- Yes - No 
I 10(d Why or why not? 
11. Where were you brought up? 
- Village - Town Cairo 
12(a) Where are you living now? 
- Company residence 
- Public residence 
- Rented house from a private owner 
- Your own house 
If a rented house, 
12(b) How much rent do you pay? 
12(c) Is your family living with you now? 
- Yes - No - Not applicable 
If no, 
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12(d) Where is your family living? 
12(e) How far is your family's residence from your residence? 
12(f) How often do you visit them? 
12(g) How much money do you send to them every month/two weeks? 
13(a) Do you visit the place where you were brought up? 
Yes No Not Applicable 
If yes, 
13(b) How often? 
13(c) How far is it from your residence? 
13(d) whom do you visit there? 
I 
Now I would like to know your opinion about some points related'to your job. 
1. rirst of all, why did you decide to come to work for this company? 
- Good money 
- Location 
- Good company to work for 
- Because friends or relatives work here 
- other (specify) 
2. Below are two statements, for each one I would like to know if you agree 
or disagree and why? 
2(a) Most workers in this company work only for money. 
- Agree - Disagree 
If disagree, why? 
2(b) Workers are willing to work hard on their jobs to avoid'punishment. 
- Agree Disagree 
If disagree, Why? 
3.1 would like to ask you about the characteristics of your Job. 
3(a) Please indicate the amount of each characterisitc which is true of your 
current job? 
Characterisitcs High Moderate Low 
- Good income 
- Friendly and helpful fellow workers 
- Good chances for promotion 
- Secure future in the job 
- Good fringe benefits 
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- Respect and fair treatment from 
management 
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3(b) Would you rank three characteristics which are the most important to you? 
- Good income 
- Friendly and helpful workers 
- Good chances for promotion 
- Secure future in the job 
- Good fringe benefits 
- Respect and fair treatment from management 
4(a) Do you ever think about your job after work? 
- Yes No 
If yes, 
4(b) What things do You'think about? 
5(a) Is there any Shop-floor job in the company which you would rather do than your own? 
Yes No DK 
If yes, 
5(b) Which job is that? 
5(c) Why would you rather do that job than your own? 
6. If there is one thing about your job here you could change, what would it be? 
7(a) Have you ever thought of leaving your present job? 
- Yes No - Refused 
7(b) If yes, why? 
7(c) Have you done anything about it? 
- Yes - No - Refused 
If yes, 
7(d) What have you done? 
8(a) If you have a free choice, how long do you expect to be working for 
this company? 
8(b) Why is that? 
9(a) If you could get a job of your choice in another company, is there any 
thing(s) that stops you from doing this? 
- Yes - No - DK 
If yes, 
9 (b) What is this thing (s) ? 
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Now I would like to ask you about your incentive scheme in the company. 
1. How far do you feel you understand the incentive scheme in your job? 
- Very well - Fairly - Not at all 
If affirmative, ask 2 and go to 5 
If no, go to 3. 
2(a) What are the factors taken into account to calculate your incentives? 
2(b) In your opinion, are there any other factors which should be taken into 
account to calculate your incentives?, 
- Yes No DK 
If yes, 
2(c) What are these factors? 
3(a) Is it, important for you to understand how, your incentives are calculated? 
- Very important Important Unimportant - DK 
If unimportant, 
3 (b) Ay do you say, that?. 
4 (a) Have you made any attempt to understand the incentive scheme in your Job? 
Yes No 
If,, yes, 
4(b) What happened? 
5(a) Do you think that under the work standards in your Job to earn an 
incentive you have to work 
- Too hard 
- About right 
- Not very hard 
- DK 
- Not applicable 
5(b) Why do you say that? 
, 30.7 






if never go to 6(f) 
If regularly or occasionally or rarely, ask 6(b), 6(c), 6(d) and 6(e) 
and go to 7. 
6(b) When was the last change in the standards in your job? 
6(c) Why was that change made? 
6(d) In your opinion, was that change fair or unfair? 
- Fair - Unfair - DK 
6(e) Why do you say that? 
6(f) Do you think the standards in your job are fair or unfair? 
- Fair - Unfair - DK 
6 (g) If unfair, why? 





- Not applicable 
B(a) "In this company how much you earn depends on how hard you work" Do you 
agree or disagree with this statement? 
- Agree - Disagree 
MY If disagree, why? 
9. How do you describe the relationship between a worker's effort and his 
output in your job? Would you say they are 
3013' 
- Completely related 
- Fairly related 
- Unrelated 
- DK 
10(a) Do you think the amount of money paid as an incentive is sufficient to 
encourage you to work harder? Would you say this amount is 
- Too much The right amount - Too little - DK 
10(b) About how much would be sufficient? 
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We have talked about your job and the incentives. Now I would like to ask 
you about promotion. 




1(b) How many times have you been promoted? 
I(c) could you tell me what jobs were you promoted to? 
1(d) Did you get more money as a result of this promotion? 
- Yes - No 
If no, 
1(e) What, do you think, is the reason? 
2(a) How would you rate your chances of being promoted? 
- Good - Average - Poor - Hopeless - DK 
If poor, or hopeless 
2(b) What do you think is stopping you from being promoted? 
- Lack of education 
- Lack of training 
- No openings for promotion exist 
- Other (specify) 
3(a) How much are you interested in being promoted? 
- Very much - Not much - Not at all 
3(b) If not at all or not much, why? 
4(a) How, do you think, workers are identified for promotion in this company? 
4(b) which factor is the most important? 
5(a) Would you say chances of promotion in your job compared with other 
shop-floor jobs are 
- Better than most 
- The same as most 
- Worse than most 
If worse, 
5(b) What should management do about it? 
6(a) In five years timep do you expect to be doing the same job? 
- Yes - No - DK 
6(b) Why or why not? 
7(a) Does the company have a written policy of workers promotion? 
- Yes - No DK 
7(b) What does it consist of? 
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Now I would like to ask you some questions about workers performance appraisal 
in this company? 
1. How many times are you appraised every year? 
2(a) Who appraises your performance? 
- My supervisor 
- Department manager 
- Personnel Department staff 
- other (specify) 
- DK 
if supervisor is not mentioned, 
2(b) What do you think is the role of your supervisor in this process? 
3. What, do you think, is the point of the appraisal system in this company? 
4(a)'Do you know what factors are used in appraising your performance? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
4(b) What are these factors? 
5(a) In your opinion, are there any other factors which should be used in 
workers' appraisal? 
- Yes - No - DK 
If yes, 
5(b) What are these factors? 
6. Are the results of your formal appraisal made known to you? 
- Usually - Sometimes Rarely - Never 
if never, ask 7 and go to 9 
If usually or sometimes or rarely, ask 8 
7(a) In your opinion, which is betterr to make the results of workers 
appraisal open or secret? 
- Open - Secret - DK 
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7(b) Why do you say that? 
8(a) Do workers have the right to discuss their appraisal? 
- Usually - Sometimes - Rarely_ - Never 
If usually, sometimes or rarely 
8(b) With whom? 
8(c) Is it worth it? 
9(a) Do you think the appraisal system in this company is 
- Fair - Unfair - DK 
if unfair, 
9 (b) Why? 
I 
10. Generally speaking, would you say workers formal appraisal in this 
company is 
- Important - Unimportant - DK 
If unimportant, 
Why? 
I 1', - -11 1.1 
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We have talked about quite a number of things. Now I would like to ask 
you about discipline in this company. 
1(a) What do you think about discipline in this company? 
Would you say it is 
- Too strict - About right - Easy going - DK 
1(b) Have you ever been disciplined in this company? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
1(c) What happened in the last case? 
J(d) Were you satisfied with the way of dealing with this case? 
- Yes - No 
1(e) If no, why? -1 
1(f) Who was involved in this case? 
2(a) Do management praise a worker who has done particularly good work? 
- Usually - Sometimes - Rarely - Never DK 
If usually, sometimes or rarely 
2(b) How is a worker praised? 
- orally 
- Formal recognition in the company bulletin 
- Letter of commendation 
- other (specify) 
If never, 
2(c) Why is that? 
2(d) Have you ever been praised for doing particularly good work? 
--Yes - No 
If yes, 
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2 (e) What happened? 
3 (a) Are you told when you make a mistake in your job? ' 
-Usually sometimes rarely Never 
if usually, sometimes or rarely. 
3 (b) Who tells you? 
3 (c) How are you told? 
4 (a) Do you know the offences for'which you can be disciplined in. this company? 
4 (b) Could you give me some examples? 
4 (c) How do you know about these, offences? ' 
5(a) Do you know the penaltyýof each offence inýthis company? 
Yes No 
if yes, 
5(b) Could you give me some examples? 
5(c) How do you know about these penalties? 
6(a) From your past experience, what is the best thing to do when you feel 
that you have been treated unjustly in the company? Would you 
Keep your problem to yourself 
-Talk to a fellow worker- ab8ut- the, problem- that -bothers you 
Complain to your. supervisor 
Complain tolthe next higher level of management 
other (specify) 
6(b) If the, worker does not complain, why? 
7 (a) Do you know the formal procedures by which a worker can complain when he feels 
that he has been treated unjustly? 
- Yes No 
If yes, 
7(b) Could you tell me these procedures? 
7(c) How do you know about them? 
B(a) Do you think these procedures provide adequate protection for workers? 
- Yes - No - DK 
8(b) Why or why not? 
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Now I would like to ask you some questions about training. * 
l(a) When you first took up this job, who trained you? 
l(b) In what way? 
2(a) Aside from on-the-job training, have you ever received off-the-job 
training since you came here? 
Yes - No 
If yes, 
2(b) What off-the-job training have you received? 
Name of the programme Period Contents 
3. Why did you undertake off-the-job training? 
4(a) How useful has the training been to your work? 
- very useful 
if useful, 
4(b) In what way? 
If not useful 
-Useful - Not useful - Not applicable - DK 
4(c) Why is that? 




5(b) In what way? 
*This section was dropped after the pilot study. 
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6(a) Do you think you would benefit from further training? 
- Yes - No - 
DK 
6(b) What kind of training? 
6(c) Do you think you will be able to obtain this training? 
- Certainly - Probably - Unlikely - 
DK 
6(d) why do you say that? 
7. Who do you think selects workers for training? 
- Supervisor 
- Department manager 
- Training department 
- other (specify) 




Workers' past training 
Recommendations by supervisors 
Good relations with management 
- Other (specify) 
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Finally, I would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. 
l(a) Do you have any other job outside this company? 
- Yes - No - Refused 
If no, go to 
If yes, 
l(b) What is it? 
1(c) Could you tell me how much do you earn from it? 
2(a) Would you like the opportunity of having a second job? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
2(b) What would you like to do? 
2(c) Is there any opportuAity to get this job? 
- Yes - No - DK 
Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
Thank you for y ur help 
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I am interested, in your ideas about workers' needs, and some of the 
company policies related to workers but first, I would like to ask you 
some questions about yourself. 
1. How old are You? 
2(a) How many years of regular education did you have? 




. Technical - Industrial - Co=ercial - Agriculture 
- Secondary 
. General 





3(a) What is your present job? 
- Foreman - Supervisor 
- Department Manager - Plant Manager 
- other (specify) 
3(b) What is the grade of your present Job? 
3(c) How many jobs have you had before in this company? 
3(d) What kind of jobs have you had? 
3(e) Are you supervising: 
- Machine Operators - Maintenance Workers - Both 
3(f) In which plant do you work now? 




4. How long have you worked for this company? 
5(a) Have you worked in any other company(s) before you came here? 
Yes No 
If Yes, 
5(b) How many years have you worked in other company(s)? 
5 (c) What was this company (s) ? 
I Company 
Type of industry No of jobs 
6(a) Have you worked in any Arab country(s) before you came here? 
Yes No 
If yes, 
6(b) How many years have you worked in Arab country(s)? 
6(c) What was this country(s)? 
6(d) Have you worked in any Arab country after you came here? 
Yes No 
If yes, 
6(e) How many years have you worked in Arab country(s)? 
6(f) What was this country(s)? 
7(a) How much is your average earnings after deductions every month in your 
present job? 
7(b) Could you tell me the breakdown of your average earnings? 
- Basic wage or salary 
- Incentives 
- Inflation payment 
- Nature of work payment 
- Other (specify) 
8. Are you - 
- Single - Married - Widowed - Divorced 
9(a) How many dependent children do you have? 
9(b) How many other dependents are you responsible for? 
10(a) Does your wife go out to work? 
- Yes - No - Not applicable 
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If yes, 
10(b) How much does she earn? 
If no, 
10(c) If your wife could get a job, would you let her go out to work? 
- Yes - No 
10(d) Why or Why not? 
11 Where were you brought up? 
- Village - Town Cairo 
12(a) Where aie"you living now? 
- Company residence 
- Public residence 
- Rented house from a private owner 
- Your own house 
If a rented house, 
12(b) How much rent do you pay? 
12(c) Is your-family living. with you now? 
- Yes No Not applicable 
If no, 
12(d) Where is, your family living? 
12(e) How far is your family's residence from your residence? 
12(f) How often do you visit them? 
12(g) How much money do you send to them every month? 
13(a) Do you'visit the place where you were brought up? 
Yes' No 
If yes, 
13(b) How often? 
13(c) How far is it from your residence? 
13(d) Whoih do you visit there? 
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First of all, I, would like to ask you some questions about workers' needs. 
1. Below are some statements, for each statement I would like to know if 
you agree or disagree and why? 
1(a) Most. workers in this company work only for money. 
- Agree - Disagree 
If disagree, why? 
1(b) A supervisor's-basic task is to ensure co-operation and make workers 
feel that they are useful and important to the company. ' 
- Agree - Disagree 
If disagree, why? 
1(c) If tasks are simple and workers are closely supervised they produce 
up to the standard. 
- Agree - Disagree 
If disagree, why? 
J(d) Workers are willing to work hard on theirjobs to avoid punishment. 
- Agree - Disagree 
If disagree, why? 
2.1 would like to ask you about workers' jobs characteristics. 
2(a) Please indicate the amount which you think is true of workers' 
jobs now in your section/department? 
Characeteristics High Moderate Low 
Good income 
- Friendly and helpful 
fellow workers 
Good chances for promotion 
Secure future in the job 
- Good fringe benefits 
Respect and fair treatment 
from management 
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2(b) Would you rank three characteristics which seem to you the most 
important to the workers in your section/department? 
- Good income 
- Friendly and helpful fellow workers 
Good chances for promotion 
Secure future in the job 
Good fringe Benefits 
Respect and fair treatment from management 
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Now I would like to, -ask you about the incentive schemes for workers 
in your section/department. 
1. How far, do you think, the workers-in your'section/department understand 
the incentive schemes in their jobs? 
Very well Fairly - Not at all -DK 
2(a) What are the factors taken into account to calculate workers' incentives 
in your section/department? 
2(b) In your opinion, are there any other factors which should be taken 
into account to calculate wokers' incentives in your section/department? 
Yes No DK 
If yes, 
2(c) What are these factors? 
3(a) Inyour opinion, is it important for workers in your section/department 
to understand how their incentives are calculated? 
- very important - Important - Unimportant - DK 
If unimportant, 
3(b) Why do you'say that? 
4(a) Have you made any attempt to explain the incentive scheme to the 
workers in your section/department? 
- Yes No 
If Yes, 
4(b) Why was that? 
4(c) What happened? 
If no, 
4(d) Why is that? 
5(a) Do you think workers who want to earn an incentive under the work 
standards used now in your section/department have to work 
- Too hard - About right - Not very hard 
- DK - Not applicable 
5 (b) Why do you say that? 
6(a) How often are the standards examined in your section/department? 
- Regularly - occasionally Rarely - Never - DK 
If never, go to 6(f) 
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If regularly or occasionally or rarely, ask 6 (b) , 6. (c) ,6 (d) , 6, (e) , 
and go to 7. 
6(b) When was the last change in the standards in your section/department? 
6(c) Why was that? 
6(d) In your opinion, was that change fair? 
- Yes - No - DK 
6(e) Why do you say that? 
6(f) Do you think work standards in your section/department are fair or 
unfair? 
- Fair - Unfair - DK 
If unfair, why? 
7. Do you think that the present rate for a unit of production in your 
section/department is 
- Excellent 
- Fairly good 
- Rather poor 
- DK 
- Not applicable 
8(a) "In this company how much a worker earns depends on how hard he works". 
Do you agree or disagree with this statement? 
- Agree - Disagree - DK 
8(b) If disagree, why? 
9. How do you describe the relationship between a worker's effort and his 
output in your section/department? Would you say they are 
- Completely related 
- Fairly related 
- Unrelated 
- DK 
- Not applicable 
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10(a) Do you think the amount of money paid as an incentive is sufficient 
to encourage the workers in your section/department to work harder? 
Would you say this amount is 
- Too much 
- The right amount 
- Too little 
- DK 
10(b) How much would be sufficient? 
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Now I would like to ask you about workers' promotion in your section/department. 







If poor or hopeless, 
1(b) What do you think is stopping workers from being promoted? 
- Lack of education 
- Lack of training 
- No opening for promotion exists 
- Other (specify) 
2(a) How much do you think, are workers in your section/department interested 
in promotion? 
- Very much - Not much - Not at all - DK 
if not much or not at all, 
2 (b) Why do you say that? 
3(a) How are workers identified for promotion in your section/department? 
3(b) Which factor is the most important? 
4(a) Would you say chances of promotion for workers in your section/ 
department compared with other sections/departments are 
- Better than most 
- The same as most 
- Worse than most 
If worse, 
4(b) What have management done about it? 
5(a) Does the company have a written policy of workers promotion? 
- Yes - No - DK 
If yes, 
5(b) What does it consist of? 
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Now I would like to ask you some questions about workers performance 
appraisal in your section/department. 
1. What is the purpose of workers formal appraisal in this company? 
2(a) How many times is workers appraisal performed for the workers 
in your section/department every-year? 
2(b) In your opinion, how many times should it be performed every year? 
3(a) Who performs the appraisal for the workers in your section/department? 
If not the interviewee, 
3(b) What is your role in this process? 
4. What factors are used in appraising the workers in your section/department? 
5(a) In your opiniont are there any other factors which should be used in 
appraising the workers in your section/department? 
- Yes No DK 
If yes, 
50ý) What are these factors? 
6. Are the results of the appraisal made known to the workers in your 
section/department? 
Usually - Sometimes -, Rarely Never 
If never, ask 7-and go to 9. 
If usually, or sometimes or rarely ask B. 
7 (a) In your opinion which is better, to make the results of 
workers 
appraisal open of secret? 
- open - secret - 
DK 
7 (b) Why do you say that? 
8 (a) Do workers have the right to discuss their appraisal? 
- Usually - sometimes - rarely 
- never 
If usually, sometimes, or rarely: 
8(b) With whom? 
8(c) What is the purpose of this discussion? 
9(a) Do you think the appraisal system in this company is 
- Fair - Unfair- 
DK 
If unfair, 
9 (b) Why? 
10(a) Are there any written instructions on how to perform the appraising 
task in this company? 
- Yes - No - DK 
If yes, 
10 (b) Could you tell me what do you know about them? 





11(b) Was the programme carried out inside or outside the company? 
- Inside - Outside 
11(c) How long did it last? 
11 (d) Could you tell me the contents of this programme? 
12 (a) Do you write down any notes to be used in appraising the workers 
in your section/department? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
12(b) What are the contents of these notes? 
12(c) Where are they kept? 
13(a) Generally speaking, would you say workers formal appraisal in this 
company is 




13 (b) Why? 
We have talked about quite a number of things. Now I would like to ask 
you about workers-discipline in this company. 
1., What. do, you think,, -is the primary function of the disciplinary system 
in this company? 
2(a) Would you say that discipline is only a sanction of last resort? 
Yes No DK 
2(b) Why or why not? 
3. What do you think about discipline in, this company? 
would you say it is 
- Too, strict - About Right - Easy going DK 






- DK/No Response,. 
If usually, sometimes or rarely, 
4(b) How is he praised? 
Orally 
Formal recognition in the company bulletin 
Other (specify) 
If never, 
4(c) Why is that? 









If usually or sometimes or rarely. 
5(b) Who reprimands a worker? 
5(c) How is a worker reprimanded? 
If never, 
5(d) Why is that? 
6(a) Have you ever been involved in taking a disciplinary action against 
any of your workers? 
Yes No 
If yes, ask 6(b) 
If'no, ask 6(c) 
6(b) Could you tell me what happened in the last case? 
6(c) Who was involved? 
7(a) Do you know the formal procedures by which a worker can complain when 
he feels that he has been treated unjustly? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
7(b) Could you tell me what do you know about these procedures? 
7(c) In your opinion, do these procedures provide adequate protection for 
workers? 
- Yes - No - DK 
7(d) Why do you say that? 
8(a) Have you received any training on how to carry out disciplinary actions? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
8(b) Was this training carried out inside or outside the company? 
- Inside - Outside 
8(c) How long did it last? 
B(d) Could you tell me the contents of this programme? 
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Finally, I would like'toask you some questions'about the training of the 
workers in your section/department. 
1(a) When a worker first takes up his job in your section/department, who 
trains him? 
1(b) In what way? 
2(a) Do you select workers in your section/department for off-the-job training? 
- Yes No 
If yes, ask 2(b), 2(c), and go to 3 
If no, ask 2 (d) ,2 (e) ,2 (f) and 2 (g) 
2(b) How do you select them? 
2(c) What factor is the most important? 
2(d) Who does? 
2(e) Are you involved in this process? 
- Yes No 
If yes, 
2(f) How? 
If no, ' 
2(g) Why is that? 
3(a) How useful is off-the-job training to workers in your section/department? 
- Very useful Useful Not Useful - Not applicable 
- DK 
If very useful, or useful 
3(b) In what way? 
If not useful-i 
3(c) Why is that? 
4(a) In your section/department, have workers been rewarded for undertaking 
the training? 
- Yes No 
If yes, 
4(b) In what way? 
This section was dropped after the pilot study. 
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5(a) Do you think, workers in your section/department would., benefit, from 
further training? 
- Yes No DK 
If yes, 
5(b) What kind of training? 
5(c) Do you have a plan for giving them this training? 
- Yes -ýNo 
If yes, 
5(d) Can I have a copy of this plan? 
6(a) Do you think they will be able to obtain this training? 
- Certainly - Probably- Unlikely DK 
6(b) Why do you say that? 
7(a) Have you yourself ever received off-the-job training since you 
came here? 
- Yes - No 
If yes, 
7(b) What off-the-job training have you received? 
Name of the progr Period Contents 
7(c) How useful has the training been to your work? 
- Very useful - Useful Not useful Not applicable 
7(d) If useful, in what-way? 
7(e) If not useful, why is that? 
Is there anything else you would like to tell me? 
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